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Abstract
This thesis addresses two main gaps within social science research: the relative 
neglect of the household within general labour market theories and the relative 
neglect of the impact of life course changes in approaches to female labour force 
participation. In empirical terms, nowhere is the later gap more clear than the 
current research on female employment in the Middle East.
Therefore, this thesis aims to identifiy changing female employment patterns in 
Jordan with particular reference to young single urban women. Unlike previous 
generations, women currently marry at a later age, have relatively high education 
levels and have access to expanding employment opportunities. The result is that 
women are experiencing a new life course trajectory: single employed adulthood. 
Given that Jordanian society has traditionally been based on rigid gender and 
generation hierarchies, the study explores the implications of the new trends at two 
main and inter-related levels: the workplace and the household. The research 
methodology utilises both quantitative and qualitative tools and consists of an 
employer survey of 36 private sector institutions, a questionnaire survey of 302 
households, and a sub-sample of 40 semi-structured interviews with young 
women.
At the workplace level it explores the bases of gender differentiated recruitment 
and occupational segregation and how this structures young women's work 
opportunities. At the household level the investigation assesses the characteristics 
that are likely to influence young female labour supply and considers inter- 
generational patterns of household income management. Synthesising these 
perspectives, the research then goes on to explore the ways in which normative 
patriarchal relations are responding to young women's prolonged single adulthood 
as well as young women's perceptions of their work. One of the main findings of 
the research is that single adulthood may have expanded opportunities and the 
aspirational horizon for some young women but it had not brought about a 
significant redistribution of either power relations or gender divisions in society at 
large.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
This study explores the disproportionally high workforce participation of young 
unmarried women1 in Amman, Jordan, a group effectively experiencing a new life 
course2 trajectory of single employed adulthood and who have as yet received 
little attention in the debates on women's work in developing countries. Indeed, 
although there is a considerable amount of research on women's positions in the 
labour market and the impact of work on their lives and gender division of labour 
(see for example, Barrett, 1980; Blumberg, 1991a; Dex, 1985; Scott, 1994; 
Stichter, 1990; Walby, 1988a), the lack of attention to life course changes has 
meant that most these analyses have considered female employment from the 
generalised stereotype of married women with young children. Studies on 
women's employment which have focused upon the reproductive roles3 of married 
women have in turn tended to emphasise the negative influence these have on their 
employment opportunities. Yet, in light of empirical evidence from both 
industrialised and developing countries which suggest that childbearing absorbs 
fewer and fewer years of an average woman's life and that there is considerably 
more flexibility in the timing of these years than in the past (Chant and Mcllwaine, 
1995a: 164-6; Hanson and Pratt, 1993:28), greater attention has been paid more 
recently to the impact of life course changes on women's lives (see Allatt et al. 
1987; Katz and Monk, 1993). This increased attention has also arisen as a 
challenge to tendencies that universalised women's experiences both in terms of 
space and time and which have portrayed them in the context of a western 
framework of the nuclear family with a male breadwinner (H.Standing, 1991:6). 
Research addressing the life course attempts to go beyond the notion that women 
represent a homogeneous group. The life course approach also examines women's 
lives as:
...extended so that they are not only mothers, wives and workers 
but also in relation to other generations - as daughters, 
grandmothers and so on - and in domains outside the family and 
workplace, their wider community of friends as well as in 
relation to various social and political institutions, which will 
vary in significance over the life course (Katz and Monk,
1993:20).
One of the rationales for looking at the intersections between the life course and 
women's work is because women seem to display distinct patterns of age-related
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economic activity, which are not apparent among men (Stichter, 1990:23-4; 
Momsen, 1993:124). Yet, despite acknowledgment of the fact that women's work 
is contingent upon their age (not to mention other factors such as race, religion and 
class), the life course stage of single employed adulthood has neither been 
sufficiently recognised nor adequately researched.
In placing the concerns of this study within the context of the conceptual 
interrelationships between gender, the life course and employment, the main 
argument is that young working women in Amman are experiencing a new 'niche' 
in the life course, a stage which their predecessors rarely passed through. In this 
context we need to know how this came about;4 the extent to which it is 
accommodated within existing personal and familial norms and expectations; the 
implications employment as single adults have for women's lives and identities, 
and the extent to which increasing levels of employment are related to rising levels 
of education and postponement of marriage. Additional questions include whether 
employment among young women will continue into their later, married and 
childbearing years, or whether the employment patterns of young women are 
primarily determined by employers' needs for a cheap, unskilled and temporary 
workforce. In the present study, these questions are broached by looking at 
women's employment in a holistic manner (comprising economic, social and 
ideological dimensions) both in the workplace itself, and in the arena of the 
household.
Given the growth in young women's employment in Amman, the remainder of this 
chapter situates the concerns of the study within recent trends in female 
employment in developing countries in general and in the Middle East more 
specifically (more detailed analysis of theories relating to the study are dealt with 
in Chapter Two). The chapter goes on to provide a brief outline of the research 
methodology utilised, the circumstances of conducting the field research and 
concludes with an explanation of the organisation of the thesis.
1.1 Recent Trends in Female Employment in Developing Countries
In the past two decades there has been a steady upward trend in the participation of 
women in the labour force in developing countries (Bruce and Dwyer, 1988:4; 
Moore, 1988:97; Stichter, 1990:1). The context of this increase includes the inter­
related factors of recession, debt crises and economic globalisation.5 The roots of 
globalisation lie in the global economic recession in the early 1980s, where many 
developing countries became entrapped in debt repayment. According to 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations debt repayment should be
11
approached through increasing the production of tradables as opposed to non- 
tradables. Competitiveness among countries with large debt became so significant 
that labour market regulations have been eased in order to increase productivity 
(Standing, 1989:1078). This primarily meant the erosion of minimum wage and 
other labour benefits and securities. With the decreased role of the state and the 
increased role of the private sector women have been increasingly recruited in the 
labour force, especially in the export manufacturing sector. Concurrent with this 
increase, is what has come to be known in the literature as the 'feminisation' of the 
labour force (Joekes, 1987, Standing 1989).6
With the open economy and export-led industrialisation the 'family wage' in many 
developing countries is being replaced with the 'individual wage,' and conditions 
of the industrial workforce are increasingly informalised (Standing, 1989:1078). 
Dominant perceptions of women's cheaper labour power has been an important 
element within strategies to stimulate economic growth (ibid, 1989:1078).7 Other 
explanations for the rise in female employment in manufacturing industry are 
attributed to perceptions of women's docility, subservience and manual dexterity 
(Elson and Pearson, 1981:93), and as Susan Joekes (1995:3) has summed up:
In the contemporary era, no strong export performance in 
manufactures by any developing country has ever been secured 
without the reliance on female labour.
Within this context, there has been considerable documentation of the fact that 
rises in female employment have largely been concentrated among young, single 
women (see for example, Heyzer, 1986; Salaff, 1981; Kung; 1983; Wolf, 1992, 
1990b). It has been suggested that young women are preferred by employers 
because they are assumed to lack consciousness of their rights and labour 
regulations, are less likely to join labour unions or actions, and will accept lower 
wages than married women (Safa, 1990:77; Wolf, 1992).
The consequences of export-led industrialisation on women's employment have 
been largely viewed negatively, with evidence to suggest that working conditions 
in export-led industries are unsafe and insanitary, with long working hours, low 
wages and minimum long term job security (see for example, Elson and Pearson, 
1982; Eviota, 1992; Femandez-Kelly; Joekes, 1987). From a political standpoint it 
is argued that such firms involve the transfer of low skilled, unstable jobs to the 
Third World where perceptions of male authoritarianism over a submissive female 
labour are reinforced (Eviota, 1992:125). However, the extent to which 
manufacturing employment entrenches female subordination has been a matter of
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debate, for there are those who argue that increasing working opportunities for 
poor women (despite inferior positions in poorly paid jobs), helps them to improve 
other aspects of their lives (Kabeer, 1995; Lim, 1990; Wolf 1990a). For example, 
women workers' contribution to family income may lead to improved family well­
being, and increased personal status and decision making power within their 
households (Safa, 1995). Moreover, the extent to which women's inferior working 
conditions in manufacturing employment is unvaried has been brought into 
question. Writing on the Philippines, for example, Chant and McEwaine (1995b) 
demonstrate that women's working conditions significantly differ from one 
manufacturing firm to another, in terms of wages and benefits as well as job 
satisfaction among workers.
1.2 Recent Trends in Female Employment in the Middle East
Although many non-oil producing Middle Eastern countries, like other developing 
countries, have been undergoing structural adjustment programmes, this has not 
been accompanied by import substitution industrialisation, nor have they evolved 
into mainstream export manufacturing economies although, Egypt, Morocco and 
Tunisia are possibly exceptions.8 Jordan for example has only recently tried to 
adopt development strategies based on export-manufacturing and still is a long 
way from competing in the global market. Much of the economy is still 
maintained by government intervention that inadvertently reduces private 
(especially foreign) sector investment and most employment is concentrated in the 
public sector (World Bank, 1995:124; also Chapter Three). In terms of female 
employment, unlike other developing countries, the Middle East has not 
experienced the same upward trend as other developing regions (Moghadam, 
1995:2). In fact, it is widely accepted that female employment rates in the Middle 
East tend to be lower than most other regions in world (United Nations, 1991:83).9
Concerning Jordan, more specifically, female labour force participation has indeed 
been consistently low. The rate of growth has also been slow. In 1979 female 
labour force participation rates were 7.7% and although this had increased by 1991 
(13.4%) it is still low compared with other developing countries.10 However, 
currently, the rate of growth of female employment exceeds the rate of growth of 
male employment (see Al-Qudsi et al. 1993:3; see also Chapter Three). In 
addition, the current age structure of the female labour force is quite young, where 
the majority (68%) are below the age of 30 years. There is also evidence to 
suggest that increasing employment opportunities for women seem to be in the 
industrial sector (Abu Amra, 1994; World Bank, 1994c; see also Chapter Three). 
Therefore, the focus of this study, on young women workers, represents a group
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that has emerged relatively recently in significant numbers in the Jordanian labour 
market, a trend which is not too dissimilar from other developing countries, 
although relatively less obvious in quantitative terms.
Yet because Middle Eastern women have not been influenced by industrialisation, 
in the same manner as South East Asian countries for example, and did not 
experience a visible increase in the labour force, the region in general, and Jordan 
in particular, have tended to be ignored in the debates revolving around the 
impacts of employment on women's lives.11 The reasons that are commonly cited 
for the shortage of women workers in the Middle East are: conservative cultural 
and/or religious attitudes (see Memissi, 1975; Minces, 1982); early age at 
marriage and prolonged childbearing (see Azzam et al. 1985; Youssef, 1978), and 
lack of education and training (see Azzam et al. 1985; Doctor and Khoury, 1991; 
Moghadam 1993).
In addressing first, the matter of cultural and religious constraints, discussions on 
the social and economic position of Middle Eastern women have traditionally been 
analysed within the framework of Islam, the dominant religion in the area. This, 
unfortunately, has often involved misinformed conceptions that have 'sealed off 
Muslim women from the theoretical mainstream within the social sciences 
(Kandiyoti, 1995:l l) .12 However, and as Valentine Moghadam (1993:7) claims:
By examining changes over time and variations within societies 
and by comparing Muslim and non-Muslim gender patterns, 
one recognises that the status of women in Muslim societies is 
neither uniform, nor unchanging nor unique.
As for the second factor of age at marriage, there is evidence to suggest that this 
has been consistently rising.13 As for prolonged childbearing, some research 
suggest that women have an increased desire and ability to achieve lower family 
size (Nawar et al. 1995 on Egypt). Finally, in terms of education and training, 
growing levels of female education in the Middle East are increasingly becoming 
visible (see Al-Qudsi et al. 1993; Farrag, 1991; Fergues, 1995; Nawar et al. 1995, 
United Nations, 1995; see also Chapter Three).14
Within this framework, therefore, there is a need to re-address the reasons that lie 
behind the marginalisation of research on Middle Eastern women relative to others 
in the developing world. One of the aims of this study is to bring in the experience
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of Middle Eastern women in line with the global processes of recession and 
globalisation by demonstrating the increasing, as well as changing patterns, of 
female labour force participation.
1.3 Gender Employment and the Life Course: A Review of Literature
Conceptually, literature on women and employment has long since acknowledged 
the interdependencies of the household and the workplace arenas (see Beechey, 
1987, Hartmann, 1979; Walby, 1988a, 1988b; also Chapter Two). The importance 
of these interactions has been increasingly borne out empirically as well (see for 
example, Chant 1991a; Hanson and Pratt, 1995; Mcllwaine, 1993; Safa, 1995). 
Parallel to household - workplace linkages, there is also increasing recognition of 
the impact of life course trajectories on women's employment (see Katz and Monk, 
1993, Masini, 1991; Saraceno, 1991). However, within this field of inquiry, few 
studies have directly addressed the experiences of young working women.
By and large, studies that look at the workplace have highlighted the participation 
of young women (see for example, Safa, 1995 on the Caribbean; Elson and 
Pearson, 1981, Heyzer, 1986 on South East Asia). However, the general 
assumption, that employers' preferences for young single women determine their 
high participation, has resulted in little attention to household factors that influence 
labour force involvement (for exceptions, see Greenhalgh, 1988; Kung, 1983; 
Wolf, 1990a, 1991). Another reason for the exclusion of young single women is 
perhaps due to the fact that they are not perceived to be as involved in the gender 
assigned duties of reproduction as their older married counterparts (Chant and 
Mcllwaine, 1995a:20). Despite some exceptions, therefore, it is rare, for research 
on workforce participation among young women to explore the linkages between 
labour market factors and household level influences. The following will elucidate 
on this gap through a review of relevant literature that looks at both the demand 
and supply of female labour. It has to be noted, however, even though they will be 
discussed separately, labour demand and supply factors are significantly 
interrelated.
1.3.1 Demand for Female Labour
Analyses of labour demand for young women have suffered from two main 
limitations. The first is a sectoral limitation whereby most literature has looked at 
the participation of young women in labour intensive manufacturing (see Elson 
and Pearson, 1981; Femandez-Kelly, 1983; Heyzer and Kean, 1988; Humphrey, 
1984; Kung, 1983; Lim 1983; amongst others). This has resulted in the portrayal 
of young women workers as synonymous with 'factory girls'. A second limitation,
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and which in some respects is a by-product of the focus on manufacturing 
industry, is a regional bias. Most of the literature on this subject has been carried 
out in Southeast Asia (see for example, Heyzer and Kean, 1988; Kung, 1983; Lim, 
1983; Salaff, 1990; Stivens, 1987; Wolf, 1991) and to a lesser degree in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (see Femandez-Kelly, 1983; Pearson, 1990; Safa, 
1995; Tiano, 1990), which reflects the preponderance of export manufacturing in 
these regions.
Although evidence from the Middle East suggests that the majority of working 
women are also young and single (Farrag, 1991; Ibrahim, 1985; Moghadam, 1994; 
Mujahid, 1985; Rockwell, 1985), as stated earlier, this cannot be linked to 
industrialisation as they tend to be concentrated in the service sector (Moghadam, 
1993:52). The present investigation will therefore help to redress an occupational 
and regional imbalance that exists in the literature on the workforce participation 
of young single women. By looking beyond the manufacturing industry at other 
sectors, it is also hoped to identify the extent to which stereotypes common in 
industrial employment have wider relevance or not. For example, it has been 
pointed out that employers seem to prefer young female labour in the service 
sector (for example in tourism employment), but for reasons such as 'good looks' 
as well as 'energy' (see Chant, 1990a on Mexico; Chant and Mcllwaine 1995a on 
the Philippines) (see also Chapter Four).
Moving on to the literature on the Middle East, existing studies fall short of fully 
exposing the range of factors influencing female labour demand. For example, 
there is limited information on gender differentials in wages and labour 
recruitment practices (Papps, 1992). In addition, the existing research 
acknowledging the prevalence of gender discrimination and segregation remains 
largely descriptive in scope. For example, evidence of wage discrimination is 
mostly concerned with the issue of measurement and does not fully account for the 
reasons behind male-female wage differentials (see Hosni and Al-Qudsi 1988; 
Malkawi, 1990). Research that investigates employers' attitudes and practices 
regarding gender in terms of recruitment, promotions and benefits remains 
deficient in accounting for sectoral differences or variations based on age and 
marital status (see Al-Meer 1988; Amerah et al. 1992; although for an exception 
see Papps, 1993).
Moreover, technological change and its effects on female labour demand have not 
been fully explored. While some studies have analysed the increased participation 
of women in manufacturing employment (see Ibrahim, 1985; Joekes, 1985;
16
Moghadam, 1994; Rockwell, 1985), few have addressed the changing and 
modernising occupational structures of labour markets in general. Within this 
context, rising demand for technically skilled workers or the changing nature of 
the service and manufacturing sectors and how this affects demand for female 
labour need to be examined.
In conclusion, therefore, because little is known about the mechanisms and 
changes of gender discrimination and segregation in employment in the Middle 
East in general, this study will attempt to bridge some of this gap through 
exploring the significance of age in the occupational segregation of labour in 
Amman (see Chapter Four). One of the main concerns here is to situate the 
increasing demand for young female labour, especially in newly emerging 
occupations, within the context of the traditional notions of gender segregation in 
society at large.15 It further attempts to investigate whether distinct patterns of 
female employment are emerging as a result.
1.3.2 Supply of Female Labour
Moving on to supply side factors that influence female employment, in empirical 
studies, these have tended to fall into three main groups: (1) personal 
characteristics; (2) household level material and demographic characteristics;16 
and (3) social/ideological dimensions of family organisation (see Chant, 1991a: 13; 
Stichter, 1990:39-40). While the present study will examine all these factors 
conceptually (see Chapter Two) and empirically (see Chapters Five and Six) it is 
important to highlight a few issues here.
As stated earlier, the majority of empirical supply side research has tended to 
concentrate on married women and emphasised the tensions between women's 
reproductive and productive activities and the gender division of labour between 
spouses (see for example, Beneria and Sen, 1986; Hammam, 1986; Safa, 1995 
among others). The continuous changes occurring in individuals' life course stages 
and how this affects their roles and employment prospects are somewhat 
neglected, however. In addition, these changes are usually accompanied by 
transitions in the life span of households as well. Therefore, analysis of female 
labour supply, also need to take into account the stage of the household domestic 
cycle (see Chapter Two).
The fact that most working daughters in the present study are in households in the 
'advanced' stages of their domestic cycles, when numbers of adult members are at 
their largest (see Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1993), means that attention to gender
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divisions of labour or the ideological issues regarding family organisation have to 
address age as well as gender inequalities. In general, studies focusing on spousal 
relations have widely documented married women's disadvantaged positions vis-a- 
vis household decision-making, power relations, and the resulting tension and 
conflict between spouses (see Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Kabeer 1995; Kandiyoti, 
1988; Sen, 1988). However, the fact that daughters could be doubly 
disadvantaged and face conflicts arising from gender as well as age and seniority 
relations have received less attention (for exceptions see, Blanc-Szanton, 1990 on 
Thailand; Greenhalgh, 1988 on Taiwan and Wolf, 1990a on Java and Hong Kong).
The studies that have looked at daughters' workforce participation have suggested 
for example, that as households resort to multiple earning strategies, it is 
daughters, rather than wives, who are sent out to work (Femandez-Kelly 
1983:220; Stichter, 1990:23). The reason for this is that the employment of 
daughters seems to be less threatening to patriarchal authority and the gender 
division of labour between spouses (Lamphere, 1986). Nevertheless, the focus on 
relations between spouses has clearly posed limits on a broader understanding of 
how household division of labour affects all family members. In addition, what 
little research there is on young working women has tended to look at migrant 
workers; especially those who leave home for industrial processing zones (see 
Chant and Mcllwaine, 1995a; Eviota, 1992; Kung, 1983, Salaff, 1990), or who 
migrate abroad, usually for work in the service sector (see Eviota, 1992; Tacoli, 
1996). Yet, although these women usually remit money, being away form their 
natal homes they are, to a certain extent, outside the immediate authority of 
household relations. There are fewer studies that look at working daughters who 
still live at home. The few studies which do look at daughters residing with their 
families reveal contrasting evidence as to the impacts of young women's work on 
their own lives and those of other household members. For example, while 
research on Java (Wolf 1992, 1991, 1990b), shows that parents exert little control 
over their daughters employment, income or social freedom, other research based 
on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, indicates that parents control their 
daughters' decisions, employment and income (Greenhalgh, 1988; Kung, 1983; 
Salaff, 1981).
Moving on to literature on the Middle East, there is a body of research that 
addresses the reasons behind the limited workforce participation of women in the 
region. One strand of such research focuses on the supply of female labour as 
statistically measured against single determining variables. These variables tend 
to be fertility (see for example, Abdalla 1987; Youssef, 1978) and education (see,
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for example, Azzam et al. 1985; Doctor and Khoury, 1991; Farrag, 1991; Mujahid, 
1985). In fact, most of the research on Jordanian women, which in it self is 
limited in numbers, seem to search for such 'determinants' (see Amra and Takriti, 
1994; Mujahid, 1985; Shakatreh, 1995; Toubeh, 1994). One of the uncertainties 
cited for this kind of analysis is that such linear causal investigations remain 
deficient in addressing the full scale of reasons behind the limited supply of female 
labour (Papps 1992:603). In other words, when investigating female employment 
against one single determinant there is a danger of misinterpreting and/or 
overestimating the outcome. In addition, any set of 'determinants' is likely to 
affect different women differently and this approach fails to capture this diversity 
by aggregating women's experiences. The current study will attempt to discount 
the notion that female employment patterns can be explained by a pre-determined 
set of variables. Instead, it will attempt to reveal that reality is complex and multi­
layered even when focusing on one age group who supposedly share a similar life 
experience.
The second strand of research attempts to demonstrate the complex and diverse 
factors behind women's limited work force participation through explanations of 
gender roles and relations in the domestic sphere and how these interact with those 
operating at broader societal, economic and state levels (see for example Aleene 
Early, 1993; Lazreg, 1990; Shami and Taminian, 1989). These generally argue 
that patriarchal authority in the Middle East, is not as rigid and oppressive as is 
usually assumed and that there are continuous negotiations between men and 
women (El-Solh and Mabro 1994; Kandiyoti, 1988; Moghadam, 1992; Wikan 
1982). Although valuable in providing information on existing patterns of female 
employment, this research has tended to concentrate overwhelmingly on low 
income married women and left out comparative data on working women from 
different economic strata and marital status (for an exception see Macleod, 1991). 
The result of this is limited information about the relation between family income 
and female employment in the region.
Moving on to the impact of work on young women's lives and their families, 
although there is valuable research that explores the diversity of women's 
experiences and household circumstances, much of this remains fragmentary 
(Rassam, 1984a). For example, there are surprisingly very few studies that address 
what happens to working women's incomes and the extent to which there are 
gender differentials in income distribution and access to household resources. The 
studies that address household resource management and consumption, reveal that 
women's secondary status vis-a-vis men's in terms of consumption rights is not as
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passive as it seems and that is precisely why their access to production is usually 
hampered by the men (see Hoodfar, 1988; Maher, 1981). For example, writing on 
the rural Moroccan context Vanessa Maher (1981:143) claims that:
Women are likely to use money in ways which would reduce 
their dependence on men, or would subvert the patterns of 
consumption which symbolise the high social value of men and 
low social value of women.
Moreover, given existing patriarchal power relations there are few studies that 
address the impact of work on women's autonomy and decision making capacities. 
One study, based on Egypt, that attempts to assess female autonomy in relation to 
female roles in general, rather than employment in particular, concludes that 
overall levels of female autonomy are low (Nawar et al. 1995). However, the 
same study also asserts that within the complexities of family relations women 
usually manage to influence family decisions particularly in issues pertaining to 
their lives (ibid: 174).
Finally, one of the factors which has received most attention in studies of young 
women workers in the Middle East is the increase in veiling (El-Guindi 1981; 
Hoffman-Ladd, 1987; Watson, 1994; Zuhur, 1992). These studies indicate that the 
increasing presence of young women in 'male spaces' is posing conflicts between 
the normative ideology of gender segregation and a reality of increasing male- 
female interaction in everyday life, and that Islamic dress serves as a shield to 
emphasise female modesty in new circumstances (Macleod, 1991). However, such 
analyses of increasing presence of young working women in 'male spaces' should 
be broadened beyond young women's bodily concealment in reaction to increased 
public participation. As yet, there are few studies that scrutinise the impact of 
increasing female employment on normative gender relations, beyond the 
framework of veiling (for an exception see Shaefer Davies 1993).
In conclusion, the main concerns of this study in terms of female labour supply are 
to stress the importance of the temporal setting of both women’s and their 
respective households' life course stages. Concentrating on one age cohort of 
women will show similarities and differences as a result of current economic and 
social processes at a micro-level. More specifically, the research examines the 
causes, characteristics and consequences of the increase in young women's 
workforce participation. It attempts to reveal the extent to which this is 
accompanied by changes in household organisation and/ or flexibility in gender 
roles and relations and whether employment enables young women to achieve
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some measure of personal autonomy. Finally, it questions the notion of the 
'traditional family1 and asks about its place within an on-going process of change 
in gender roles and relations. Within this it attempts to reveal how young women 
adapt to expanding mobility and experiences and the impacts this has on other 
social/psychological aspects of their current and future lives.
1.4 Methods of Research
This study is based on a mixture of qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques. Quantitative research helps us to see patterns, while qualitative in- 
depth research provides insight into some of the reasons behind these patterns (see 
Appendix One for a fuller discussion). In addition, corresponding with the study's 
main objective of looking at the intersections between the female employment, the 
life course and the household, research methodology is devised to cover these 
three different areas.
The first aspect of the study involves the extraction of the baseline data on the 
labour force from the 1991 Government of Jordan's 'Employment, Unemployment 
and Poverty Survey.' This was deemed necessary due to the limited availability of 
statistical information on Jordanian women. The workplace aspect of the study, is 
based on an employer survey of 36 establishments in Amman. These were chosen 
to represent a wide range of private sector activities. Interviews were conducted 
through structured questionnaires with either the employers themselves or, in the 
cases of large establishments, personnel managers (see Chapter Four and 
Appendix Three).
The household arena is explored through quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
A quantitative survey was based on questionnaires administered in face-to-face 
interviews in 14 locations across the city of Amman with 302 households. The 
sample was drawn through the random sorting of households previously visited in 
the above-mentioned 'Employment, Unemployment and Poverty Survey.' The 
questionnaire was administered to women working or non-working between 20 
and 30 years of age, who were single, and not enrolled in education at the time of 
the interview (see Appendix Two). In addition to this, 40 households from this 
survey were revisited for more in-depth semi-structured interviews. This was with 
young women and, depending on household circumstances, other family members 
as well. The interviews explored family relations, income distribution and 
management, life and work history, social activity, and views on marriage and 
work (see Appendix Two).
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1.5  Locating the Research and the Researcher
Aside from outlining the research methodology, it is also important to discuss the 
circumstances of conducting research, in light of current post-modern calls for 
researchers to locate themselves and their personal objectives and experiences with 
the context of their research (see Lai, 1996; Wolf, 1996). Aiwha Ong (1988) for 
example, has confronted the ways in which Third World women have been 
represented by Western scholars as illiterate poor and powerless in relation to 
themselves who are educated, better-off and in control of their lives (see also 
Parpart, 1993). In other words, we must be careful to recognise the inequalities in 
power between the researcher and the researched and how these affect 
representation. Given increasing self awareness by feminists/gender researchers of 
their limitations as researchers, many are focusing on the reflective mode or 
simply depicting women's voices rather then representing their own (Wolf, 
1996:34)
However, how should the issue of representation and the supposed power relations 
or hierarchy between the researcher and the researched be approached when the 
researcher is a compatriot and not a Westerner? This does not diminish the above 
mentioned dilemmas but poses a different set of issues. Researchers who study 
their own societies have been dubbed as 'indigenous' researchers (see AlTorki and 
El-Solh, 1988).17 Sometimes they are also described as 'insiders' (see Zavella, 
1996). At other times, however, the term 'outsider' is used to denote the person of 
indigenous status but who is not a member of the specific sub-culture of the study 
(El-Solh, 1988). In placing my 'indigenous' status in the current research the 
following will illustrate how I was always in a schism between an 'insider' and an 
'outsider' (El-Solh 1988, Zavella, 1996). Rather than justify my 'insider/outsider' 
position, in the following, I will discuss what it means to conduct research on Arab 
women as an Arab women.
Obtaining official data and permission
Due to my position as an 'indigenous' researcher and awareness that this might put 
academic objectivity into question I was determined to plan a research 
methodology with the maximum randomness possible. Therefore, for the 
household questionnaire survey this was thought to be the official channels of the 
Department of Statistics (see above). Ironically, striving towards this goal put me 
in a situation that evolved to signify my 'otherness' vis-a-vis my compatriots.
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Initial contact with the Department of Statistics proved that my request for a 
computer printout from one of their previous samples of locations and addresses 
was possible. However, since it is uncommon to give official information to 
individuals like myself, a prerequisite was that my research assistants and I would 
need a security clearance and an official permission from the Ministry of Interior. 
The six week experience of achieving this was nerve-racking (see also El-Solh, 
1988 on a similar experience in Iraq).
The Ministry of Interior is possibly the largest and the busiest of the government 
ministries. There, also on behalf of my research assistants, I was sent from one 
office to the next in order to get various departments' approvals, signatures, 
stamps, fees and photocopies. Throughout, there were insinuations about my 
gender and sexuality. Sometimes I had the sense that I was sent from one office to 
the next because I was a woman. In addition, the jokes that were made about the 
research topic were innumerable. The most common were: 'You are going to all 
this trouble because of a study on women? What for?' 'Researching young women? 
You should find me a bride.' 'Can I conduct this research with you?' After 
completing the documentation at the Ministry of Interior my research assistants 
and myself had to get approvals from the intelligence headquarters, as well as the 
public security department and where the above described experiences was 
replicated twice over.
Conducting Fieldwork
It is a fact that fieldwork is constructed through the personality of the fieldworker 
(Friedl, 1994:93). Each fieldworker brings with him/her a set of questions, 
assumptions and even agendas. My own case is an example of this. Besides the 
intellectual exercise, my research represented a personal commitment to the 
empowerment of Jordanian women. Within this context, the focus on young single 
women is by no means accidental as it reflected my own identity. I am aware of 
the problematic of youth in the life course of Arab women both from personal and 
previous work experience.18 Indeed, at the onset of the fieldwork, there was an 
undeniable interactive spirit between the research assistants, respondents, and 
myself, despite respective differences amongst us, since we collectively belonged 
to this sensitive life course stage. As one young woman exclaimed as I was 
unwittingly addressing her problems through busily filling out a questionnaire: 
'You are God sent! I am in need of a friend who understands.'
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Despite this collectivity, however, I was acutely aware of my 'otherness1. At the 
outset of the fieldwork I would say my name (i.e. proclaim a Christian identity), 
that I was pursuing a Ph.D. in London and when asked would reveal the area I 
lived in which, more often than not, signified class difference. These facts were 
hard to accept for some of the women, and had I been a foreign researcher the 
'difference' would have been more easily accepted. Often, I spent the first half of 
the interview answering questions about myself: How could my parents allow me 
to travel abroad? How could I live alone? Would I possibly marry a foreigner? In 
the early stages of the fieldwork I saw this as a reciprocal interchange. Mothers, 
especially, took an acute interest in me. They usually asked about my mother 
through inquiring about her health and sending her their greetings. They did not 
know my mother, of course, but I felt this was perhaps a life stage linkage that 
legitimised their interchange with me.19
In addition, there was often sympathy for I was frequently told: 'May God help 
you. What makes you do such work?' Indeed, for women young and old, who's 
autonomy is controlled by varying degrees of segregation, my position was seen as 
particularly difficult This sympathy sometimes worked to my advantage since it 
extended itself to people going out of their way to make me feel welcome. In 
addition, however, the gender conditioning of most women saw my work as not 
only strenuous but according to some even dangerous.20 A few times, as it was 
getting dark there was genuine concern for my safety.
On occasion I was asked to give my home phone number which sometimes I saw 
as a challenge to my authenticity (I am who I say I am) and at other times I saw as 
a sincere desire to become 'friends'. I usually conceded since I felt it was a gesture 
that I was more than a researcher and that they were more than mere respondents, 
until one incident when I received a phone call from a woman who was very hurt 
because I did not instantly recognise her. After this incident, I became Mariam 
(the Arabic and less Christian version of my name), did not easily volunteer 
information about myself and rarely gave my telephone number. I could not 
possibly become a friend to each and every respondent, nor could I hope to gain 
everyone's trust. After all, it was not an equal relationship. I needed their 
responses on which to base my study and reciprocity could not be integrated into 
this framework beyond giving back the information at a later stage. I resigned 
myself to the fact that I represent the 'other' for most of the women interviewees. 
Some wanted to know my 'otherness' and others distrusted it. The singularity I 
first felt about our collective life course stage gradually eroded as the fieldwork 
progressed.
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1.6 Thesis Organisation
The thesis contains seven chapters where the first and present chapter has outlined 
the main research objectives and their rationale. The second chapter sets out the 
theoretical parameters of the study, and places them within the context of wider 
debates on gender labour market analysis, female labour force participation and 
the life course. Chapter Three is divided into two parts, the first, provides 
background to the Jordanian political economy and situates the growth of the city 
of Amman within the larger changes occurring within the country in the past two 
decades. The second part looks at the labour market and employment in 
particular. It reviews major characteristics of the labour force as well as 
highlighting the nature of employment and unemployment in the different sectors 
of the labour market. This review also situates female employment trends within 
the context of the wider economy.
Chapter Four focuses on the demand for young female labour in Amman and is 
based on the employer survey. It examines the attitudes and strategies of 
employers in different private sector establishments in Amman and reveals their 
rationalisations for current patterns of labour composition. It examines the levels 
of gender typing of jobs and how this contributes to the reproduction of gender 
inequality. It focuses on the differences in gender segregation at work between 
sectors as well as within sectors which demonstrates differentials in employers 
interests and how this results in a variation in demand for young female labour.
Chapter Five, through the analysis of the household survey data, focuses on gender 
and age differences in the labour supply of adult household members. The main 
aim of the chapter is to identify the household circumstances that induce the 
workforce participation of daughters. The chapter also explores household 
divisions in the management and appropriation of wages. It reveals how despite 
waged employment, some young women continue to have little power in 
negotiating their own labour or the control of their earnings.
Chapter Six which is largely based on qualitative data examines the implications 
of young women's work on gender and generation relations at both household and 
workplace levels. The aim of the chapter is to explore the notion that Jordanian 
women are experiencing a new life course trajectory: single employed adulthood, 
and how gender relations are reconstructed in order to accommodate young 
women's prolonged singlehood. The Chapter also examines young women's own 
experiences and perceptions of their new life course trajectory. One of the major
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findings of this chapter is that single adulthood may have expanded opportunities 
and aspirational horizons for some young women, but it has not brought about 
either a redistribution of power relations or gender divisions in society at large. 
The seventh and final chapter brings together the findings of the study with 
particular attention to its theoretical implications, questions for future research and 
its insights for policy
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Notes to Chapter One
1The target population of young single women in the study are aged 20-30 years.
2The life course approach implies that societies are structured by age as much as they are structured 
by gender or class. According to David Kertzer (1991:22) it provides a broad framework for the 
study of how women's lives and family relations have generally changed in the Third World. See 
Chapter Two for a fuller discussion.
3 Women's reproductive roles involve 'biological 'reproduction which is giving birth, 'physical' 
reproduction which involves cooking .washing, cleaning and taking care of household members 
whether old or young, and 'social' reproduction which refers to the maintenance of ideological 
conditions that maintain and actually regenerate family relations and hierarchies (Brydon and 
Chant, 1989:10-11).
4One obvious reason is demographic, since the proportion of young adults in the population age 
pyramid in Jordan is now larger than it has ever been in the past (see Chapters Two and Three).
5 Globalisation is a result of rapid growth in world trade and flows in foreign investment together 
with rapid technological change and increasing efficiency of communications and transport. As 
more and more countries join the economic mainstream of free trade and integration, benefits seem 
to be unevenly distributed between countries and between different groups within countries. 
Moreover, globalisation seems, in some places, to have led to massive job losses, whether due to 
the relocation of some firms to countries with cheaper labour, or as a result of new technologies 
that replace labour (International Labour Organisation: 1995:48-49; World Bank, 1995:50-51). 
*>Guy Standing (1989) has proposed that the globalisation of production and increasing flexibility 
of labour markets favours the 'feminisation of employment’ in the double sense that women's 
involvement in industrial occupations is increasing and the conditions of employment are 
deteriorating.
7 For example, a study of Moroccan clothing industry showed that the proportion of women 
workers was higher both within and between firms when the product was for foreign markets 
(Joekes, 1985). See also Tiano (1990) on Mexican border areas and Ward (1990) for a global 
analysis.
 ^ See Richards and Waterbury (1990) and Moghadam (1993) for fuller discussions on 
industrialisation in the Middle East.
9 Female labour force participation rates for the Middle East and North Africa as a region were 
17% in the early Nineties. This is compared with 31% for Latin America and the Caribbean, 37% 
for sub-Saharan Africa and 43% for South East Asia (United Nations 1995).
10 Female labour force participation here refers to the percentage of workers among the total 
female population between the working ages of 15 to 65 years.
11 For example, Valentine Moghadam (1992:2) has pointed out that the topic of female 
employment in the Middle East is under-researched outside Middle Eastern studies and that the 
region is frequently left out of books on women workers in world economy.
12According to Mamia Lazreg (1988:82) research conducted by Western and Western trained 
scholars, represents Arab women as: 'passive pawns trapped in a world dominated by hopelessly 
outdated and regressive religious traditions.' (see also Afshar, 1993:6-7).
13 Age at marriage among Jordanian women has been steadily increasing in the last 20 years. 
While it was 17.8 years in 1972, it had increased to 21 years by 1979 and again to 24.7 years by 
1991 (Department of Statistics, 1972,1979 and 1991; see also Nawar et al. 1995 on Egypt).
14 According to the United Nations (1995) between 1970 and 1991, the gender gap, in the Arab 
region, in school enrollement at the secondary level was reduced from 54% to 32% making it the 
fastest closing of such gaps in the developing world. In addition, the annual percentage rate of 
growth in enrollment in tertiary levels, in the Arab region in the early nineties, was 5.3% for 
females compared with 3.7% for males.
15 Gender segregation as identified by Fatima Memissi (1975:51) is the 'systematic prevention of 
interaction between men and women not related to each other by marriage or by blood. Gender 
segregation divides all social space into male spaces and female spaces.'
^ A  household is defined here as a residential and consumption unit (Brydon and Chant, 1989:8-9). 
17The issue of the indigenous researcher versus the foreign researcher has received some attention. 
Indigenous researchers are supposed to have indisputable advantage of being able to attach 
meanings and uncover processes much faster than non-indigenous researchers (Altorki and El-Solh, 
1988:7). This is because they share the same body of knowledge and cognitive world. On the 
other hand, some suggest that common language and culture makes it more difficult to maintain the
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social distance that a foreign researcher is able to do and that it is difficult for the researcher to 
distinguish between his/her own values in the research community (Altorki and El-Solh, 1988:8).
*8 Besides this relation with my own identity as young and single the choice is also based on 
previously difficult field work experience among married women in childbearing ages in southern 
Jordan. The research which focused on women's reproductive health usually left respondents 
shocked and unaccepting of the fact that I, a single woman, was inquiring about pregnancy, child 
birth and family planning methods. This is because it is a subject closely linked to sexuality which 
is a taboo for unmarried women.
*9 Seteny Shami (1988) during her fieldwork in squatter areas in Amman actually introduced her 
mother to her research community since an unmarried woman working on her own needed some 
authentication through kinship ties and consequently would gain more acceptability. Similarly, in 
my case, the fact that the mothers asked after my mother was perhaps a demonstration of the fact 
they accepted me as a respectable person with respective kinship ties.
During the household questionnaire survey I continuously explained that I was not alone but part 
of a research team who are in the neighbourhood. However, during the semi-structured interviews 
I was often alone.
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CHAPTER TWO
GENDER. EMPLOYMENT AND THE LIFE COURSE: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK
While the last chapter was concerned with outlining the objectives of the study and 
situating them within the framework of related research on gender and 
employment, this chapter sets out the conceptual and theoretical parameters. As 
one of the main objectives of this study is to investigate the complex interrelations 
between gender, employment and the life course, it is difficult to adopt a single 
theoretical orientation. Instead, and in accordance with the multi-dimensional 
approach of this study, the present chapter attempts to provide a framework drawn 
from an amalgamation of different theories and approaches.
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first is concerned with identifying 
core concepts in the study, namely the labour market, gender, gender ideology and 
the life course. Gender and the labour market is the focus of the second section. 
This reviews labour market theories and approaches to gender inequality in 
employment and attempt to situate the study within them. Since conventional 
theories mostly neglect the household arena in influencing female employment, 
the third section considers conceptual frameworks which have been developed to 
explain household level influences on female workforce participation. This 
section also makes particular reference to the life course and to the Middle East in 
order to reveal the significance of life course changes for female employment and 
household organisation and relations.
The overall aim of this chapter is not only to provide a framework for this study, 
but also to reveal the importance of moving away from the rigidity of structured, 
universal theoretical parameters and the importance of interweaving elements from 
different approaches to capture the complexities of young women's rising labour 
force participation.
2.1 Labour Markets, Gender, and the Life Course: Conceptual 
Considerations
Since this study is based on the interrelations between gender, labour markets and 
the life course, the present section clarifies these terms and how they will be 
utlitised in the current study.
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2.1.1 The Labour Market
The first term that requires clarification is that of the labour market since it 
provides the platform in which the interrelationships between employment, gender 
and the life course occur. One universal definition of a labour market is difficult 
to provide since it depends on the nature of the theory adopted. Labour markets 
can be defined in a number of ways. The neo-classical approach, for example, 
essentially treats the labour market like any other market, as summed up by 
Loveridge and Mok (1979:27) who define a labour market as:
(A) unified entity in which allocation is regulated by the price 
mechanism. That is in an exchange system where buyers and 
sellers of labour meet each other individually as equals
Standing and Tokman (1991:1) provide a wider definition of than neo-classical 
approach by including the role of policy and state regulation:
Forces of supply and demand should be enabled to operate to 
ensure the efficient allocation of resources, so that policies 
should be implemented to ensure high levels of labour mobility 
at low cost and flexible labour markets.
Despite their differences, the above definitions of labour market highlight the issue 
of 'price' and regard labour as a 'commodity'. However, Standing and Tokman 
(1991:1) go on to explain that such definitions actually contradict one of the 
International Labour Organisation's founding principles that 'labour is not a 
commodity'. They proceed to stress the importance of recognising the quest for 
labour security and how such market mechanisms may need to be circumvented in 
the interest of social values.
According to John Weeks (1991:55-6) neo-classical definitions of the labour 
market, when applied to developing countries, 'break(s) down.' This is because 
they assume that the labour market is based on institutional arrangements, where 
employers have obligations to employees and vice versa. According to Weeks a 
major characteristic of urban labour markets in developing countries is that the:
...pursuit of livelihoods involves a chaotic collection of different 
employment relations, frequently operating according to 
conflicting principles of rationality.... The foregoing analysis 
indicates that the central characteristic of urban labour markets 
in underdeveloped countries is that they are comprised of 
heterogeneous collection of subordinate relations which, while 
they coexist and overlap, cannot be effectively integrated.
Their non-integration is the result of different adjustment 
mechanisms, not all of which are economic.
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Other definitions of the labour market extend to include territorial and social 
criteria (see Duncan and Savage; 1989, Massey, 1994). Such definitions draw 
attention to the fact that labour markets are spatial areas where people work and 
develop social relations. This larger social/spatial boundary makes it more 
possible to fully capture the complexity of female employment and its 
interrelations with familial and ideological factors (see below). In addition, 
Doreen Massey (1994) goes on to explain that despite the importance of the socio- 
spatial dimensions of labour markets, they are far from being autonomous spatial 
structures. This is because they change according to political and economic 
circumstances. This is especially so with the increasing international division of 
labour and its globalising influences on local level labour markets (Massey, 1994: 
Chapter Six).
2.1.2 Gender
Gender is a social construct, whereas sex refers to physical distinctions (see 
Brydon and Chant, 1989:2; Mackintosh 1981:4; Rogers 1980:12). As a construct, 
gender varies considerably in relation to other axis of social differentiation such as 
age, class, race and geographical specificity (Eviota, 1992:29; Momsen, 
1993:127). Therefore, the category 'woman' has no unitary definition and indeed 
consists of multiple realities that need to be consistently specified and not assumed 
(Parpart and Marchand, 1996:7, Moore, 1988:189). The present study also departs 
from the fact that gender is a homogeneous category, and is particularly concerned 
with age's differentiating impacts upon the different relations women have with 
male counterparts, whether fathers, brothers, employers or male work colleagues.
This study is also concerned with gender ideologies, which refer to meanings that 
are lived by social individuals and constitute a 'way of life' (Oakley, 1972). The 
term is closely linked with the above argument regarding gender as a social 
construct and how far it affects women's lives. Ideologies of gender are:
...lived through consciousness, motive, and emotionality in a 
continuing process of producing, challenging, reproducing and 
transforming meanings of gender-based social order (Eviota 
1992:25).
Gender ideologies are the locus of power relations between men and women 
(Humm, 1995:107) By and large this functions through three main areas of social 
relations: First, is the extent to which either sex is denied access to positions of 
control (see Afshar, 1992:206; Moore, 1988: 149-50; Walby, 1988a). Second, is
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the division of labour between the sexes regarding what work is considered 
appropriate for either sex (see Adkins, 1995: Chapter Two; Moghadam, 1993:15; 
Young, 1993;72). And third, are the structural arrangements separating men and 
women (Afshar, 1987b:73-5,1992; Memissi, 1975:51).
In the context of the present study, this term often intersects with patriarchy which 
is a form of systematic dominance of men over women in all areas of social and 
economic relations (see Hartmann, 1981; Humm, 1995; Kandiyoti, 1988). Indeed, 
the terms gender ideology and patriarchy, will be used inter-changeably in the 
study.
2.1.3 The Life Course
'Life course' is a term associated with a method of analysis which has been used to 
frame the life stages and which emphasises individuals' transitions into different 
stages in changing historical conditions (Allatt, et al. 1987:2).1 The essence of the 
life course approach, therefore, lies in the continuous interplay between social 
change and the lives of individuals (Kertzer, 1991:19).
A closely related term is the 'life cycle approach' which refers to the analysis of 
life span through predictable biological transitions and inevitable changes in social 
status. The life course, on the other hand, allows for the interaction of the 
individual with social structures and historical change (Allatt et al. 1987:2; Monk 
and Katz, 1993:19). While Allatt et al (1987:10) distinguish these differences and 
identify them as contrasting, they nevertheless state that the two frameworks 
should go hand in hand in order to enhance the appreciation of the complexities 
which accompany an individual's progression. Monk and Katz (1993:19), on the 
other hand, stress the use of life course since it allows the emphasis on the 
diversity of experiences within one age group and the lack of clear associations 
between chronological age, perceptions, and behaviour (see also Rossi, 1980). 
Throughout this study the term life course rather than life cycle will be used. This 
is because the former term encompasses the diversity of women's experiences even 
among those in the same age cohort.
In terms of gender, the life course approach provides an opportunity to enlarge the 
understanding of the interdependent life trajectories of men and women (Oakley, 
1987:13). Consequently, it draws heavily on gender ideologies. For example, 
there are differentiated gender trajectories where men's and women's transitions 
from one life stage to the next are affected, controlled and/or legitimised by 
societal norms and agencies (ibid:4). This is a focal point for the present study in
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that it investigates a group of women who are in a previously non-existent life 
course trajectory and which is more a result of economic and demographic, rather 
than ideological, change.
2.2 Theories of Gender and Labour Markets
The present study does not adopt one theoretical orientation on gender and the 
labour market, but rather attempts to draw some aspects from different approaches 
that enhance the depth of analysis. The use of one theoretical framework is 
difficult for the following reasons: first, conventional theories do not provide 
adequate explanations for the relations between gender, employment and the life 
course; second, few theoretical frameworks address relations between workplace 
and household arenas which are deemed as crucial in the present study; and third, 
conventional economic theories assume universal applicability when in reality 
they are western oriented (Redclift, 1985; Standing, 1991). None the less, it is 
helpful to review existing theoretical approaches to the gender segmentation of the 
labour market and female labour force participation in turn and to pull out 
elements which may be applicable to the present study.
2.2.1 The Neo-Classical Approach
Neo-classical labour market theory is essentially a theory of markets and market 
interdependencies without reference to its societal context (Loveridge and Mok, 
1979:27-28). The behaviour of individuals is the primary unit of analysis. In this 
sense individuals have 'tastes' and 'preferences' and on the basis of those they 
respond to market signals. Therefore, there are assumptions that the individual 
exercises freedom of choice and behaves rationally in order to maximise utility 
(Amsden, 1980:13).
Notions of utility maximisation under the neo-classical framework are extended 
from the individual to the family unit. It is assumed that because families allocate 
resources rationally through a gender division of labour, women will stay at home 
and assume primary responsibility for reproductive work, the underlying 
assumption being that there is an economic return to women's lack of participation 
(Anker and Hein, 1987:7). Also, women are said to have a natural comparative 
advantage in domestic work. As Amsden (1980:15) puts it:
Women hire men as breadwinners since men earn more than 
women in the market (women's earning power is diminished by 
their childbearing activities). Men hire women as nursemaids 
since women bear children and are superior in rearing them
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(men's childrearing capacities are diminished by their market 
earning activities). This division of labour is concluded to be 
consistent with economic maximising principles.
Gender divisions of labour and persistent labour market gender inequalities are, in 
turn, the backbone of a related neo-classsical approach which is usually referred to 
as the 'human capital approach.' This approach analyses the individual's 'capital' 
in terms of education, skill, productivity potential and experience (Loveridge and 
Mok, 1979:46). Since women tend to have lower average level of skill and 
training, they are considered to be, less productive which also results in lower 
average wages than men. The reasons why women are thought to have lower 
human capital lie in the time they spend out of the labour force during which they 
have children (Mincer and Polachek, 1980). In addition, it is said that they choose 
jobs which require less education and training because of 'prospective 
discontinuity' (ibid: 177). As a result, employers assume that women have less 
attachment to work than men, and prefer to train male workers who will work 
continuously (Sinclair, 1991:5) According to this reasoning, therefore, women's 
low human capital seems to be both the cause and consequence of their 
employment conditions (ibid:5).
These neo-classical paradigms are not particularly relevant to the present study, 
primarily because ideological factors which mould the supply and demand for 
labour are not taken into account (Loveridge and Mok, 1979:28). In other words, 
people's behaviour according to are termed as 'tastes' and 'preferences' are 
considered exogenous factors. Furthermore labour market behaviour is viewed as 
constant regardless of any changes in the underlying social relationships that may 
take place over time (Loveridge and Mok, 1979:28). These approaches tend to 
homogenise human experience and within this context it is not possible to look at 
interrelations between gender, employment and the life course. The notions that 
could be helpful for the present context, however, include the analysis of human 
capital differences which enables comparisons of the changes occurring in the 
supply and demand of male and female labour (Sinclair, 1991:6). In the specific 
context of this study this would include changes in the supply of and demand for 
young women as opposed to older women or young men in the same age cohorts. 
This could shed some light on particular aspects of young women's emerging 
employment characteristics Despite this, however, it has to be cautioned that such 
an undertaking will not account for labour market's 'social prejudices and 
preconceptions' that lead to these human capital differences (Sen, 1990:138).
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2.2.2 Labour Market Segmentation Theories
The roots of this approach lie in concerns about the explanatory adequacy of the 
neo-classical approach. Labour market segmentation theories are often referred to 
as 'Institutional* or 'Structural' approaches. According to these approaches the 
labour market is not a single, open competitive market but instead divided into 
different segments where access is restricted (Reich et al. 1980). Therefore, they 
basically challenge the human capital theory of wage determination, although 
assumptions regarding competition remain closely aligned with previous neo­
classical conceptions (Sinclair, 1991:7). These approaches developed to include 
several 'off-shoots' with divergent views on the causes behind segmentation.
One 'off-shoot' is the 'dual labour market approach' which distinguishes between 
primary and secondary sector labour forces. According to Barron and Norris 
(1991) primary sector workers receive higher wages, better working conditions, 
promotions and training and are filled by men. Secondary sector jobs, on the other 
hand, are less stable, lower paid and are usually filled by women. The reason 
behind this is that women, as a result of their socialised domestic orientations, are 
perceived by employers to have less commitment to work and consequently the 
characteristics of secondary workers (Stichter, 1990). Barron and Norris (1991) 
also describe how employers base recruitment on gender stereotypes because these 
are seen as 'natural' by society at large. That is to say employers’ gender 
stereotyping is not consciously premeditated. Even so, segregation seems to be 
useful for employers since it allows them to minimise competition between groups 
(it allows one dominant group to have higher status and remuneration) while at the 
same time maintain a cheap source of labour (Walby, 1990:53-4).
The applicability of this approach to the present study lies in that it identifies and 
attempts to assess inequality between different groups of workers in the various 
sectors/segments of the labour market. The limitation, however, lies in that age is 
seldom considered as a basis for segregation. However, if age, which connotes 
less experience, is coupled with the inferior status of women, it can only 
exacerbate their secondary positions. Therefore, notions of job segregation that 
are useful for this study lie in what is identified as vertical and horizontal 
segregation. Horizontal segregation refers to the concentration of women in some 
occupations and men in others, while vertical segregation refers to women who 
occupy the lower rungs of the job hierarchy (Walby, 1988a:2-3).
Since 'dual labour market' theorists have not provided an adequate explanation for 
the question why men are recruited and trained for primary sector jobs while
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women are recruited as secondary sector employees, 'cultural theorists' attempted 
to bridge this gap through focusing on job typing and the system in which jobs are 
allocated. This approach stresses the fact that people choose jobs which are in line 
with their beliefs and which are perceived as appropriate to prevailing masculine 
or feminine norms (Walby, 1988b: 16). In other words, some of the determinants 
of gender segregation lie outside the workplace. The importance of this approach 
arises in that, first it draws attention to the fact that gender typing of jobs is usually 
taken for granted (see Walby, 1988b; Oppenheimer, 1970). Second, it explains 
how increased rates of female labour force participation can be an outcome of the 
growth in 'women's jobs.' That is increasing female employment rates should not 
necessarily be equated with decreasing labour market segregation (for reviews see 
Amsden, 1980; Oppenheimer, 1970; Matthai, 1982; Walby, 1988a).
A relevant issue here is the impact of technological change. Although, it is 
assumed that changes in occupations may lead to desegregation, it has been 
repeatedly acknowledged that skill itself is a gendered attribute and that new skills 
arising from technological change become ascribed as feminine or masculine (see 
Cockbum 1985; Phillips and Taylor, 1980). Thus, gender typing of occupations is 
largely based on employers' gendered recruitment decisions (Chant, 1991a:99-101; 
Jenson, 1989:146). This includes, first, employers perceptions of differences in 
the physical capacity of the sexes and where women are considered weaker in 
muscular strength. Secondly, it includes definitions of skill, where female skills 
are usually considered to be an extension of their domestic roles (Anker and Hein 
1986; Chant, 1991a). Thus, the suitability of men and women for different jobs 
result from social, and not factual, definitions of skills and biological differences 
(Dex, 1989; Sinclair, 1991).
Moving on to the 'radical theory' of segmented labour markets, this emphasises the 
role of socialisation of workers prior to entering the labour market in determining 
their future roles in paid work (Sinclair, 1991:9). This is closely related to Marxist 
analysis that identifies the role of class conflict in the historical determination of 
labour markets (Amsden, 1980). Marxists see the way in which income is 
reproduced and distributed as a function of social forces and ideology (ibid:24). 
Therefore, segmentation of the labour market into hierarchical primary and 
secondary sectors is functional for the reproduction and monopoly of capitalism 
(Reich et al. 1980:239). According to these theorists, in order to control capital 
and to avoid labour disruption, employers segregate the workforce into different
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segments which result in different class factions. Although other dividing lines 
such as gender and race could be encompassed as well, it is suggested that these 
are considerably less important than the issue class (Dex, 1985).
In general, criticisms of labour market segmentation theories, include the fact that 
they provide more of a critique of neo-classical theories than a comprehensive 
alternative. In addition, and despite the fact that labour market segmentation 
theories, unlike neo-classical theories, attempt to reveal the inherent complexities 
of labour markets and worker-employer relations, they remain largely limited in 
utility as far as the present study is concerned. This is because in explaining 
women's employment, one basic weakness, in all of the above approaches persist 
and that is they do not take fully into account the intricate relations between 
women's employment and the household arena (Sinclair, 1991:10). In fact, and 
according to Lisa Adkins (1995:21), most of these theories have adopted a 
'masculine conception of work and workers.' Needless to say, life course changes, 
and even the issue of age, are difficult to incorporate in any of the above theories.
However, in attempting to draw out some aspects that could be helpful for this 
analysis, it appears that while 'cultural' and 'radical' theorists look at barriers 
specifically affecting women (gender ideology and capitalist interests) and 
relegating them to factors outside the workplace, 'dual labour market' theorists 
focus on the institutional barriers within the workplace that determine inequalities 
such as wage differentials. Therefore, the 'cultural' approach's emphasis on 
ideology will be drawn upon in this study and the 'dual labour market' approach's 
emphasis on management's’ selective procedures, provides an analysis for 
discrimination not only by sex but also by age (see Chapter Four).
The Female Marginalisation' Thesis
Before moving on to the feminist approaches that emphasise the interconnections 
between women's paid labour and the home, it is important to highlight the female 
marginalisation debate which is related in some ways to labour market 
segmentation concepts. From the above review it would seem that women remain 
at the margins of the labour market as a result of their economic positions and the 
development of capitalist growth and interest. However, Alison MacEwen Scott 
(1986:653-4) challenges that 'female marginalisation' has come to be utilised in an 
undifferentiated manner in research on women's employment. Scrutinising the 
concept more deeply, Scott identifies diverse elements: (1) marginalisation as 
exclusion from productive employment (2) marginalisation as concentration on the 
margins of the labour market (i.e. informal sector), (3) marginalisation as
37
feminisation of certain occupations, and (4) marginalisation as economic 
inequality in terms of wage and benefit differentials between men and women. 
Scott then proceeds to question the bases for these presumptions and the criterea 
used to analyse trends over time (p.655-56). Moreover, she discusses the issue of 
causality and where marginalisation is considered a result of capital's needs to 
maintain low wage levels. Through case study material based on Latin America 
she illustrates that female marginalisation may apply to certain kinds of 
occupations but not to others where there is a selective incorporation of women, 
for a variety of reasons, such as docility, domestication, subordination, and not just 
lower wages: 'Thus it is not just marginalisation that needs to be distinguished, but 
dimensions of gender (p.673).'
The re-evaluation of the female marginalisation thesis has been followed up by 
other authors (Blumberg, 1991b; Safilios Rothchild, 1990; Safa, 1995). For 
example, Anne Faulkner and Victoria Lawson (1991) provide a case study from 
Ecuador that illustrates the diverse ways in which women are integrated into the 
labour market. They demonstrate how there is no uniformity across sectors 
between women's incorporation into the labour force and their empowerment 
within employment. They further identify a need for research that explores the 
extent to which economic power in the workplace engenders changes in family 
power relations (p.40).
The importance of these debates for the present case study lie in combining labour 
market segmentation theories, which explain the emergence of low level 
occupations, with feminist theories (see below) which explain why and how 
women become concentrated in low level occupations. They further address 
crucial questions for this study which are the relations between women's 
occupational status, their individual autonomy and household positions (Faulkner 
and Lawson, 1991:41).
2.2.3 Feminist Approaches to the Labour Market
Moving on to feminist approaches per se. the exclusion of the household in the 
above mentioned mainstream labour market theories and their failings to explain 
gender inequality have led to a considerable number of feminist criticisms. Many 
of these are Marxist-oriented and tend to draw from (as well as critique) Freidrich 
Engel's (1972 [1884]) The Origin o f the Family, Private property and the State 
which argued that male owned private property and the development of the family 
are the root causes of women's subordination. Feminist critics alternatively argue
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that women's positions in the labour market are the product of the complex 
interconnections between the productive and reproductive spheres of life (Moore, 
1988:136).
One Marxist feminist concept is the 'domestic labour debate' which addresses the 
relations between household production and market economy (see Beechey, 1977). 
In this view, the confinement of women to domestic work and their secondary 
status in the labour market are seen as a function of capitalism (Stichter, 1990:31). 
This concept has been influential in feminist theorising as it draws attention to the 
sexual division of labour and highlights the interrelationships between women's 
economic and non-economic activities and the ideological construct of the 'male 
breadwinner.' Critics of this approach, however, have pointed out that this still 
does not explain why women, in particular, are the ones subordinated (see Barrett, 
1980).
Other approaches like Heidi Hartmann's (1979) 'dual systems theory,' attempt to 
address this by positing the idea that there are autonomous patriarchal relations in 
the production of gender inequalities and that gender segregation at work is best 
understood by accepting the existence of an alliance between capitalism and 
patriarchy. This approach assumes that job segregation is created by men to keep 
the better jobs for themselves and hence more power, not only in the workplace, 
but at home since women who earn less wages are encouraged to get married and 
hence become the unpaid domestic workers for their husbands (Adkins, 1995:23).2 
In other words, the control of women's labour in the labour market by men 
constitutes a material basis for domestic patriarchy. At the expense of 
underestimating the friction between both systems, this alliance is considerably 
useful for the present study insofar as patriarchy not only privileges men over 
women but also the old over the young, thereby enhancing the power and authority 
of elder males. Therefore, if gender inequality is constructed on women's 
dependence on men and where younger women are especially dependent, then, 
such an approach allows us, to some extent, to incorporate age inequality into 
labour market and family relations.
Another Marxist conceptualisation of capitalism's interrelations with women's 
employment relates to the notion of a 'reserve army of labour' (Beechey, 1978, 
1987). This approach argues that women form a reserve army of labour that is 
pulled into, and pushed out of, the labour market according to the need of
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capitalism. Moreover, an 'excess' of female labour supply (for certain 
occupations) allow employers can keep wages down. Within this framework, 
women's family roles give them in this reserve army status.
Feminist approaches therefore go further than other labour market theories in 
acknowledging the existence of inequality between men and women in the labour 
market and household domains. They search for connections between divisions of 
labour at home and in the workplace and explore the processes by which women 
are assigned to domestic labour. In attempting to adapt these concepts to the 
current study, however, some drawbacks emerge. First, Marxist feminists have 
tended to stipulate universalistic assumptions about gender roles and relations, 
notably that men are the primary earners (breadwinners) and that women are the 
reproducers and secondary earners. Second, because female labour is usually 
associated with the stereotype of the married dependent women with young 
children the implications of changes in productive and reproductive relations 
across women's and households' life courses is not adequately explored. Third, 
despite the fact that they take into account household power relations, they do not 
address the role that other adult family members might play in influencing female 
employment. In fact, when other household members, such as daughters for 
example, are addressed, it is to point out that they are dependent in exactly the 
same way as married women on their families (see Beechey 1977). Such 
treatment of both women's and household's' life courses are a reflection of how 
gender relations are undifferentiated and even 'collectivised' by Marxist feminists. 
Thus, while adopting some insights from the Marxist feminist approaches 
regarding the household-labour market linkages, we might have to recognise that 
these approaches are limited in terms of understanding the life course.
2.2.4 Post-modernism
Although not a labour market theory, it is important to consider, at this stage, post­
modernist debates especially as they advocate a shift away from the role of 
economic relations in explaining the functioning of society. Post-modernism 
cannot be easily encapsulated into one phrase for it refers to a variety of ideas. 
According to Michele Foucault the false power of hegemonic knowledge can be 
challenged by alternative discourses which offer other explanations of reality (as 
cited by Scott, 1988:35). Thus, post-modernism is concerned with the concepts of 
'difference,' the 'other' and the deconstruction of meaning. It rejects universal 
definitions of social phenomena arguing that these definitions essentialise reality 
and fail to reveal the complexity of life as a lived experience (Parpart, 1993:441). 
Within this context, the need to deconstruct the category of women is increasingly
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being acknowledged. Yet, although Fraser and Nicholson (1990:20) believe that 
feminist and post-modern approaches complement each other since the fusion 
provides an opportunity to investigate women's diversity without sacrificing the 
larger complexity of, and causes for, female oppression, others have felt uneasy 
about this potential alliance, for example, Sylvia Walby (1990:2) argues:
postmodernism in social theory has led to the fragmentation of 
the concepts of sex, race and class and the denial of the 
pertinence of overarching theories of patriarchy, racism and 
capitalism.
While post-modernism may at some level dilute the theoretical status of gender, it 
is felt to be helpful in the context of the present study since it provides an 
opportunity to understand the divergent experiences of women which feminism 
until now has attempted to unify. Second, post-modernism's interest in diversity 
acknowledges women's differential experiences across the life course. Perhaps 
one of the landmarks exemplifying this is the collection of studies edited by Katz 
and Monk (1993) which looks at how women's lives develop and change with 
reference to the life course but also in the context of the cultural specificity of 
these changes. They stress how the emphasis on women's diversity has been 
previously limited to differences based on race, ethnicity or class and that interest 
in diversity across the life course is only recent (ibid: 17).3 The importance of 
looking at gender and the life course arose because women's responsibility for 
household organisation and care ensures that entry and re-entry into employment 
never represents a straight-forward commitment to a particular career trajectory 
(Allatt et al. 1987:2). In other words women, typically experience more complex 
interactions with the labour market over the life course than men especially as 
larger historical, economic and social forces influence them differently (Moen, 
1987; Saraceno 1991).4 Therefore, the life course perspective allows us to look at 
working women, by examining both their household and workplace relations 
through specific temporal conditions that shape their particular experiences. 
However, and as mentioned in Chapter One, the life course stage that this study is 
concerned with: single employed adulthood, has received little specific attention 
within the existing conceptual and empirical literature on the life course.5
2.3 The Life Courses of Households and Household Members With Reference 
to the Middle East
This chapter has thus far attempted to reveal the importance of the household and 
the life course in looking at female employment. The following section will 
further review these two important variables by attempting to locate them within
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the context of female labour force participation in the Middle East. Here it is 
useful to consider the conceptual frameworks which have been developed to 
explain female employment patterns through the analysis of household level 
characteristics (Anker and Hein, 1986, Chant 1991a, Stichter, 1990). For example, 
Stichter (1990:39) identifies the most important groups of household level factors 
as the following: (1) reproductive work, which includes both fertility and domestic 
labour; (2) intra-household productive factors, which include the sexual and age 
division of labour, (3) income and resource allocation within the household, (4) 
household composition, and (5) decision-making and power relations.
However, it is important to recognise at this stage that households are not static. 
Just as much as there are continuous changes in individuals' life courses there are 
transitions in the life courses of households as well.6 Both of these are also subject 
to external economic situations that require continuous adjustment (Jelin, 1991:21- 
2). Therefore, household labour supply, or the ability of different members to 
generate income, is determined, to a large extent, by the stage in the domestic 
cycle. Writing on Mexico, Mercedes Gonzalez de la Rocha (1994:25) identifies 
three major stages in household domestic cycles that may well reflect the situation 
in Jordan. The first, is the 'expansion' phase where the domestic unit grows and 
increases its number of members. The second is the 'consolidation' or 'equilibrium' 
phase, during which the unit becomes more economically balanced as children 
shift from being dependent consumers to becoming income earners or participants 
in domestic work. The third is the 'dispersion' phase where members of the 
household separate and form their independent units. This model is central to the 
argument in the current study which situates the household in a specific stage of 
this evolving framework.
The investigation of the 'consolidation' phase in Arab households in general is of 
particular pertinence at this moment in time given that the population in the 
Middle and East and North Africa is at a point in history where the largest age 
cohort is between 20 and 29 years old (Fergues, 1995:188).7 Furthermore, as 
already mentioned, age at marriage in the Middle East in general, and Jordan in 
particular, has substantially increased for both sexes. As a result, young adults co­
exist with their elders for longer periods than previous generations. Another 
significant fact is that young adults living with their families have had more access 
to schooling than their elders and as a result tend to move in different kinds of 
occupations (see Chapter Five).
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These changes can conceivably result in potential conflict between the generations 
(Fergues 1995:188). Young educated adults have different life experiences and 
expectations from their elders and live for longer under the authority of their male 
elders within their households. In light of this, Arab households are effectively 
passing through a stage where demographic changes are affecting the internal 
structure, organisation and economic balance, on the one hand, and family 
ideologies and the behaviour of individuals on the other. It is within this context 
that the following will review the household level factors that seem to influence 
young women's increasing employment rates.
Reproduction and Sexual Division o f Labour
As mentioned at various junctures, female labour supply is conditioned to a greater 
extent than men by household/family factors. The majority of studies that have 
investigated this relationship have mainly looked at women's reproductive roles 
and the gendered divisions of labour between spouses within households (see 
earlier). The likelihood of married women entering the labour market depends on 
practical matters such as numbers and ages of children, household size and so on. 
It also depends on women's abilities to combine household responsibilities with 
income earning activities. Yet, households in the 'consolidation' phase of the 
domestic cycle include adult children who are likely to bring changes to women's 
reproductive burdens and the sexual division of labour. Usually, in this domestic 
cycle, adult female children may take part in some of the domestic burdens and 
therefore diminish the amount of reproductive work of mothers. In addition, there 
is the potential for expanding a household's resource base as adult children move 
from being dependents to potential or actual income earners (Gonzalez de la 
Rocha, 1994:85). Within this context, and in order to further explore Jordanian 
households' organisation at this stage in the domestic cycle, it is imperative to find 
out who is released into the labour force and why.
In terms of the gender divisions of labour in Arab/Jordanian households, men are 
usually responsible for income earning activities and, as a result, are more in 
control of productive resources. This is rooted in the regional patriarchal attitudes 
that result in the delineation of labour and power relations between males and 
females. The ideology of the male economic provider together with norms of sex 
segregation significantly constrain female employment (Hoodfar, 1988; Youssef 
1978). In light of this situation, how can the current increasing release of young 
female labour in Amman be explained? Although young women may be forced to 
work by male elders in order to supplement household income in some cases (see 
Chapter Five), on the whole, young women need permission from male elders to
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take employment and may be refused (see also Hein 1986:288-9, on Mauritius; 
Ibrahim, on Egypt, as cited in Papanek, 1985:327). Regardless of the forces 
determining young women's employment, however, the stark differentials between 
the release of daughters vis-a-vis wives into the labour force are significant.
Data outside the Middle East suggests that there is a greater acceptance of 
daughters' employment than wives, as this is perceived to be less destabilising to 
hierarchical male-female relations (Lamphere 1986). Several case studies also 
reveal that daughters are in a doubly weak position within the household because 
of both gender and age hierarchies (Greenhalgh, 1988:69; Wolf: 1990a:57). A 
daughter, for example, is expected to continue to defer to her father, even if he is 
not working, especially if he owns the house (Safa, 1990:82). This empirical 
evidence, which is mostly based on Asia, reveals that daughters' employment does 
not necessarily alter their household positions (see Salaff, 1981 on Hong Kong; 
Greenhalgh, 1988; Kung 1983; on Taiwan ). This is likely to be the case in the 
context of Jordan, where daughters are allowed to work as long as they do not 
openly challenge patriarchal authority and relations; in other words, as long as 
they abide by ascribed gender roles and normative codes of moral conduct (see 
Chapter Six).
Resource Allocation and Power Relations
Gender divisions of labour within households not only influence women's access 
to paid employment, but also how their work is perceived and valued inside the 
household unit. Since women are supposed to shoulder domestic burdens and men 
income earning activities, there is wide-ranging evidence to suggest that inequality 
arises as men have more control of income and consequently, greater shares of 
decision-making power (see Blumberg, 1991b; Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Brydon 
and Chant, 1989; Papanak, 1990; Sen, 1990; Wilson 1991 among others). What is 
more, this inequality seems to persist (and even intensify) even when women are 
income earners (Scott, 1991; Standing 1985; Whitehead, 1981). Such empirical 
evidence, which incidentally, is rarely based on Middle Eastern countries, has 
given rise to the questioning of the neo-classical economic theories that view the 
household in light of joint welfare maximising functions. The ensuing research 
expanded on household relations and considered the important connections 
between control of money and control of decisions as opposed to views that 
household relations revolve around altruism and joint welfare (see Kabeer, 1994b 
for a fuller discussion). These came to be labelled as 'bargaining models' or 
'cooperative conflict models' (see Kabeer, 1994b, Sen, 1990; Wilson 1991).
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The current study attempts to adapt household bargaining models to a life course 
perspective in Amman by looking at inter-generational gender stratification in 
control over income and decision making in the light of the male breadwinner 
ideology. This involves two interconnected levels of investigation. The first is the 
role of the above mentioned 'consolidation phase' of the domestic cycle and how 
much the existence of other adult members affects labour arrangements, control of 
income and decision-making powers. In other words, does household capacity to 
generate income vary across time and, in the presence of other adult family 
members, and is control over resources likely to be affected? The second strand of 
investigation involves extending the bargaining models from relations between 
spouses to relations between daughters and male elders. What impacts are 
daughters' life course stages and occupations exerting upon household bargaining 
and negotiation, and how does this affect the appropriation of sons' versus 
daughters' wages and consequently their roles and status within their households? 
In Amman, an income earning daughter does not necessarily fully control her 
income neither does her income allow her more control over her life. Sons on the 
other hand, are more in control of their income (see Chapter Five). So, the 
unequal distribution of resources and power relations between spouses extends to 
children on the basis of gender inequality .
Household Composition
In addition to the factors operating within households, a significant influence on 
the supply of female labour is household composition and structure. Comparative 
empirical research has revealed that different household structures place individual 
household members in different positions in the labour market (Stichter, 1990:49). 
Several studies indicate that female labour force participation in nuclear 
households (comprising spouses and children) is more limited than in extended 
households (see Chant 1991a; Benerfa and Roldan, 1987 on Mexico; Safa on the 
Caribbean; and Fapohunda, 1986 on Nigeria). One of the rationales for this has to 
do with the practicalities of child care and domestic responsibilities where in 
extended households other female members can share the burdens (Chant 1991a 
on Mexico; Safa, 1990 on the Caribbean). Other rationales include the fact that in 
extended households husbands' authority over wives' and daughters' labour power 
may be abated by the presence of other family members (Chant, 1991a). Finally, 
extended households are often more economically secure than nuclear households 
since there are usually multiple earners and household incomes can be expanded 
(Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1994:86). However, the predominant evidence on how
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extended household forms influence female employment is based on examples 
from Latin America and the Caribbean, and it has to be pointed out that this 
relation is not necessarily similar in other cultural contexts (i.e. the Middle East).
There are also those households which are headed by women. Recent attention to 
female headed households reveal that in the absence of a male economic provider, 
women have little option but to find employment (Chant, 1997; Chant, 1991a; 
Folbre, 1991; Moore, 1994). Yet, the absence of a male provider also entails 
access to autonomous decision making especially in terms of whether to work or 
not (see Chant, 1991a: 162-171 for a fuller discussion). However, women in this 
type of structure are often in disadvantaged positions especially in terms of social 
status and state policies and may well be poor (see Chant 1997; Folbre, 1991; 
Moore 1994 for fuller discussions).
It is important to point out, however, that household structure is in continuous 
change as members leave and enter (Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1994:86 on Mexico; 
Shami and Taminian, 1985 on Jordan).8 Household composition, for example, 
changes in response to employment opportunities (see Stichter, 1990:52). These 
opportunities for different members are affected by the domestic cycle and results 
in shifts in labour arrangements and income earning strategies (Gonzalez de la 
Rocha, 1994:86-7).
Moving on more specifically to the Middle East, households have been usually 
portrayed as extended in structure, large in size, and where relations revolves 
around a patriarchal and patrilocal kinship system (see Sharabi 1988; Moghadam 
1993; White 1994). These assertions about 'typical forms' of Arab households 
have been recently re-addressed since evidence suggest that social change and 
increasing urbanisation is weakening traditional patriarchal kinship systems 
(Moghadam, 1993:24). In addition, there are signs that households are 
increasingly becoming nuclear (see ESCWA, 1992:5-7; Nawar et al. 1995:150; 
Shorter and Zuryak 1988:83). Could, this nuclearisation mean that the multiple 
earning strategies common of extended households are now being replaced by 
daughters' workforce participation in nuclear households? Evidence from 
respondents reveal that indeed daughters are significant contributors to household 
income (see Chapter Five).
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2.4 Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to reveal the significance of adopting an integrated 
holistic approach for understanding the relations between, gender, employment 
and the life course. This was done through reflecting on the conceptual issues and 
critically reviewing theoretical approaches to gender segmentation of the labour 
market and female labour force participation. This has demonstrated the limited 
utility of conventional labour theories to the present context and established the 
need to consider household impacts on patterns of female employment. In taking 
into account the multiplicity of household factors, this chapter attempted to 
demonstrate how the life course stage of individuals as well as households also 
play significant roles in influencing female employment patterns. The attempt to 
adapt this to the cultural specificity of the Middle East was a means to signal the 
relevance of the life course and young female employment in other settings. In 
short, this review has revealed the importance of avoiding structured parameters in 
research and the significance of broader frameworks that are formulated on the 
basis of interactions between the different economic, social and ideological 
dimensions that influence female employment.
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Notes to Chapter Two
1 The life course approach has demographic roots. It was first used by demographers in order to 
capture population changes (see for example Bongaarts et al. 1987). With time, interest in the life 
course approach developed into a multi-disciplinary area of research including inputs from 
psychologists, family historians (see Hareven, 1978), sociologists (see Rossi, 1980) and economists 
(see Oppenheimer 1970).
2 There are many criticisms of this approach. One such example is Sylvia Walby (1988b:23), who 
claims that this approach overstates the relations between patriarchy and capitalism. She maintains 
that the conflicts between the interests of capital in utilising cheap labour and those of patriarchy in 
restricting women to domestic labour are underestimated. In other words, there is an inherent 
conflict of interest between the systems.
3 It could also be added here that, until recently, this limited interest in the life course has been 
predominantly based in industrialised countries as opposed to developing countries (see for 
example Saraceno, 1991 on Italy; Hareven, 1982 and Oppenheimer, 1970 on the United States).
4 An illustration to this is a study of Italian women which demonstrates how three age cohorts of 
women reveal different patterns of labour force participation. These differences reflect changes in 
gender ideologies, marriage laws, educational provisions, fertility trends and a restructuring of the 
Italian economy (Saraceno, 1991).
5 For example, in the research edited by Monk and Katz (1993) and cited above as a landmark,' 
single employed adulthood, while addressed in some of the articles, is not signaled as a distinct life 
course stage.
6 Changes in households across time are usually referred to as the 'developmental cycle,' the 
liousehold life span' or the 'domestic cycle.' The term life course which is adopted here to refer to 
changes in individuals' lives, has rarely been applied to the household arena. Since the former 
terms refer to inevitable, and perhaps chronologically occurring changes, reference to the 
household life course will be introduced here, alongside the other terms.
7 The reason behind this is the fact that mortality decline, as a result of improved health care, has 
been significant yet fertility rates have remained at high levels. It is expected that in the coming 
decade fertility will decline and diminish the relative weight of this age group within the population 
as a whole (Fergues, 1995). For more on the changing urban demographic structures of Middle 
Eastern cities see Assaad (1995).
8 In a study of squatter areas in Amman, Shami and Taminian ( 1985) observe: '...it was interesting 
to note how rapidly the composition of family and household members changed over a period of 
few months. Given large family size, high infant mortality, early age at marriage and so on, it 
appeared as though members of the household were in constant flux. The demographic survey of 
these squatter areas identified 75 different types of households. Collapsing these forms into three 
types: single, extended and multiple, tends to obscure the dynamics of relationships within 
households.' See also, Fonseca (1991) on Brazil; Chant (1991b) on Costa Rica and Chant (1996a) 
for a comparative overview.
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CHAPTER THREE 
JORDAN: POLITICAL ECONOMY. LABOUR FORCE AND
EMPLOYMENT
Jordan’s short history has been one of continuous upheavals. The major events 
that shaped the country were to a great extent due to external forces based on 
Jordan's geographic location. It witnessed three major crises: the 1948 and 1967 
Arab-Israeli Wars and the 1990 Gulf crisis. Yet, it also benefited tremendously 
from the oil boom in neighbouring countries. Indeed, due to the lack of natural 
resources within the country, Jordan has always looked beyond its borders both for 
economic support and political legitimacy (Brand, 1994). This chapter is 
concerned with the interaction between external influences and the domestic 
development of Jordan. It aims to delineate the factors that affected the country's 
political economy and proceeds to discuss labour force evolution. The 
overarching objective, however, is to describe the background under which young 
urban women seek employment in Amman today.
The first and second sections of this chapter provide geographical and historical 
background to Jordan. The third section investigates the political economy by 
providing an overview of the major events in the last few decades which shaped 
the country generally and influenced its labour market in particular. This 
commences with the boom years in the early 1970s into the debt crisis of the late 
1980s, the shock of the Gulf Crisis in 1990, and finally, on a more speculative 
note, the impact of the peace accords with Israel which are currently underway. 
This part also reviews the development of Amman as a city which is the location 
of the present case study and the capital of Jordan. The fourth section is concerned 
more specifically with the labour force. It provides background information on the 
size, education and unemployment levels of the labour force and the trends in 
female labour force participation. The fifth and final section outlines the major 
employment sectors in Jordan, which include the public, private and informal 
sectors.
3.1 Geography and Natural Resources
Jordan is situated at the northwest comer of the Arabian Peninsula and to the east 
of the Mediterranean Sea (see Map 3.1). It is almost entirely land-locked except 
for the 26 kilometers on the Red Sea's Gulf of Aqaba. In terms of area, Jordan is
49
Map 3.1 Jordan: Political Boundary and Main Cities
Dead Sea
Aqaba
Mediterranean
■
Sea
: -
SAUDI ARABIA
/
! West 
( Bank
s
/
'  (
(
\
\ ISRAEL 
\
\
\
\
EGYPT
IRAQ
SYRIA
50
about 92,000 square kilometers (Jordan Media Group 1995). It has a population of
4.1 million of whom 1.6 million live in Amman, the capital (Department of 
Statistics 1995).
In terms of topography, the country can be divided into three distinguishable 
regions (Jordan Media group 1995). The first is semi-arid desert and steppe land 
which covers almost 80% of Jordan and lies to the east and southeast. 
Traditionally, animal husbandry together with limited cultivation has been 
common in these areas. The second is the highland region in the north and north 
west which is mountainous and rocky together with deep valleys. Agriculture in 
the highlands is limited to grains, olive trees and grape vines which generally 
depend on rain water. The population distribution is unevenly concentrated in this 
region with the city of Amman in the centre of the area. The third region is of the 
Jordan rift valley in the west of the country. This faces the Jordan river that runs 
from the Golan Heights in Syria towards the Dead Sea and eventually into the Red 
Sea. The northern part of the Jordan valley is fertile. The country's agricultural 
production, for both domestic consumption as well as export, consists of citrus 
fruits and vegetables and is concentrated in the northern part of the Jordan valley. 
The southern part of the valley, by contrast, is dry and arid and includes the Dead 
Sea which is the lowest spot on earth.
Jordan is a relatively dry country, but rainfall varies throughout the different 
regions of the country. It ranges from 50 millimeters per year in the eastern parts 
to between 400 and 600 in the highlands (Jordan Media Group, 1995). With 
population increase, water scarcity is one of the principle problems facing the 
country. Chronic water shortages in the summer months are common in many 
parts of the country. In terms of natural resources, Jordan's wealth is limited to 
minerals such as phosphate or potash which are its major exports. In fact, Jordan 
has reserves of 1.5 billion tons of phosphate and is the third largest exporter in the 
world (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1989). However, unlike most of its 
neighbours, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Syria, no oil has ever been found.
3 .2  Historical Context
Jordan is a young nation. It was part of the Ottoman empire until 1921 when it 
gained independence after the Arab revolt.1 Soon afterwards, in 1923, the British 
took control of what became known as 'Trans-Jordan.'2 By 1928 the area became
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known as the Emirate of Trans-Jordan under Emir Abdalla. At the time, the 
Emirate was largely populated by nomads and pastoralists and its only commercial 
centre was Salt which linked trade with Palestine.3
Throughout the years of the British Mandate (1921-1946) Jordan’s economic 
growth was slow. Yet, economic activity increased as a result of World War Two 
as Britain' expanded its military bases in Amman and other cities (Tell, 1994:5). 
This in turn stimulated imports and the emergence of a new merchant class and led 
to the establishment of industries such as cement as well as increasing commercial 
activities (ibid:5). By 1946, the new Kingdom of Jordan:
Appeared to be the most successful of Britain's experiments in 
empire by mandate in the Middle East. British influence sat 
lightly on the country, disguised by trappings of Sharifian rule, 
and the collaboration of a nascent bureaucratic bourgeoisie 
which owed all to the imperial connection (ibid:7).
Despite this, however, Jordan remained under-developed in terms of infrastructure, 
education and agriculture (Sayigh 1978:180). In contrast to the rest of the 
population, therefore, it was only the new urban elites of Amman, the ruling 
Hashimites, and some of the Bedouin leaders, who aligned themselves with the 
new rule and thus benefited from Amman's growth.
Following World Two Britain relinquished its mandate over 'Trans-Jordan,' which 
became the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan in 1946. Two years later Britain also 
relinquished its mandate over Palestine which was immediately followed by first 
Arab-Israeli war.4 The creation of Israel in 1948 led to an influx of 375,000 
Palestinian refugees into Jordan.5 This together with the 1948 War in which 
Jordan participated, had drastic economic consequences on Jordan since it was 
faced with providing housing, infrastructure as well as employment for the 
Palestinian refugees. Furthermore, Jordan had lost its trading routes linking it with 
the Mediterranean (Sayigh 1978:189) (see map 3.1).6
By 1951 Jordan unified the part of Palestine which had not been occupied by Israel 
in 1948 and which came to be known as the West Bank. Both refugees and 
residents of the West Bank, who amounted to 460,000, were given Jordanian 
citizenship. Migration of Palestinians from the West Bank continued through to 
the 1960s as people who lost their lands came to settle mostly in Amman. Thus, 
after the creation of the state of Israel and Jordan's annexation of the West Bank
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the Jordanian population increased by more than 800,000 almost overnight. 
Sudden population increases such as these have been common in Jordan's short 
history.
During the 1950s Jordan was considered an 'economic basket case' (Gubser, 
1988:107). It was a resource-poor country with an artificially large population, a 
weak economic infrastructure and a labour force characterised by unemployment 
and underemployment.7 However, in another light, the influx of Palestinian 
refugees is seen to have had a positive long term economic and social impact. 
Palestinians were skilled, educated and more urbanised compared with the 
Jordanians (Kanovsky 1989:1). Some of them brought capital with them which 
facilitated their economic integration (Gubser, 1988:107).
Between the mid-1950s and 1966, and despite pessimistic predictions regarding 
Jordan's future, GDP growth rates grew to reach an average of 6.5% in real terms 
(Khader 1990:85). During this time Jordan was dependent on foreign aid.8 The 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)9 contributed considerably to 
the welfare of Palestinian refugees. The British who were later succeeded by the 
Americans contributed to budgetary economic development (Gubser 1988:107; 
Khader 1990:89). Other sources of economic aid were the United Nations 
agencies and several bilateral aid agencies as well as private groups (ibid, 
1988:107). In 1964 external aid reached as much as 54% of government receipts 
(Sayigh, 1978:197).
The second crisis in Jordan's history was losing the West Bank in the 1967 Arab- 
Israeli war. The West Bank included half of Jordan's economy at the time and the 
religious shrines in Jerusalem and Bethlehem had attracted substantial tourism 
(Gubser, 1988:110). The war resulted in yet another influx of refugees who fled 
the hostilities. The estimates were 280,000 refugees of which many had already 
been displaced, as a result of the 1948 war. Again, Jordan depended on foreign aid 
which now included large grants from the Arab oil producing states (Kanovsky, 
1989:5). Meanwhile, the number of Jordanians working abroad in the Arab oil 
producing States was increasing and this helped to reduce unemployment and to 
increase remittances.
3.3 The Political Economy of Jordan
The current political economy of Jordan is marked by the boom years where 
growth was phenomenal due to the remittances from workers in the oil-producing
53
Arab states. This was followed by two economic shocks the first being the debt 
crisis and the ensuing stablilisation policies and the second being the Gulf Crisis 
where Jordan lost its main trading partner, Iraq, and severed ties with other oil rich 
Arab countries. The last and still evolving aspect of Jordan's political economy is 
the peace process with Israel which is currently underway.
3.3.1 The Boom Years
Between the mid 1970s and the mid 1980s, Jordan enjoyed remarkable economic 
prosperity. This was mainly due to the oil boom in neighbouring Arab states 
which resulted in the transfer of oil wealth from Gulf States following the 1973 
War. This came in three ways: direct aid; the growth of Jordanian exports to these 
countries and the remittances of expatriate labour.
During this period, Arab assistance to Jordan was stepped up. This coincided with 
decreasing US aid (which followed British aid). Between the late 1960s and mid 
1980s assistance from oil-rich Arab countries accounted for over 80% of external 
aid to Jordan (World Bank 1994a:l).10 One of the main reasons for this was 
Jordan's geographic location as the front-line with Israel. However, Arab aid was 
dependent upon the price of crude oil and the region's volatile economic and 
political circumstances. Nevertheless, aid was still high enough to allow Jordan to 
embark upon far-reaching development and infrastructure projects. The standard 
of living also rose as Jordan became 'the only oil economy without oil' (Satloff 
1986:38). During this period the economy grew rapidly, rising to 10% per annum 
in real terms (Satloff, 1986:8).
Other regional events also helped Jordan's economic growth. These included the 
eruption of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 which prompted businesses to 
relocate to Jordan and caused, among other things, a boom in the real estate 
market. The reopening of the Suez Canal, in the same year, also gave a boost to 
Jordan's only port of Aqaba (Kanovsky 1989:6). Another regional factor was the 
Iran-Iraq war which started in 1980 and in which Jordan became the only 
alternative route to Iraq. Transit trade between Aqaba and Iraq increased Jordan's 
earnings as well as the export of Jordanian goods to Iraq.
Under these circumstances, foreign exports grew and from the mid-1970s onwards 
manufacturing industry grew by 17% per annum along with considerable growth 
of exports to Arab oil producing countries (Weiss, 1987:147). This included both 
major capital intensive industry such as potash and cement as well as a diversified
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consumer goods industry including small and medium-scale plants (Weiss, 
1987:147; Kanovsky, 1989:57). During this period, and as a consequence of 
government capital expenditure, the service sector, especially health and 
education, grew to provide 61% of GDP and 62% of jobs.11
During the 1970s, however, Jordan also became increasingly reliant on transfer 
payments and remittances from workers in the oil producing Gulf States. By the 
end of the 1970s, 350,000 or 40% of the Jordanian labour force was working in the 
Gulf. The net gain from the remittances jumped from US $15 million in 1970 to 
US $900 million in 1981 (Satloff, 1992:130). During the 1980s this averaged 16% 
of GDP (World Bank, 1994a:4).12 At this time there was almost no 
unemployment in Jordan. In fact, there was actually labour shortage as skilled 
labour left for better paying jobs in the Gulf and labour was imported for the 
menial jobs that Jordanians refused to perform (Birks, Holt and Sinclair, 1990:5; 
Kirwan, 1981:677; Satloff, 1986:2).
Table 3.1 Sources of Revenue 1973- 1981 (in million $US)*
Revenue Source 1973 1981
Direct Arab aid 71.8 1179.0
Workers' remittances 37.6 1032.0
Exports (goods) 57.6 734.9
GDP 665.5 3531.2
Total 167.0 2945.9
Source: The World Bank, World Tables. 3rd. edition, vol. 1, Economic Data 
* $US at constant prices
In short, three main factors, Arab aid, increasing exports and labour remittances 
(see Table 3.1) were the causes behind the boom. These three sources of revenue 
amounted to 84% of Jordan's GDP by 1981 (Satloff, 1992:130). Thus, this period 
of growth is primarily dependent on external factors. Accordingly, it could be 
stated that this economic prosperity was merely an illusion. As noted by Birks and 
Sinclair (1978:20):
A rapid change in perspective of aid donors or in the propensity 
of Jordanian workers to remit would cripple the economy.
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Indeed, there was a major downside to such a heavily dependent economy. The 
high levels of foreign transfers (both aid and workers remittances) had not 
financed investment for growth and development but consumption which totaled 
to 109% of domestic production (World Bank, 1994a:5). Furthermore, despite the 
growth in the industrial base, there was an increasing trade deficit. This is because 
of disproportionate levels of imports, especially of foodstuffs. In other words, 
Jordan was consuming more than it was producing. Imports also meant growth in 
inflation rates and escalating costs of living (Satloff 1990:12). According to the 
Central Bank, the national cost of living index rose by 168% between 1973 and 
1981. Wages did not rise due to the influx of guest workers from abroad who 
were ready to accept lower wages and inferior working conditions (Sha'ban, 
1990:58).
The fall of oil prices by 1981 and the ensuing regional depression resulted in 
severe consequences by the late 1980s. However in the early recession years, until 
1986, even with decreased Arab aid, government spending did not decrease. In 
fact, the government continued to support heavy subsidies, especially in food 
items, and foreign exchange reserves were used to finance budget deficits (Satloff, 
1992:132).
3.3.2 The Debt Crisis
From the beginning of the oil recession to the end of the 1980s Jordan 
accumulated billions of dollars in debt (Satloff, 1992:132) (see Table 3.2). In the 
early 1980s, after the oil shock, decreased Arab aid and decreasing workers' 
remittances, Jordan continued its spending mainly on military and large 
development projects.13 By the second half of the decade foreign savings were 
significantly reduced and debt service obligations increased. However, the 
government resisted adopting harsh stabilisation measures, first seeking to cover 
its problem with commercial borrowing from abroad. However, sources were 
quickly depleted and the result was a massive reduction in the flow of foreign 
savings to the public sector by 1988. The government then turned to domestic 
sources, borrowing heavily from the banking sector at regulated prices rather then 
market prices. Between the beginning and the end of the 1980s, GDP growth 
declined from an average of 9.9% a year to an average of 1.2% (World Bank, 
1994c: 6).
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Table 3.2 Government total external debt, Expenditure, and revenue 1981-1988
(in millions of Jordanian Dinars)*
Year External Debt Government
Expenditure
Government
Revenue
1981 540,90 576,17 309,20
1982 632,53 643,65 362,04
1983 815,04 630,04 400,58
1984 959,73 640,64 415,01
1985 1,054,57 713,44 440,81
1986 1,110,70 770,13 514,39
1987 1,215,99 825,71 531,53
1988 1,726,58 910,87 544,34
Sources: Column 1 Ministry of Planning, Amman. Column 2 and 3 IMF 
International Financial Statistics Yearbook, 1992.
* Jordanian Dinars at constant prices
It was during this period that wealthier Arab states failed to fulfill their previous 
commitments to Jordan. However, there were also other external factors that 
exacerbated the situation. First was Jordan's dramatic decision to sever all ties 
with the West Bank in 1988.14 The disengagement meant the cancellation of the 
West bank development plan, the cancellation of all salaries to West Bank 
bureaucrats and teachers. It is arguable that this move was instigated in order to 
alleviate Jordan's financial burden. However, the move backfired in two ways: the 
first was the reaction of Palestinians in Jordan, (who controlled a substantial part 
of Jordan's wealth in banking, trade and commerce) as their confidence and 
security over their position plummeted and resulted in decreasing investments. 
Second, West Bank funds usually invested in Jordan began to be diverted 
elsewhere (Brand, 1992:183; Satloff, 1992:136). Another blow to Jordan's 
economic well-being was the end of the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq had been Jordan's 
largest trading partner with transit trade and exports. During the war overall Iraqi 
debt to Jordanian exporters reached US $600 million which was a large amount for 
Jordan's fragile economy.
For the first time in its history, Jordan's crisis were not due to external political 
events and could not be solved on the basis of international accords.15 Jordan had 
to 'turn inward' for a change rather then seek temporary external support (Satloff, 
1992:134). In November 1988 the government unveiled its first IMF dictated
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austerity programme, involving the freezing of expenditure on development 
projects, a ban on imports of luxury goods, a sharp rise on customs duties and 
taxes on hotels and restaurants. The most drastic measure, however, was the 
devaluation of the Jordanian Dinar which devalued several times between 1987 
and 1989 to fall to 50% of its former value (Brand, 1992:184). This however, 
proved to be 'too little too late'16 (Satloff, 1992:136).
In early 1989 an IMF team arrived in Amman to work out a fuller adjustment 
programme. The goals of the plan were the recovery of economic growth to 4% 
by 1991, a 50% drop in inflation rates by 1993, and the elimination of the external 
current account deficit by 1993. The ways to achieve this were through further 
cuts in spending and imports and the raising of revenue from exports. The 
government committed itself to reducing total expenditure from 54% of GDP in 
1988 to 46% in 1993 and to increasing revenue during the same period from 32% 
of GDP to 36% of GDP. It also agreed to limit imports and pursue export 
promotion policies to boost exports by 11% (Khader 1990:94).
According to the IMF, freezing government spending and subsidies and imposing 
new duties and taxes was still insufficient to reduce the deficit. Additional 
measures were imposed one of which included price increases on a wide variety of 
goods and a reduction of subsidies on staples such as bran, barley and powdered 
milk. When the Jordanian government implemented these measures in April 1989 
it regained the IMF's approval and obtained another US $275 million in loans and 
credits and entitled it to reschedule its former loans.
However, all these drastic measures came as a shock to the Jordanian public and 
spurred widespread protests in the same month of April 1989. These protests 
came later to be known as the 'food riots' or the 'IMF riots'.17 Key demands of the 
protests were increased accountability of the government and a more equitable 
distribution of government services by reducing the concentration of services in 
Amman. King Hussein responded to these protests by dissolving the government 
and promising parliamentary elections which, due to martial law, were the first in 
20 years. Shortly after these riots, however, it was revealed to the public that the 
government had sold 25% of the Kingdom's gold reserves to service its debt 
burden and that the debt was US $8.3 billion, nearly US $2 billion more than had 
been previously reported (Andoni 1989; Satloff, 1992:140).18
During this time, the Jordanian government made considerable efforts to rectify 
the deteriorating economic situation. Government expenditure was curtailed,
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inflation was reduced and the Jordanian Dinar remained stable after a period of 
fluctuation. Imports fell and exports were increased. Consequently, the budget 
deficit was reduced. As a result of this Jordan was able to reschedule a large 
portion of its external debt. However, during these efforts at rectifying its macro- 
economic imbalances, Jordan was faced with another and a more dramatic 
upheaval: The Gulf Crisis of August 1990.
3.3.3 The Gulf Crisis
Other then Iraq and Kuwait, there is no doubt that Jordan was the most adversely 
affected country by the Gulf Crisis. The Gulf Crisis, which started with Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and culminated in the war in January 1991 was 
a devastating blow to Jordan and reversed much of the progress made in the 
performance of the economy. Besides this setback there was an alarming influx of 
an estimated 300,000 'returnees' into the country with tremendous economic and 
demographic implications. This section will review these implications by first 
looking at the macro-economic imbalances (including employment and balance of 
payments) and then at the impact of the returnees on infrastructure such as 
housing, education and health services.
During the early months of the crisis Jordan was faced with an emergency 
situation with the influx not only of Jordanians working in the Gulf, but the 
evacuation of thousands of (mainly Asian) workers, fleeing the hostilities between 
Iraq and Kuwait through Jordan before being repatriated. It is estimated that the 
Jordanian government spent an estimated JD 30 million to accommodate 800,000 
non-Jordanian migrant workers as they passed through Jordan (Abdalla 
1991:15).19 This effort put pressures on food supplies which were already limited 
in the country given the lack of foreign exchange at the time due to the economic 
crisis, as well as water supply which is one of Jordan's chronic problems.
The Gulf Crisis was a blow to the Jordanian economy in several ways. The first 
was the loss of export markets for both agricultural and manufactured goods. In 
1989, 23% of Jordanian exports went to Iraq. Jordan lost this market due to the 
embargo imposed by the international community on Iraq. The other export 
markets Saudi Arabia (9%), and Kuwait (3%) were lost as a result of Jordan’s 
supposed alliance with Iraq during the Crisis.20 Second, as a result of the 
imposition of a trade embargo, as called for by the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 661 (1990),21 Jordan suffered significant trade and financial 
losses.22 Jordan was forced to import oil at higher market prices, instead of 
receiving Iraqi oil which was expected as partial repayment of Iraqi debt.23
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Jordan's losses in the transport sector as a result of the embargo was immense. 
Land transport was a booming industry in Jordan because of its strategic position 
next to both Iraq and the Gulf States but the sector simply came at a standstill. 
Shipping was also hit hard especially as the US Navy began searching ships going 
to Aqaba as part of the blockade on Iraq. Inadvertently this caused ships to avoid 
the port of Aqaba altogether. There was also an imposition of war risk insurance 
on all incoming sea freight and air traffic which increased cost of imports and 
caused delays of essential goods to the Jordanian markets. Jordan's Central Bank 
estimates indicate that the loss of exports, remittances and other earnings in 1990 
cost Jordan US $2 billion. GNP fell by 10% having grown by 1.5% prior to the 
Crisis (Ministry of Planning, 1991) and income per person tumbled by 12-13% 
(Abdalla, 1991:16).
Thus, Jordan, which was undergoing painful austerity measures, was faced with 
the loss of export markets, dwindling remittances and the numerous burdens of 
accommodating returnees. With these circumstances, the government found itself 
unable to meet scheduled debt payments. The World Bank, recognising that it was 
impossible for Jordan to comply with the structural adjustment programme 
suspended it until after the crisis.24
Besides the macro-economic impact of the Gulf Crisis the most pressing problem 
facing Jordan was the accommodation of the 300,000 returnees, that is those 
Jordanians who lost their homes and jobs in the Gulf states. Given that the 
country's population was 3.2 million in 1990, the returnees resulted in a sudden 
6.9% increase in population size and about 10% increase in its labour force 
(Ministry of Planning, 1991:10-11).
This increase in labour force had, and continues to have, a substantial impact on 
the Jordanian labour market. In the wake of the Crisis, unemployment peaked at 
18.8% in 1991 but fell to 13% by the end of 1994 (Ministry of Planning, 1991:4). 
In fact, the returnees exacerbated an already serious unemployment problem. 
Before the Gulf Crisis, Jordan's labour force was growing at 6.5% annually while 
the Jordanian economy's demand for labour was growing at 2.5% annually (Roy 
and Irelan, 1992:185). The financial requirements for creating jobs for the 
returnees were estimated at US $1,730 million (Ministry of Planning, 1991:11). 
This is a figure that is beyond Jordan's limited financial resources.
60
The returnees' situations varied significantly. Many were highly skilled and had 
considerable amounts of savings. A large number of them already had houses in 
Jordan. However, many of them were unskilled with no savings at all. A 1990 
UNICEF study estimated that 33% of the returnees were living in abject poverty. 
Most of the returnees settled in Amman or Zarqa25 which caused pressure on 
housing and a subsequent increase of 50-70% in rents in 1991 (ESCWA, 1991:16). 
Water supplies were also strained which forced the government to ration water 
(ibid: 19). In addition to the problems of absorbing the returnees, however, were 
the families who subsisted on income derived from the Gulf States whether 
directly through remittances of relatives or indirectly through employment sectors 
that depended on trade with the Gulf (especially transport and agriculture).
Furthermore, 40% of the returnees were under the age of 15 years (UNICEF, 
1990b). This put pressure on the educational system at a time of government 
cutbacks on social expenditure. The private sector was supposed to absorb a large 
number of returnee students. But it was estimated that 95% of returnee students 
were enrolled in the government schools. This caused congestion in government 
schools in Amman and Zarqa. Finally, the pressures on the public health services 
was another issue that the government had to address.26 In short, the impact of the 
Gulf Crisis on Jordan was immense. It had to deal with the returnees who lost 
their life savings and jobs as well as adjust to the increasing pressures on 
infrastructure and the loss of export markets. This came at a time of political 
isolation and during the implementation of austerity measures.27 Jordan did 
receive emergency financial aid, mainly from the European Community and Japan. 
However, this was hardly an adequate compensation for the damage caused by the 
Crisis.
3.3.4 The Peace Process: New Economic Prospects?
The aftermath of the Gulf Crisis had left Jordan in severe economic crisis. There 
was widespread deterioration of living standards. The crisis, and Jordan's support 
of Saddam Hussein, left Jordan politically isolated with the severance of ties with 
the Arab Gulf States, the United States (whose navy was continuing to search 
ships going to Aqaba) and, lastly, other Arab neighbouring countries such as Syria 
and Egypt.
These factors led Jordan into a period of political rapprochement. This culminated 
in its participation in the 1993 Madrid peace conference which basically ended the 
40 year hostility with Israel and with the July 1994 Israel-Jordan Washington 
Declaration. Jordan's major role in the Arab-Israeli peace process was an act
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closely tied with its revival of US relations. It is said that the peace accord which 
Jordan signed alone without the other concerned parties (i.e. Palestinians, Syrians 
and Lebanese) was due to US pressure which basically tied to easing of Jordan's 
debt problem to its 'good behaviour' in the peace process.
Upon signing the 1994 Washington Declaration, Jordan and Israel, agreed on basic 
pressing issues such as water sharing, border demarcation, and economic 
cooperation. However, there were also a number of more tangible benefits to 
Jordan following King Hussein's signing of the agreement, including the full 
restoration of US-Jordanian relations, and the lifting of Saudi Arabia’s boycott. 
Immediately after signing the agreement, US $90 million of Jordan's US $275 
million debt to the US was written off as a first step to waiving the full amount 
within a two year period. At the same time Britain announced that it was 
scrapping some US $90 million of Jordan's debt. As the then prime minister, 
Abdul Salam Majali, stated at the time, in a clear reference to the problems the 
Kingdom had faced since the Gulf War 'All doors that were closed have been 
opened to Jordan' (Hawatmeh, 1994:5).
These 'open doors' include a wide range of economic benefits as seen by the 
government and the international community. It was expected that through trade 
with Israel, the peace process was itself opening up new investment opportunities 
(Economic intelligence Unit, 1994). The open links between Israel and Jordan 
were expected to improve sectors such as tourism especially because of the open 
borders between Aqaba and Eilat.
Other benefits that the peace process were expected to achieve included the 
alleviation of unemployment in Jordan. This was partly through economic growth 
but also through the return migration of Palestinian refugees to Palestinian 
autonomous regions. According to World Bank analysts the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip would experience substantial investments which would increase labour 
demand and create incentives for migration (1994d). In other words, peace was 
supposed to reduce the supply of labour in Jordan. It is noteworthy here, however, 
that such assumptions and aspirations for reducing unemployment rest on a subject 
that was missing in the Jordan-Israel 1993 Agenda.28 To date, the Israelis and the 
Jordanians have not discussed the future status of Palestinian refugees in Jordan. 
Moreover, Jordan's aspirations for economic prosperity through peace with Israel 
have not been fulfilled as expected. The lifting of the trade embargo with Israel 
(the so-called 'normalisation' process), is worrying Jordanian producers and traders 
who anticipate high competition. Neither has it caused a boom in the tourism
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industry as was hoped. In addition, a large part of the Jordanian public including 
private sector establishments are still hesitant to cooperate with Israel for 
ideological reasons. Finally, the US $275 million debt relief promised by the 
American Administration did not come through as it was not approved by the 
American Congress in March of 1995. Despite all this, at official levels, the 
government remains optimistic while a large part of the public remain skeptical. It 
is arguably too early at this stage to foresee the real impact of the peace process.
3.3.5 Amman: Growth Within a Dependent Economy
Thus far, this chapter has demonstrated how Jordan's development was dependent 
on external factors such as the influx of refugees, aid from oil rich Arab States and 
the inflow of capital from migrant labour. The modem development of the city of 
Amman reflect these factors clearly. Janet Abu Lughod (1984:101) in a 
classification of urbanisation patterns of Middle Eastern and North African 
countries categorises Jordan, through its capital, Amman, as a 'charity state.' This 
refers to countries dependent on welfare for their development or when:
The key consequence for urbanisation of the welfare mode of 
production is that settlement patterns need not (author's 
emphasis) have any relationship to internal economic 
development.29
Indeed, the development of Amman reflects not only the 'charity State' concept but 
also a haphazard and uncontrolled pattern. Amman's growth in the last three 
decades has been unprecedented. According to Robert Satloff (1987:8), for 
example:
Statistics cannot quite capture the sense of growth, affluence, 
and easy money that characterised Amman in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s.
Amman, has grown from a small market town into a teeming metropolis over the 
course of a few decades. Amman's early history saw the settlement of Circassian30 
farmers and the completion of the Hejaz railway in 1908 that passed through 
Amman on it’s way from Medina and Damascus. By 1928, after the success of the 
Arab revolt and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Amman became the 
capital of the new Emirate of Trans-Jordan as Emir Abdalla settled there. During 
the British Mandate, Amman's importance grew. This in turn stimulated imports 
and attracted a merchant community through immigration from Syria and Palestine 
(Tell, 1994:5).
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However, it is the influx of refugees, mostly Palestinian, that characterises the 
phenomenal growth of Amman (1948, 1967, 1990/1). From a population of
33,000 in 1947, the population of Amman grew to 108,000 in 1952. From 1952 to 
1963 migration of Palestinians from the West Bank to Amman continued at an 
average annual rate of 30,000 migrants. In addition, as a result of the 1967 Arab- 
Israeli war another 100,000 Palestinian refugees settled in Amman (Doan, 
1992:27). Amman attracted other refugees including those from Lebanon during 
the Lebanese Civil War between 1975-8431 and from Iraq during the 1990/91 Gulf 
Crisis.32 Thus, population growth in Amman is a result of external political 
conditions where refugees mostly settled in Amman and to a lesser extent in 
Zarqa.33 This artificial population growth is also accompanied by high total 
fertility rates (6 children per woman in childbearing years), low levels of infant 
mortality (35 per 1000) and an annual population growth rate of 3.3% during the 
1980s which dropped to 2.8% in the early 1990s (Shakhatreh, 1994:3). In short, 
the population growth rate of Amman has far exceeded that of any other place in 
Jordan.
Since 1948, economic development in Jordan has also been mainly concentrated in 
Amman (Doan, 1992:29). During the 1950s there seems to have been an official 
policy to develop Amman at the expense of Jerusalem (Gubser, 1983:26). After 
the unification of the West Bank all government services were located in Amman 
which drew civil servants working in government institutions to the city (Doan, 
1992:27). The public sector grew in size and until today is a major employer (see 
below).
By the 1970s the inflow of oil wealth enriched the commercial elite in Jordan, with 
the growth of the banking sector in particular. Both aid and remittances, during 
this period, financed a massive expansion in education and health services. 
Infrastructure development projects further encouraged Amman's growth (Kliot 
and Soffer, 1986). This resulted in the incorporation of neighbouring villages 
within the city. The expansion of both infrastructure and social and health services 
was accompanied by a stark urban bias in the distribution of these services. At this 
time, for example, there was a relative neglect of agricultural policy (Kanovsky, 
1989:4). In fact, Amman was expanding at the expense of agricultural lands 
(Tewfik, 1983:79). With scarce water being diverted to the expanding city 
through piping. There was also an evident maldistribution in health and 
educational services compared with the rest of the country.
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Thus, Amman is a city that can be characterised by oil wealth. However, although 
oil wealth was not confined to one class, it did not come without its inequalities. 
In fact, one study demonstrates that between 1973 and 1980, during the boom 
years, inequality (differences between rich and poor) among urban households 
increased (Sha'ban 1990). Inequality between the years 1980-86, on the other 
hand, decreased in urban households as a result of recession (that is better-off 
households were adversely affected by the recession rather than an increase in the 
standard of living in general) (ibid:67-8). The urban sprawl of Amman was 
accompanied by rising consumer prices where, in just three years (1975-1977), 
inflation in Amman jumped 51%, with food prices alone advancing more than 
75% (Satloff, 1986:115). This was accompanied by scarcity of housing and 
increasing prices on rents. Not everyone, therefore, benefited from the boom 
years, and many were left out.
There is also a geographic dimension to inequality in Amman. The influx of 
refugees to Amman following the 1967 war has resulted in the uncontrolled 
growth of squatter settlements largely in East Amman. Official refugee camps run 
by UNRWA are surrounded by unofficial camps which lacked many essential 
services and were often overcrowded (Razzaz, 1993:11). In the early 1970s the 
municipality of Amman estimated that 12% of the population of Amman were 
living in squatter areas and the conditions and quality of housing has deteriorated 
since the 1960s (United Nations, 1974 as quoted by DeJong, 1993:112). In 1983, 
7% of the total Jordanian urban population lived in squatter settlements and 11% 
lived in refugee camps (Doan, 1992:29).
With time, this has developed into a social differentiation between West and East 
Amman that starkly characterises the city today. West Amman and its suburbs, 
are characterised by upper income neighbourhoods, open spaces and good 
infrastructure while East Amman is characterised by middle and lower income 
neighbourhoods, over-crowded conditions and poor infrastructure (see DeJong, 
1993; Kliot and Soffer, 1986; Razzaz, 1993). In 1980 the government, realising 
these disparities established the Urban Development Department (UDD). The task 
of the UDD was to provide services for the underprivileged in terms of housing 
and infrastructure and its main beneficiaries were those living in squatter areas.34 
Disparities between West and East Amman were decreasing by the 1990s. This is 
mainly because during the last two parliamentary elections (1989 and 1994), 
residents of these areas became more vocal and demanding. Unfortunately these 
changes came at a time of increased fiscal pressures on the state.
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In sum, this chapter has thus far provided a chronology of Jordan's political 
economy and highlighted its dependence and fragility. It has also integrated the 
development of Amman within this framework. The following sections will 
investigate the structure of the labour force and the principle employment sectors 
in Jordan and how these political and economic factors have shaped much of the 
labour market.
3.4 Labour Force and Employment in Jordan
Having outlined the context of political economy in Jordan this section will 
provide an account of characteristics of the Jordanian labour force. This will 
highlight its growth and age structure, female labour force participation patterns, 
education and unemployment levels.
3.4.1 Size and Age Structure of the Labour Force
A critical feature in Jordan is the high number of young people in proportion to the 
total population. In 1979 51% of Jordanians were below the age of 15 years. By 
1991 this dropped to 42% of the population. One of the results of this is that the 
rate of growth of the labour force far exceeds the rate of growth in the population. 
This is due to the increasing numbers of young people who are entering the labour 
force. The rate of population growth between 1979 and 1991 was 3.4% while the 
rate of growth for the labour force for the same period of time was 6.1%. There is 
a continual increase in the percentage of the working age population. In the 1970s 
the number of those entering the labour market was 15,000 per year. During the 
1980s this increased to 25,000 and again during the 1990s to 46,000 per year 
(Ministry of Planning, 1992:37-8).
Concomitant to this is the age structure of the Jordanian labour force which is 
quite young. According to Table 3.3, in 1991, 49.5% of the male workforce and 
68.6% of females were below the age 30 years. This has consistently been the 
case since 1979, when 41.2% of male workers and 68.5% of female workers were 
below the age of 30 years. Two observations can be made from Table 3.3. The 
first is the persistently disproportionate workforce participation levels of young 
women compared with other age groups of women. The second, is the dramatic 
decline in the labour force participation of women below the age of 20 years, 
which dropped from 11.2% in 1979 to 5.3 % in 1991, especially as there are no 
significant alterations in the participation of men in these age cohorts. Women's 
participation is therefore becoming increasingly compressed between the ages of 
20 to 29 years. This is probably due to the fact that women stay in education for 
longer years before joining the labour force.
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Table 3.3 Distribution of Labour Force by Age Group and Sex 1979,
1987,1991 (%)
Age Group 1979
male female
1987
male female
1991
male female
13-15 - - 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3
15-19 10.9 11.2 10.9 6 9.4 5
20-24 16.3 35 22.3 40.7 21.8 36.4
25-29 14 22.3 14.4 24.2 17.9 26.9
30-39 24.6 21 17.6 18.7 20.1 21
40-49 18.5 6.4 16.6 6.6 15.3 7.6
50-59 10.2 2.4 11.8 1.8 10.2 2.3
60-64 2.7 0.4 3.1 0.4 2.6 0.5
65+ 2.8 0.4 2.7 0.3 2.2 0.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: 1979 Housing and Population Census 
1987 Health Nutrition and Manpower Survey 
1991 Employment, Unemployment, Poverty and Returnees Survey
The urbanisation of the formal labour force is another feature, with the growth of 
Amman and the size of the service sector meaning increased employment 
opportunities. Indeed, Amman's share of employment in comparison to the rest of 
the country is as much as 69% of the total Jordanian labour force (Amerah et al. 
1993:12). Not all of this labour force necessarily live in Amman, however. It is 
common for people to commute from neighbouring towns to Amman on a daily 
basis. Another reason for this increasing urbanisation is the increasing education 
levels (see below) and the fact that the labour force are becoming increasingly 
skilled professionals. In 1991, for example, 20% of males and 38% of females 
were in technical and professional occupations.
3.4.2 Female Labour Force Participation
In 1991 female labour force participation rates in Jordan were 14.1%. This is 
substantially lower than many other developing countries. However, these rates 
are a characteristic of the region where neighbouring countries report more or less 
the same rates.35 One of factors behind the low labour force participation rates of 
females in Jordan is the high total fertility rates (see earlier).
Table 3.4 illustrates the growth rates of the Jordanian labour force by sex. It 
reveals that the rate of growth of the female labour force has exceeded the rate of
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growth of the male labour force. It is also evident from this Table that there has 
been a consistent increase in female labour force participation since 1961 while, on 
the other hand, there is a slight drop in the growth of the male labour force rates. 
This phenomenon, of female labour force growth outstripping male labour force 
growth has been documented for many other developing countries (See Brydon 
and Chant, 1989:162; Moore, 1988:97; Joekes, 1987:17) and in Middle Eastern 
countries as well (see, Al-Qudsi et al. 1993:3).
Table 3.4 Labour Force Participation Rates, 1961,1976, 1987,1991 (%)
1961
male female
1976
male female
1987
male female
1991
male female
Crude Participation 
Rate36
50.9 2.2 33.3 4.1 38.9 5 36.3 6.4
Participation Rates 83.2 3.3 73.3 8.4 69 10.6 81 14.1
Sources: 1961 First Census of Housing and Population
1976 The Multi-purpose Household Survey
1987 Health Nutrition and Manpower Survey
1991 Employment, unemployment, Returnees and Poverty Survey
As indicated above, and in Chapter One, most of the female labour force are young 
and below the age of 30 years. In addition, there is the women's marital status: 
65% in 1991 were single (compared to 37% of males). Therefore, a related issue 
here is the increasing age at marriage of women in Jordan and its relation with the 
increasing rates of female labour force participation. In 1990, age at marriage for 
males was 27 years and for females 24.7 years. For females this is a significant 
increase since in 1972 age at marriage was 18 years and in 1979,21 years.
3.4.3 Education Levels of the Labour Force
For a country poor in natural resources, Jordan has invested heavily in its human 
resources, in the past few decades. The oil boom brought Jordan unprecedented 
opportunities for its educated manpower which reinforced the country's 
commitment to education but made it increasingly dependent on remittances from 
abroad. Today, Jordan has one of the most advanced and sophisticated educational 
systems in the region (Kanovsky, 1989; Roy and Irelan, 1992; Richards and 
Waterbury, 1992). It has been noted that there are few less developed countries 
with such a large number in higher education in relation to size of the population 
(Kanovsky, 1989:47).
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The development of the education system was one if the government's priorities 
since the 1950s. The emphasis then was to provide enough schools to serve the 
whole population and to eliminate high illiteracy rates. By the 1960s elementary 
education became compulsory. It was during this period that education policy 
became geared towards labour export to oil producing countries in need of 
technical labour. Therefore, education became not only targeted toward Jordan's 
labour market needs but of those of the Gulf States. During the 1970s, education 
policy became more directly linked with government's general development plans 
and emphasis shifted towards improving quality rather than expanding services. 
This continued throughout the 1980s by which time Jordan had developed an 
extensive educational infrastructure. Whereas primary school enrollment in the 
1950s was 50% of school-age population this increased to 91% during the 1970s 
and almost a 100% during the 1980s. Enrollment of girls during the 1980s was 
90% (Roy and Irelan, 1992:193).
As for higher education, during the 1970s Jordan had the highest ratio of students 
in the Arab world (Sayigh 1978: 193) However, there was an increasing mismatch 
between graduates and local labour demand. Training was geared towards skills 
needed in oil producing industries since skilled Jordanians were mostly migrating 
to these countries. The result of this was an increasing shortage in local skilled 
labour. It was the first time in Jordan's history where there was virtually no 
unemployment. Here, the government attempted to fill the void left by this skilled 
male out-migration by encouraging female recruitment into the public sector 
(Hijab, 1988).
Higher education policies became largely geared towards the export of labour 
insofar as the 1981-1985 National Development Plan anticipated that 27% of new 
entrants to the labour force would be university graduates and another 26% 
graduates of post-secondary levels (i.e. diplomas and polytechnics). Neither 
planners nor students anticipated that the demand for foreign labour in the Gulf 
states would end. What is worse is that during the same period the recession in 
Jordan itself reduced domestic demand for educated manpower. While there were 
plenty of graduates seeking work in Jordan there was a shortage of middle level 
practical skills. For example, Jordan has about three times as many physicians as 
nurses. With the increasing unemployment of university graduates, 40% of nurses 
were expatriate labour (Kanovsky, 1989:48). Indeed, the numbers of foreign 
workers, mainly Syrian and Egyptian was swelling as they took on the low paid 
jobs the Jordanians were refusing to do (ibid:49).
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Data from 1991 reveals that the education levels of the Jordanian labour force are, 
hardly surprisingly, quite, high but this is also accompanied by high graduate 
unemployment (see below). Table 3.5 clearly demonstrates the increasing 
education levels of the labour force during the past two decades for both men and 
women. More important, however, it reveals that the education levels of the 
female labour are considerably higher than the male labour force.
Table 3.5 Distribution of Labour Force By Level of Education and Sex, 1979,
1987,1991 (%)
Education Level 1979
male female
1987
male female
1991
male female
Illiterate 20.6 8.7 12.4 8.2 7.9 5.6
Read and Write 21.5 4.2 20.4 5 13.8 3.8
Primary 24 7.3 17.9 3.8 18.1 4.1
Preparatory 12.6 8.1 20 9 22.4 7.9
Vocational - - 1.7 0.9 2 1.3
Secondary 10.6 26.4 12.5 18.8 14.6 14.9
Mid. Diploma 4.4 32.5 7.9 41.9 9.8 45
Bachelors 5.4 11.57 6.9 11.5 9.7 16
Higher Education 0.7 1.7 0.5 0.3 1.4 1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: 1979 Housing and Population Census
1987 Health Nutrition and Manpower Survey
1991 Employment, unemployment, Returnees and Poverty Survey
For example, according to Table 4.5 post secondary education for males increased 
from 11% in 1979 to 16% in 1987 and again to 19% in 1991. In contrast, the 
education levels of females increased from 44% in 1979 to 56.5% in 1987 and to 
62% in 1991. The reasons for this is that unlike males, the higher the female 
education the more likely they will participate in the labour force (See Chapter 
Five for fuller discussion).
3.3.4 Unemployment
The above review of the increasing size, young age structure and high education 
levels of the labour force leads to a discussion of unemployment. In tracing 
unemployment trends in Jordan during the last three decades it becomes obvious 
how these are contingent not only on demographic determinants but also on
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regional and external influences as well. Jordan had high unemployment rates in 
the early sixties, with the influx of Palestinian refugees. This evolved into a labour 
shortage during the oil boom years, as Jordan became a regional labour supplier. 
For example, in 1976 at the height of the oil boom, unemployment was as low as 
2%. However, since the beginning of the recession years in the early eighties, 
unemployment has been steadily increasing. In 1987 it was 15% and by 1991 it 
reached 17.%. It can be argued that this is the result of education policy which has 
produced a highly skilled labour force for which there is not enough market 
demand. This is also coupled with a short-sightedness of education policy that 
assumed that the demand for skilled Jordanian labour abroad would continue and 
that the local labour market, which is small, would be able to absorb the remaining 
graduates.
Perhaps because the female labour force has higher education levels than the male 
labour force, there are significant gender differentials in unemployment levels. In 
1987, male unemployment was 13% compared with 27% among women. By 1991 
these differences were exacerbated as male unemployment increased to 14.7% 
while female unemployment became as high as 34.4%. Another possible reason 
for these differentials is the fact that female labour supply is limited to a few 
gender ascribed jobs (such as teaching and secretarial work) (see Chapter Six). 
However, regardless of the reasons behind these differentials, the fact remains that 
the gap between males and females has been increasing. The role of labour market 
discrimination or segmentation will be the focus of discussion in Chapter Four.
Generally, unemployment levels by age groups reveal that the problem is of youth 
unemployment, which is expected as it is linked to the initial search for 
employment. However, yet again the problem is greater among females than 
males. In 1991, 84% of unemployed females were between 20-29 years of age 
compared to 50% of the males. Furthermore, 76.8% of unemployed females in the 
same age groups had post secondary education compared to 34.8% of the 
unemployed males.
3.5 An Overview of Employment in Jordan
Employment opportunities in Jordan can be described through a categorisation into 
three main sectors: the public, private and informal. These sectors differ in terms 
of employment conditions, remuneration levels and job security and benefits. 
However, as the following will demonstrate, this does not mean that different 
employment sectors do not overlap.
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3.5.1 The Public Sector
One of the main characteristics of employment in Jordan in general and Amman in 
particular is the size of the public sector. In 1991 the public sector alone 
accounted for almost half of employment (46%) in Jordan (World Bank, 
1994b:35). The reasons behind the growth of the public sector are several. First, 
the growth in social sectors accompanied the demands of a swelling population 
whether in health, education and other services. Second, the government was 
obliged to provide jobs for the expanding labour force. Third, in order to boost 
economic growth in a resourceless country with a sizable number of refugees, the 
government became a main shareholder in the productive sector. Fourth, regional 
instability required resources to be moblised towards security and defense 
(ibid:34).37
The state is not only a major employer in Jordan but also owns large shares of the 
major industries. According to Laurie Brand (1994:490):
The picture that emerges is that of a domestic economy with a 
public sector component that is deceptively large for a country 
with an avowedly free market orientation such as Jordan.
The government owns 42% of mining, 23% of manufacturing, 27% of tourism and 
20% of transport and finally as much as 90% of the phosphate mines which are 
Jordan's main export (Richards and Waterbury, 1990: 209). The government also 
runs the Pension and Social Security funds, and the Housing and Industrial 
Development Banks which are main funders for housing and industrial loans for 
citizens. This state-led growth can be understood through the Marxist concept of 
state capitalism, whereby the state acts as the private sector without any change in 
the relations of production.38 However, even though the Jordanian state has large 
stakes in the means of production, this does mean that it is run by state capitalism 
in the Marxist sense. This is because public sector enterprises in Jordan largely 
operate at a loss and cany more workers then they need. It is the provision of jobs 
that is their main objective rather than profit and controlling the means of 
production. Furthermore, upon adopting the stabilising measures, in the early 
1990s, it was recommended by the IMF that the government sell its shares in 
public enterprises, but to date, such measures have not been taken.
The state thus remains a major employer in Amman and recruitment is centralised 
through the Civil Service Commission (CSC). Recently the CSC has only 
recruited graduates, however, and leaves unskilled labour to be hired by the 
relevant Ministries or institutes which need it. In recent years there has been
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changes in public sector employment as government expansion has reached its 
limits with significant over-staffing (World Bank, 1994b:40). The result of this is 
reflected in changes between the number of those appointed compared with those 
who have applied in recent years. For example, in 1981 86% of applicants to the 
CSC were appointed, but by 1994 the proportion had dropped to 6.5% of 
applicants.39
Public sector employment is very attractive, even though the government is 
viewed as a low wage employer compared with the private sector. This is because 
compensations exist with respect to job security and fringe benefits.40 Wage 
determination is closely linked to education and a civil servant's grade might 
increase with years of experience. There are thus several allowances and benefits 
to public sector employment which in effect decrease the wage differential 
between public and private sectors.
Women are particularly attracted to public sector employment and form 31% of 
the total employees of this sector (Akel et al. 1993:22-3). While males in the 
public sector earn 10% less than males in the private sector, these differentials are 
only 2% for females (World Bank, 1994a:37). Besides the earnings advantages 
women might prefer public sector employment due to factors such as flexibility of 
work conditions, shorter working hours and stricter compliance with maternity 
leave and relevant labour legislation compared with the private sector. In addition, 
there are general attitudes in society at large, whereby public sector employment is 
considered 'respectable' and 'secure' for women (see Chapter Five for a fuller 
discussion). In other words, public sector employment is prestigious for women. 
Typically, they are school teachers. In 1991, 58% of the total female employment 
in the public sector was teaching followed by 26% in administration and another 
16% in health services (Akel et al. 1993:22-3). Most men in the public sector 
besides civil servants in government ministries are in the military (Brand, 
1994:73).
3.5.2 The Private Sector
Attempts to signal out the private sector are complicated by the fact that in Jordan 
official statistics do not differentiate between private sector and public sector 
activity especially as the government is a major shareholder in the major Jordanian 
industries (see earlier). In addition, there is also an overlap between the private 
sector and the informal sector employment in official statistics as self-employed 
and family workers are usually quantified as private sector employees. This is 
compounded by the fact that private sector employers utilise, on occasion,
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employees on a temporary informal basis (see below) who might otherwise be 
described as informal sector employees.41
Given these limitations in the differentiation between the sectors, in 1991 it was 
estimated that the private sector accounts for 50% of the working population, 
(including the self employed and family workers) (World Bank, 1994c: 115). This 
has been usually described as small.42 The low rate of job creation in the private 
sector can be traced to the predominance of the public sector in terms of both 
employment policies and government shares in private sector companies (see 
above). On the other hand, the beginning of the 1990s showed an increased 
dependence on the private sector for new job opportunities in light of the inability 
of the public sector to absorb more labour, and owing to the decrease in foreign 
demand for Jordanian labour (Ministry of Planning, 1992:38)
The private sector does not have the fringe benefits or the various securities that 
exist in the public sector, although it can be argued that wages in general are 
higher than the public sector. Having said this, the private sector is largely 
governed by a comprehensive labour legislation and regulation which provides 
employment conditions, trade unions, industrial relations, processes of 
negotiations, labour inspection, occupational health and safety. These laws, which 
were established in 1960, cover all workers irrespective of nationality and sex. 
Some of these regulations are now outdated as labour market conditions have 
changed during the previous 30 years. A draft for the re-organisation of labour 
laws has been on the parliament's agenda since 1984 but there have been no 
amendments since then except for some ad hoc decisions to regulate labour.
The Jordanian labour law in principle does not discriminate on the basis of gender. 
There are also several elements that specifically address women workers. These 
include maternity leave of 40 days with full pay and a prohibition of the 
employment of women in 'dangerous' jobs and a ban on night work.43 Although 
these measures are seen as protection to women workers this can sometimes work 
against them in terms of finding work (see also, Akel et al. 1993; Government of 
Jordan, 1995).
Besides the Jordanian labour law there is the Social Security Scheme that provide 
worker protection in the private sector. This was established in 1978 and is 
basically a state-run corporation. It collects fees from employers and employees 
and provides health insurance, compensation for disability or death and 
unemployment benefit. Pensions are paid for men at the age of 60 years and
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women at the age of 55 years. It also covers public sector employees who do not 
benefit from the pension law for civil servants (i.e. those not employed through the 
Civil Service Commission). The Social Security scheme includes private sector 
establishments employing 5 persons or more. However, small establishments are 
entitled to join if they choose.
It has to be mentioned here, however, that even though such schemes were devised 
to regulate private sector employment and to ensure worker rights and benefits this 
is not always the case. Private sector employers employ their workers on three 
different terms. The first is formal contract terms in which workers are permanent, 
fully protected by the labour laws and get full Social Security benefits. The 
second type of workers are those who are employed on a no-contract basis. These 
workers have no job security in terms of permanence of employment but do have 
access to the Social Security Scheme. The third are casual informal workers who 
have no benefits whatsoever. This absolves the employers of the responsibility of 
including such employees in the social security scheme which is costly to them 
(employers have to contribute to the social security of their workers) and/or 
providing the various rights and benefits. It is here that formalXinformal sector 
employment intersects.
The main economic activities of the private sector in Jordan are commerce and 
manufacturing. In terms of commerce, almost two-thirds of commercial activity in 
Jordan takes place in the Greater Amman area. The commercial sector includes 
the largest number of workers after the government sector. In 1991, it employed 
23% of the male labour force and 17% of the female labour force (Department of 
Statistics 1991). The Jordanian Chamber of Commerce plays a major role in 
regulating this sector as each establishment engaged in any form of commercial or 
services activities is required to register and obtain a permit. In 1990, there were
70,000 members belonging to branches in the different cities of the country of 
which 24,000 were in Amman.
The manufacturing sector also represents a large share of Jordan's economy. 
During the last few years the manufacturing sector has grown substantially and its 
contribution to GDP (at 1985 prices) went up from 11.1% in 1986 to 13.1% in 
1992 (Ministry of Planning, 1992:70). The Amman Chamber of Industry is 
another is another body that regulates this sector. Its members are both public, 
private and mixed sector companies. In 1990, membership totaled 6,000 (Brand, 
1994:57). The major problem with industrialisation in Jordan is that most 
Jordanian industries are major importers of most of their raw materials due to the
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paucity of natural resources in the country. This has limited Jordan's 
competitiveness in the world market and increased the vulnerability of the sector. 
For example, during the Gulf Crisis and the embargo on ships bound for Aqaba, 
industries were hit hard as they had no access to their raw materials. Despite this, 
within the industrial sector there are those that concentrate on the Jordanian 
market, especially in foodstuffs and clothing, while others are export oriented, 
especially those producing pharmaceuticals, clothing and electronics.
In 1991, 54% of manufacturing employment in Jordan was in Amman. In 
addition, in recent years this sector has experienced the largest increase in 
employment generation (see Ministry of Planning, 1992).44In particular, 
manufacturing employment has created new job opportunities for women as it 
accounts for 61% of female recruitment between the years 1988 and 1990 (World 
Bank, 1994c: 121). Moreover, it has been projected that the future demand for 
female employment in this sector will outpace that for men (see Amerah et al. 
1992).
3.5.3 The Informal Sector
Distinguishing the informal sector is problematic because of an overlap with the 
private sector. Perhaps as a result, there is a relative paucity of information on 
informal sector employment in Jordan. The available data vary according to 
specific definitions and approaches to the informal sector.45 In the absence of 
extensive or uniform data, therefore, this section first outlines characteristics of the 
informal sector in Amman as identified through official data and then through two 
micro level studies conducted in low income areas in Amman. The official 
approach for differentiating between the formal and informal sectors in Jordan is 
through size of establishments. Thus, employment surveys as well as other 
sources of national level data define the formal sector as those establishments 
employing more than five persons and the informal sector as those establishments 
employing less than 5 persons. According to this approach 45% of such informal 
micro-enterprises are in the city of Amman (Akel et al. 1992:11). Typically, these 
small establishments are in the construction, transport and service sectors. Wages 
in this sector are lower then either the public or private sectors where in 1991, as 
much as 91% of those engaged in this sector earned less then 150 JD ($219 US) 
per month. Furthermore, female participation is quite low at 7.2% (ibid:45). 
These figures may reveal some aspects of employment in small establishments but 
are by no means exhaustive and representative of the informal sector per se.
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Other approaches in defining the urban informal sector in Jordan discounts the size 
of the enterprise and utilise different parameters. Rebecca Doan (1992:29) in a 
study based in squatter areas in Amman defines the informal sector as the:
Labour without contractual arrangements or legal protection
whether the self employed, petty traders and producers.
This approach describes the informal sector in Amman as generated by the formal 
sector which resorts to informal, sometimes temporary, arrangements of labour 
recruitment (see also Ozar, 1996 on Turkey). This is due to the fact that demand 
for the services or product of the formal sector fluctuates and such methods of 
recruitment fill their needs according to current levels production. Another reason 
is to curtail costs as well since such informal employees are paid less and receive 
no benefits. As for the employees, this is simply a survival strategy in an 
environment of weakly enforced labour legislation, lack of minimum wage 
legislation and weak labour unions (Doan, 1992:36). Apart from the informal 
work in formal establishments, the informal sector depends largely on what can be 
termed the 'traditional economy' and the accessibility to this sector is easier then 
the formal sector. Although less desirable in terms of its lower wages, the 
flexibility of this sector is considerable especially for women who can work at 
home.
While the numbers of economically active women in this sector in the official data 
outlined above were low, a study of female labour force participation in three low 
income communities in Amman reveals significantly high economic activity that 
takes place inside the household (see Toubeh, 1994). In these communities it was 
found that 87% of working women are engaged in the informal sector.46 Of those, 
68% worked at home mainly in embroidery and sewing and another 17% in the 
immediate neighbourhood (ibid:99). This study also revealed that young women 
tend to work in the formal sector compared to older women who are engaged in 
informal and home based productive activities (see also Chapter Five).
Having outlined employment in the three sectors in Amman the question is their 
interaction or more specifically the mobility of workers between sectors. It has 
been pointed out that the public sector provides long term security and the private 
sector's wages are higher, and, finally, that the informal sector is more flexible and 
possibly more accessible. In fact, workers in Amman aspire to move between 
these sectors to maximise their benefits. For example, someone might be engaged 
in the informal sector until he/she can secure a more permanent public sector job.
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Also, a common phenomenon in Amman is that of multiple jobs. That is, a public 
sector employee will have a small private business after hours or could be engaged 
in some informal activity. In this way an employee will enjoy the various fringe 
benefits of the public sector as well as extra wage. It has to be mentioned here, 
however, that the phenomenon of multiple jobs is more prevalent among male 
employees then female employees.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated how Jordan's short history is based on a series of 
external influences as a result of its lack of resources and its location within the 
Arab system. Having depended on the export of labour and economic aid for 
prosperity, this proved to be unsustainable when these sources of income 
diminished dramatically. A more recent factor is the peace process with Israel. It 
is hoped that unlike the oil boom years, this will bring a more lasting stability 
rather than a temporary and fictive one.
Within these general trends the Jordanian labour force has evolved as young in 
age, highly educated and urban which also means that there are high rates of youth 
unemployment. What is also significant is that the growth rates in the female 
labour force are outpacing the growth rates of the male labour force. Employment 
opportunities for this youthful labour force revolve around the public sector,which 
is currently contracting and no longer able to absorb the growing labour force, a 
private sector, that is too small in size but is experiencing change in its 
occupational structures (see Chapter Four), and an informal sector, that has a low 
demand for an educated or skilled labour force.
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Notes to Chapter Three
1The great grandfather of King Hussein' (the present king of Jordan) led the revolt against the 
Ottomans with the assistance of the British. This helped to free Arab lands from Ottoman control 
in World War One (Gubser, 1988:98).
2 At the end of the First World War and the defeat of the Ottoman empire, the French and the 
British took control of regions that were previously under Ottoman rule. Syria and Lebanon 
became under the French mandate during this period while Palestine and Jordan under the British 
mandate. Britain had also some control over Iraq and Egypt.
3 According to Mary Wilson (1987:3) '...Abdalla's domain as it was created in 1921, had a 
population of only some 230,00, no real city, no natural resources, and no importance to trade 
except as a desert thoroughfare.'
4 During the British Mandate in Palestine, Jewish immigration from Europe was escalating 
especially following the 1916 Balfour declaration in which the British promised the Jews a home in 
Palestine. In Jordan, during the British mandate, land was allegedly being bought by Jewish 
colonists who considered Jordan as part of ancient Israel. However, unlike Palestine, a Jewish 
homeland in Jordan was not a tangible threat.
3 Jordan has absorbed about one half of Palestinian refugees after the creation of the state of Israel. 
Almost all the other refugees were in Gaza Strip, (then under Egyptian rule) Syria and Lebanon 
(Kanovsky, 1989:1).
6 Aqaba, which is Jordan's current port city on the Red Sea was undeveloped at the time and most 
commercial links were dependent on the Palestinian port cities of Haifa and Jaffa.
7 For example, a World Bank mission visiting Jordan in the mid 1950's arrived at very pessimistic 
conclusions. The only expected improvements were either the discovery of oil or the union of 
Jordan with other Arab States (Kanovsky, 1989:1).
8 Indeed foreign aid has been one of the most important factors in Jordan's economy since its 
creation.
9 UNRWA was set up temporarily in 1950 as means of addressing the needs of Palestinian 
refugees. Although its mandate is renewed every three years it still operates today in Jordan as 
well as in countries with Palestinian refugees such as Lebanon, Syria, West Bank and Gaza Strip.
10 Satloff (1992:130-1) distinguishes between pre-1970s Western aid and Arab aid, stating that the 
latter was of a completely different magnitude. According to him there were different rationales 
where the offer of Western aid grew out of a politically motivated agenda to assist moderate anti­
communist regimes and that it was just adequate to maintain a 'controlled' level of development. 
Arab aid on the other hand was unconditional and reflected the economic circumstances of the 
region: as oil prices increased, so too did the level of aid.
11 For more on the expansion of education during this period see Roy and Irelan (1992) and 
Richards and Waterbury (1992). For more on the expansion of health services in Jordan see 
DeJong (1993).
12 This is compared to an average of 3% of GDP in other non-oil producing Arab countries (World 
Bank, 1994a:5).
*3 Most debt was incurred during the period 1979-1990 (i.e. the recession years). It increased from 
below US 1 billion in 1979 to nearly US 8 billion in 1990 (World Bank, 1994c:6).
14 After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 Jordan continued to administer public 
services in the West Bank. Also, private sector ties continued to function. Relinquishing such 
control was a symbolic gesture that the West Bank is a Palestinian and not a Jordanian entity.
13 It seems that Jordan still had hopes that it will be bailed out of their debt by funds from the Gulf 
States. Although the Gulf donors gave Jordan 350 million in emergency aid following the crash of 
the Dinar in 1989, this was not enough (Satloff: 1992:138).
^  In January 1989 Jordan was forced to withdraw a 150 million US Dollars loan days before it 
was opened for syndication in Europe because it had virtually no subscribers. The Kingdom's lack 
of creditworthiness came as a shock to the government as well as to local bankers and speculators 
(Satloff, 1992:136-7).
17 There were similar protests in other parts of the region, such as in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and 
Morocco, as a response to austerity measures (Richards and Waterburry, 1992:286)
*8 This was a further embarrassment for the government which was aiming to restore confidence 
through a change in government and cabinet together with changes in electoral law that been under 
martial law since 1967.
*9 In 1991 a Jordanian Dinar roughly equaled $1.46 US Dollars.
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20 Officially Jordan's declared position was of neutrality, and the government repeatedly declared 
its interest in the peaceful resolution of conflict However, both the Jordanian government and 
people had cultivated close relations with Iraq. Jordan (along with Gulf states and the US) has 
supported Saddam Hussein during the 8 year long war against Iran. As a result Jordan had built 
economic ties with Iraq and in a way had come to identify politically with it. Thus, during the Gulf 
Crisis Jordanian people’s sentiments were largely pro-Iraq (Power-Stevens 1994::23). Indeed, 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were slow to 'forgive' Jordan its positions, and political and economic 
relations, which were previously Jordan's life-line, were slow to recover (Power-Stevens, 1994:25).
21 In response to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the Security Council in its Resolution 661, 
decided that all states should prevent all kinds of trade from and into Iraq including any transfer of 
funds for the purpose of any business related trade, commerce, industry or public utility 
undertaking (Abdalla: 1991:1). Currently in late 1996 and five years after the war, this embargo is 
still in place except for some humanitarian aid.
22 Indeed it was not only Jordan that suffered because of this embargo but many other developing 
countries. See Abdalla (1991) for impact of Gulf Crisis on developing and East European countries
23 This was later rectified and Jordan was allowed to receive oil as part of debt incurred during the 
Iran-Iraq war.
24 This was to be renewed by October 1991 and within a different framework as assumptions and 
projections had been altered. The new conditions were more lenient and ran for 8 years rather 5 
years. The reasons behind this are assumed to be Jordan's anticipated participation in the peace 
conference with Israel in Madrid in late 1991 (Economic Intelligence Unit, 1992).
23 Zarqa is Jordan's second largest city.
26 For more on the impact of structural adjustment as well as the Gulf Crisis on public health 
services in Amman see DeJong (1993).
27Aid during this period was closely tied to political affiliation. Egypt for example, although 
adversely affected in terms of remittances, had been compensated through debt forgiveness for its 
stand with the Allied Forces during the War. Syria as another example was also compensated 
through grants and soft loans from Western as well as Arab funders (Abdalla, 1991:14-20)
28 It has been suggested by analysts that this may have been a trade-off against King Hussein 
being given a prominent role in the future status of Jerusalem's holy sites (Power-Stevens, 
1994:46).
29 Countries included in this classification are Lebanon, Israel, the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories and, to a lesser extent, Egypt. For an elaboration on the classification of Arab cities and 
mode of production see Abu Lughod (1984).
30 Circassians are an ethnic group originating from the Caucacus. It is said that they fled Russian 
rule in the late 19th century. Today they comprise approximately 5% of Jordan's population.
31 Between 1974-84 approximately, 30,000 to 50,000 Lebanese settled in Amman. Most were 
involved in finance and commercial enterprises which boosted Amman's economy (Kliot and 
Soffer, 1986).
32 The number of Iraqis in Amman fleeing the war during 1990-91 was estimated at 10,000 
(Ministry of Planning 1991).
33 Between 1965 and 1980 more than 50% of urbanisation in Jordan can be explained by migration 
(Richards and Waterbury, 1990:265).
34 The Urban Development Department was originally part of the Amman Municipality. It was 
renamed in 1992 as the Urban Development Corporation. The main objective was to upgrade 
squatter areas through giving beneficiaries legal tenure and building materials. In return, the 
beneficiaries were bound by contract to repay the cost of upgrading on a phased basis over 10-15 
years (see Bisharat and Zagha, 1986; DeJong 1993 for further discussions).
33 1990 data reveal that female labour force participation in Egypt was 11%, in Syria 15% and in 
Iraq 6%. The highest female participation rates in the region were in Lebanon at 27% (UNDP 
1993).
36 Crude labour force participation rates refers to percentage of workers from the total population.
37 Military expenditure in 1986 was 14% of GNP. The ratio of military expenditure to health and 
education was 2:1 and the ratio of armed forces to teachers was 2.5:1 (UNDP, 1990, Table 18 as 
cited in World Bank, 1994a:34).
38 State capitalism refers to the fact that public ownership does not mean that the profit motive 
disappears or that the workers gain control of the surplus value of their own labour. In other words, 
worker-owner exploitation still prevails (see Richards and Waterbury, 1990:219-223).
3^ These figures are calculated from the Civil Service Commission data. It should be noted that 
numbers of applicants have increased dramatically in recent years. In 1981 there were 7175
80
applicants of which 6188 were appointed while in 1994 there were 110890 applicants of which 
7278 were appointed.
40 The allowances and benefits of public sector employees are extensive. They include family 
allowance, transport allowance; annual leave of 30 days for university graduates and 21 days for 
those with lower education; pensions after 15 years of service for females and 20 years of service 
for males; health insurance for family including parents; access to subsidised government stores. 
Other benefits that apply to all civil servants include housing loans, education grants, preferential 
tax treatment and provident fund. For more details on these benefits, see World Bank (1994b: 37- 
8).
41 For a fuller discussion on the problems of labour classification see Tokman, 1991.
42 Laurie Brand (1994:53) estimates that the private sector which is small in size can be credited 
with producing only 50-60% of Jordan's GDP.
43 These are supposed to provide 'protection' for women workers. What is meant by 'dangerous' 
jobs are conditions that might endanger the foetus of pregnant women. In terms of night work the 
ban is in effect between 7 pm to 6 am.
44 Manufacturing employment increased by 11% per annum in the 1980s or by 1 2000 jobs per 
annum. This growth is significantly greater then the rate of increase in total employment (6.9%) 
(World Bank 1994c: 120).
45 For definitions of informal sector employment as adopted by the International Labour 
Organisation see Mehran (1996). For a review of informal sector employment in the Latin 
American context see Tokman (1989).
46 This is perhaps a result of a Save the Children income generating project of sewing and 
embroidery that operates among the three communities of Al-Natheef, Al-Mahata and Al-Misdar. 
This might explain the high participation rates of women in the informal sector in the sample of 
this study.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GENDER. AGE AND LABOUR DEMAND
Having examined the political economy of Jordan, the characteristics of the labour 
force and nature of employment, this chapter focuses specifically on labour 
demand for young women in Amman. It explores the degree to which there is 
gender typing of jobs and the implications for young women who enter the labour 
market. Labour demand is evaluated here on the basis of current composition of 
the labour force and attitudes and policies towards gender in labour recruitment 
(see Chant, 1991a).
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section briefly outlines 
the employer survey from which the bulk of data for the current chapter is drawn. 
Section two analyses the employer survey data through four different sectors: 
manufacturing, trade and services, retail, and community and personal services. In 
each sector it considers the composition of the labour force, employer recruitment 
strategies and occupational and spatial segregation. This demonstrates the existing 
differences in segregation within as well as between sectors. Finally, section three 
synthesises a profile of gender and age segmentation in labour demand in Amman 
through the analysis of gender stereotyping, on part of the employers, occupational 
segregation and workplace spatial arrangements.
4.1 The Employer Survey
As noted earlier, the employer survey is based on 36 interviews of private sector 
establishments in Amman. Limiting the survey to the private sector is motivated 
by the recent retrenchment in public sector employment and the expansion of the 
private sector (see Chapters One and Three). In addition, since public sector 
employment is centralised and organised around rules and regulations it would 
have been difficult to reach an insight into gender and age segregation in labour 
demand. Excluding informal and family based activities here is based on the fact 
that youth employment is concentrated in the modem sectors and not informal and 
traditional activities (see Chapter Five).
The establishments chosen represent wide ranging private sector activities in 
Amman. Interviews were conducted through questionnaires with either the 
employers themselves or, in the cases of large establishments, personnel managers 
(see Appendix One and Three). It is important to point out, at this stage, that the 
number of cases are too few to be representative of formal economic activity as a 
whole in Amman. Nevertheless, despite the limitations that this poses, the
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following is an attempt to provide illustrative data on case study material in 
relation to the role of gender and age in labour market demand.
In general, the composition of the labour force in the private sector is 
predominantly male. The total female labour force in the sample was 28% which 
is quite high compared with the national average of 14.1% (see Table 4.1). 
However, this may be due to the small size and nature of the study rather than a 
reflection of higher female participation rates in Amman's private sector. 
Furthermore, due to the objectives of the study it would have been counter­
productive to include a majority of firms with no female employees. There are 
four firms, in the survey sample, with no females and there are no establishments 
with no male employees. The firms which have a majority of female employees, 
have at least a male owner and/or manager.
The sex of the owners and personnel managers is predominantly male with the 
exception of five establishments. Female employers/personnel managers are in the 
education and retail sectors with one in the manufacturing sector. These female 
employers are as much influenced by the gender typing of jobs as males and based 
much of their recruitment and job allocation accordingly.1 Therefore, the sex of 
employers is not utilised as a significant criterion of analysis.
Table 4.1 Total Number of Employees, Percentage of Women Employed and 
Average Age According to Sector in Employer Survey
Sector Total 
Number of 
Firms in 
Sample
Total 
Number of 
Employees
Percentage 
of Women 
Employed
Average Age
Male Female
Manufacturing 12 1704 28(488)* 31 22
Trade and 11 612 26(161) 37 27
Services
Retail 7 288 26 (34) 28 26
Community 6 257 48 (124) 42 27
Services
Total 36 2861 28% (807) 31 24
Source: Employer Survey 
* Absolute numbers in brackets
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The sectoral distribution of the sample includes a wide range of activity which in 
the current analysis will be grouped into four categories (see Table 4.1). These 
include 12 establishments in the manufacturing sector, consisting mainly of large 
export oriented manufacturing, such as two electronics factories and a hygienic 
paper production, and food processing, although it also included small workshops 
in clothing and a shoe production. Another 11 establishments are in trade and 
services. These include a variety of service-oriented firms such as real estate, 
travel agent, construction company, cleaning agency, dry cleaners and a bank. 
Another seven establishments are in retail. These include an optician, a 
supermarket, a bookshop, and a tea wholesaler among others. Finally, a further six 
establishments are in community and personal services. These are largely schools, 
a hospital and a community fitness centre.
4.2 Sectoral Differences in Labour Demand In Amman
While Chapter Three has outlined the structure of employment in Amman, the 
following will specifically address gender and age segregation within and across 
the different sectors. Therefore, within each sector, the following analysis will 
examine gender composition of the labour force, employers' recruitment 
preferences and practices, working conditions, occupational segregation and wage 
differentials within firms and finally spatial segregation.
4.2.1 Manufacturing Sector
According to the Amman Chamber of Industry, in 1994 there were 7500 
manufacturing establishments in Amman.2 These vary from large scale export 
oriented firms to firms with only two workers. The firms interviewed differ in 
terms of employer needs, recruitment strategies and working conditions. In 
investigating these differences the following analysis divides the manufacturing 
sector into three firm types.
The first firm type is large scale manufacturing which include two electronics 
factories, hygienic paper production and vegetable canning. The proportion of 
women in some of these industries is quite high (see Table 4.1). Employers in
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such industries openly talk about the 'advantages of hiring girls.' The second firm 
type is mechanised production. These high technology firms depend largely on a 
skilled labour force and include an edible oil refinery, a plastic moulds and paint 
factories. Apart from a limited number of clerical and administrative workers, the 
number of women in these factories is limited.3 The employer in the paints 
industry explained that in the past his workforce included a high proportion of 
women, but there was so much 'trouble'4 that they eventually switched to an all 
male hiring practices. The third firm type are the small and medium-scale 
workshops. These do not only differ from the above two types of firms but are 
themselves varied in terms of the gender composition of labour. One clothing 
workshop depend on a majority of male labour 'to avoid trouble' as well, while all 
the others depend on a majority of female labour. The bakery and the shoe 
workshop have a more or less roughly equal number of men and women.
Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices
Most employers do not only have gender preferences for different jobs but also 
different preferences based on age and marital status. In terms of the male labour 
force, large scale manufacturing employers prefer young men. This is because 
they believe that shop floor work is strenuous and it is important to have young 
and able men performing these tasks (see Table 4.2). In contrast, employers do 
not regard the marital status of the male labour, as significant. As for the 
mechanised factories, age and marital status of the male workforce is not 
important. This is because in the operation of sophisticated machinery, it is skill 
rather than muscular strength that is important. Finally in terms of the workshops, 
whether clothing, shoes or food neither the age nor the marital status of men is of 
any apparent significance to employers.
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Table 4.2 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female 
Workers in the Manufacturing Sector
Type of Firm Males
Age* Marital
Status
Females
Age Marital
Status
Large Scale 
Electrical goods 
(refrigerators, televisions 
etc.)
Electronics (electrical fuses, 
cassettes, videotapes)
20-30
20-35
n.i
n.i
18-20
18-20
single
single
Hygienic paper 18-35 n.i 18-25 single
Vegetable canning n.i n.i 16-25 single
Mechanised Production
Plastic shapes and moulds n.i n.i n.i single
Edible oil refinery n.i n.i n.i n.i
Paints 18-35 n.i n.a n.a
Workshops
Shoes n.i n.i n.i n.i
Clothing n.i n.i below 30 single
Clothing n.i n.i 15-25 single
Clothing n.i n.i 16-22 single
Bakery n.i n.i n.i n.i
Source: Employer Survey 
* Age in years
n.i = not important/no preference 
n.a = not applicable
As for the female labour force, employers' preferences seem to be much more 
specific. In large scale assembly manufacturing, there is a unanimous preference 
for young and single women. In fact, among some it is not a preference but an 
imperative to all intents and purposes. Employers seem to believe that young 
single women are more energetic and more committed to work than married 
women who are burdened with household responsibilities. In terms of the 
mechanised production firms, in the edible oil refinery which has a limited number 
of women workers, employers have no particular preference for age and marital 
status. On the other hand, the plastic moulds firm, has no preferences in terms of 
age, but do prefer single women. According to the employer this is because they 
are a new firm and they want to avoid the extra cost of maternity benefits, finding 
replacements and/or the assumed higher absenteeism of married women.
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In terms of the small workshops, on the other hand, youth and single marital status 
are an essential criterion for the clothing workshops but not in the shoe production 
or the bakery. Like large manufacturing industries owners of small workshops 
perceive young single women as better workers. They are supposed to be quieter 
and less confident which makes them more obedient to employers authority and to 
work regulations.
Other entry criteria apart from age and marital status include education levels. In 
large scale assembly work, employers seem to pay more attention to women’s 
education than men's. An employer will not employ an illiterate woman but is 
ready to employ an illiterate man. As the canning factory employer explained:
It is not that I want educated girls but illiterate girls are difficult 
to deal with and slower at learning. Illiterate boys, on the other 
hand, are not that much different from boys with some form of 
education.
This employer prefers to recruit women who have, at least, a preparatory level 
education.5 The reason behind this added education requirement for the mostly 
unskilled female labour is that women are perceived as less qualified than men 
who are better at acquiring new skills and have an advantage in coping, not just 
with machinery, but also to new working environments. Among the mechanised 
industries a majority of male workers are skilled and many are university 
graduates of engineering sciences. The few women in these industries also tend to 
be university graduates as well. In terms of the small workshops, education could 
be an added asset for entry for either sex but remains largely insignificant.
In terms of employer recruitment practices, there are no formal methods. The 
employer in the large electronics factory stated that when they first opened the 
factory they advertised in the newspaper. The result was huge; numbers of 
unskilled female applicants and a smaller number of male technical labour. That 
was the last time they had formally advertised. Most establishments utilise social 
networks and word-of-mouth search strategies. This often relates to paternalism 
evident in Jordanian working environments, summed-up by one employer who 
said: 'we are a family here.' So when employing a new recruit he first asks 'his 
girls' if they can recommend someone.6
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Differences in Working Conditions
Working hours among most establishments vary between seven am at the earliest 
and four pm at the latest except for one of the electronics factories that work 
continuously and include night shifts utilising male labour.7 In the large industries 
and some of the mechanised ones, transportation of women workers is available 
through company buses from specific pick-up points in the city, and the plastic 
moulds industry offers transportation for both men and women. Employers 
provide this extra incentive to attract young female labour who are otherwise 
socially restricted and would find it hard to commute to the industrial part of the 
city where most of these large industries are located (see Chapter Six).
In terms of worker security and type of contract, almost all establishments in the 
manufacturing sector depend on three types of working conditions: formal 
contract, non-contract and informal labour (see Chapter Three). This means that 
workers have varying degrees of job security and benefits.8 Among large 
establishments such as electronics, hygienic paper and vegetable canning, labour 
consists of a core of formal contract and non-contract based permanent employees 
together with informal based temporary workers at times of high demand. For 
example, the large electronics firm (refrigerators and televisions) frequently hires 
an extra 50-100 workers during periods of the year when demand of the level of 
production is highest. Furthermore, all the small workshops depend on informal 
based labour. No workshop was part of the Social Security Scheme. In terms of 
the gender breakdown of the contract non-contract based employment in the 
manufacturing sector, the majority of females seem to work on no contract basis 
while men are more evenly distributed among the three types of working 
conditions.
Occupational Segregation Within Firms
Manufacturing employment is the most horizontally and vertically segregated 
form of employment. Table 4.3 reveal that the overall wage differential between 
men and women in the manufacturing sector as a whole was 132 JD ($195 US) for 
men and 79 JD ($117 US) for women. This wage differential is the widest among 
the sectors included in this survey. The reasons behind this are perhaps because 
the vast majority of women, 64%, are unskilled workers. Typically, these are 
either assembly line workers in the large industries or casual labour in the clothing 
workshops. A substantial number of men are unskilled labour, at 38%, yet this 
still remains considerably less than women. Semi skilled labour consisted of a 
substantially lower number of women, 15.6% compared to 30% men. The reason 
behind this is the fact that men's and women's jobs are perceived differently
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regardless of skills. For example, men's work which includes muscular strength 
and the operation of machinery is perceived as semi-skilled or skilled. Women's 
work, which requires patience and manual dexterity is perceived as unskilled. The 
result is a construction of gender distinctions in the workplace. Employers in 
manufacturing boasted of how the accuracy and precision of 'their girls' reduce 
their costs. However, men are almost always paid more, because they do work 
that require 'muscular strength.' It was interesting how often employers confused 
men's supposed physical strength with increased worker productivity.9 The fact 
that assembly line work was strenuous for women even if it did not require 
muscular strength was not a consideration among employers. This accords with 
data elsewhere that suggest that the gendering of unskilled jobs are part of 
employers strategies to segregate men from women and maintain wage 
differentials (see Ecevit, 1991 on Turkey; Heyzer, 1986 on South East Asia; 
Pollert, 1981 on the United Kingdom).
Table 4.3 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and females in the
Manufacturing sector
Occupation
Males % females %
Average Wages 
(in JD)
Males Females
Unskilled (assembly line, 
packers, etc.) 38 (450)* 63.5 (310) 78 58
Semi-skilled (simple 
machine operators and 30 (367) 15.6 (76) 103 78
other)
Skilled (mechanics, large 
machine operators) 12.5 (152) 5(24) 147 102
Technical (engineers, lab 
technicians quality 7(88) 2(9) 270 195
control, etc.)
Supervisors, formen 4.6 (56) 5(25) 250 115
Administration and 
management 4(48) 2.8 (14) 378 198
Clerical 0.4(5) 3.6 (18) 150 120
Sales and marketing 3(36) 1(5) 200 180
Other 0.4(5) 1.4(7) - -
Total 100(1216) 100 (488) 132 79
Source: Employer Survey 
♦Absolute numbers in brackets
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In general, therefore, men and women almost never perform the same tasks. In 
cases when men do engage in the same jobs as women, which is sometimes the 
case in the clothing workshops, their pay arrangements would differ. In these 
establishments women are paid an average monthly wage of JD 60 ($89 US). Men 
doing the same job are paid per piece and can earn up to JD 250 ($370 US) per 
month. Therefore, women's pay remains lower than men's even in the same 
occupations (see also Phillips and Taylor, 1980).
Clothing workshops also provide examples of vertical gender segregation. These 
workshops tend to be female dominated apart from fabric cutters and management. 
Fabric cutting, which is designated as skilled work, comes after managerial posts 
in the occupational hierarchy and is always performed by highly paid males. In 
contrast, the lowest in the hierarchy in these workshops are those who do the 
'finishing' (sorting loose threads, attaching buttons and ironing). These are the 
least paid and are always women. Employers claim that only women can do the 
task of preparing the end product for the market because they are cleaner and 
neater.
In terms of vertical mobility, unlike men, women performing manual labour have 
few chances for mobility in most industries. The most that women can aspire to in 
such occupations is the post of supervisor. Such cases are limited to supervising 
other females and pay is only marginally higher. Women are not thought to be 
authoritative enough to be in charge of men.10 There is one case, however, among 
the mechanised industries whose demand for specialised labour seem to favour 
women. The quality control department of the edible oil refinery is occupied by 
four females. Apart from management, these women had more skill, education, 
pay and prestige than any of the other male workers. It has to be noted however, 
that despite this, these women were not directly in charge of men workers. Other 
examples of vertical mobility for women in the manufacturing sector include some 
women who are in management, administration and marketing. These women, 
although few in number seem to be able to achieve the same vertical mobility as 
men. In other words, the entry point of women largely determines the 
opportunities for upward mobility, with the higher up the occupational hierarchy 
having greater chances of ascending to higher-rank positions. Theoretically, this 
applies to men as well. However, first it has to be kept in mind that proportionally 
more women than men enter as unskilled labour. Second, there is the intervening 
variable of employers' assumptions that men are more qualified to operate 
machinery or to supervise others and that men stay longer in employment and are 
therefore more worthy of promotion and training.
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Spatial Segregation Within Firms
Employers gender typing of jobs also includes a variety of spatial arrangements. 
The most blatant are the single sex working environments that are assumed to be 
more harmonious and therefore more efficient and productive. This includes the 
all-male staff of the paint industry. It also includes the all female staff of the three 
clothing workshops. The employer of the only male-dominated clothing workshop 
claimed that he tried to switch to an all male workforce since women were causing 
too many problems. However, he was unable to get rid of all his female 
employees because some had to perform the finishing touches (sewing buttons, 
sorting loose threads and ironing) that the men refuse to perform. His solution was 
to accommodate them in the attic in order to limit their interaction with the males.
There are a variety of arrangements to do with spatial segregation other than single 
sex employment or separate work spaces, however. By and large, this worked to 
women's disadvantage as it entailed performing lower skilled jobs and hence less 
pay than the men. One such example is the electronics factory where the majority 
of assembly line workers are women and men who are permanently technicians. 
The women occupy the centre of the large hall and the men work on the periphery 
so that although they are within view, there is no direct communication. In 
addition, the women are not allowed to leave their machines nor the factory 
premises during break times. These restrictions, according to the employer are 
necessary in order to minimise interaction between male and female workers and 
maintain a 'respectable working environment.' This same establishment relied on a 
further form of spatial segregation through different shifts. Women work from 
seven am to three pm where only the male technicians would be present. The men 
have two other shifts one that starts at three p.m. and another at ten pm that would 
continue overnight. Although men and women in the different shifts performed 
identical tasks, the afternoon and night shifts means higher wages for the men
However, there are examples where spatial segregation worked for women's 
advantage. The edible oils refinery has 36 men in various occupations from 
managerial to unskilled labour. They also have four women who are the 
laboratory technicians and controlled the quality of the factory's output. These 
women are in advantaged positions and no men apart from management were able 
to enter their laboratory. The reason behind this is that the supply of well- 
qualified female laboratory technicians convinced the employer to have an all 
female staff in order to maintain a congenial atmosphere. These women never
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interact with other male workers except for the management. This is an example 
of occupational segregation which is based on spatial segregation rather than the 
gendering of jobs.
4.2.2 Trade and Services Sector
The trade and services sector has been earlier identified as the largest within the 
private sector in Amman (see Chapter Three). According to the Chamber of 
Commerce in 1993 it included 19957 members (this also includes retail firms, see 
below). Women comprise of 26% of the total employees of the firms interviewed. 
The gender composition of the firms varied. Out of the 11 firms, three have no 
female workers at all. These include what are perceived as male domains of a 
storage, movers and packing firm, a restaurant and a dry cleaners. Other firms 
have a very limited number of women. This includes a real estate firm and a travel 
agents where female employees consist of one secretary in each firm. A hotel and 
a cleaning agency also have a limited number of women but in these cases it is 
considered a problem. The employers need more female workers but social 
stigmas relating to women in hotel and cleaning occupations hinders their 
availability.11 Other firms such as the shipping agents, bank and computer 
consultancy has a fair amount of female workers who are often professionals. 
Finally, one establishment in this sector is dependent on a predominantly female 
workforce which is a hairdresser.
Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices
On the whole, although age and marital status of employees are a consideration for 
employers in trade and services they are of less significance than in other sectors 
(see Table 4.4). Skill and education are equally if not more important. 
Furthermore, unlike employers in the manufacturing sector who predominantly 
prefer young men but are not concerned about marital status, several firms in the 
trade and services sectors prefer married men. As for women workers, two firms 
prefer single women. The hotel prefers single women because they are more 
flexible in their working hours which is necessary for hotel work. Also, according 
to the manager, young women are more: 'energetic, livelier and better looking.'12 
The computer consultancy also prefers single women because according to the 
manager they invest too much in their employees to tolerate the high absenteeism 
and turn-over rates of married women. According to him: 'We expect total 
commitment and married women are not able to provide that.' When asked what 
happens to women who get married while in their employment, it transpired that 
those who have achieved good positions usually stay in employment after 
marriage.
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Table 4.4 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female 
Workers in the Trade and Services Sector
Type of Firm
Age*
Males 
Marital Status Age
Females
Marital Status
Travel agent n.i n.i below 40 n.i
Real estate n.i married n.i n.i
Bank n.i n.i n.i n.i
Shipping agents 22-35 n.i 22-35 n.i
Movers and storage 18-30 n.i n.a n.a
Coffee house/restaurant n.i n.i n.a n.a
Hotel 18-40 married 18-28 single
Cleaning services 17-25 n.i n.i n.i
Hairdresser n.i n.i 18-25 n.i
Dry cleaners n.i n.i n.a n.a
Computer consultancy 23-28 married 23-28 single
Source: Employer Survey 
* Age in years
n.i = not important/ no preference 
n.a = not applicable
In terms of the importance of education as a recruitment criterion, some of the 
above services related occupations do not require a high amount of education from 
either sex, but emphasise previous work experience. These are the hotel, 
hairdressers, dry cleaners, restaurant, and movers and packers. In contrast, for the 
bank, computer consultancy and shipping agents, education for both males and 
females is equally important but will vary according to the specific job they will 
perform. In general however, it consists of specialised university education and a 
working knowledge of the English language.
Other recruitment criterion include what employers describe as appearance and/or 
behaviour of women workers which does not apply to men workers. Trade related 
occupations especially those employing secretaries and receptionists seem to want 
women with 'good appearance' and 'pleasing character.' Both these attributes refer 
to a split in the ideological construction of Jordanian employers. This is between 
'modem' employers looking for a western image of the workplace and 'traditional' 
employers who prefer not to recruit female employees at all, or to segregate them 
from male workers. In the trade and services related firms that employ women, 
employers are more likely to prefer women employees that wear western dress
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styles and who are ready to interact freely with male superiors and clients. What 
this means is that veiled women are disadvantaged in obtaining jobs in this sector. 
Employers in modernising firms such as the travel agency, computer consultancy 
and the shipping agency will not employ a veiled receptionist or secretary.
Differences in Working Conditions
The working conditions within the trade and service sector vary considerably. 
Except for the bank and the computer consultancy, working hours are long, usually 
from eight am till around six pm, although people have lunch breaks of one to two 
hours. None of the firms in this sector has a two day weekend. Only the shipping 
and travel agents take Sunday afternoons off, which amounts to one and half days 
off. The restaurant, hairdressers and dry cleaners do not close on weekends and 
working hours are the longest and can amount to 12 per day.
The working conditions for most of the employees in this sector are relatively 
secure in comparison to other sectors. The bank, travel agency, shipping agency, 
and computer consultancy work on formal contract basis, and provide, social 
security and health insurance. In addition, the computer consultancy and the 
shipping agency has a provident fund, while the bank provides loans (especially 
for housing or education of children) and family increments (an extra amount of 
money for each dependent child). However, gender differentials are clear in the 
health insurance schemes and family increments. These benefits are given to men 
who are supposedly the family breadwinners. Since women are not the main 
breadwinners they are not entitled to either health insurance for their families or 
family increments for their dependents. This bias is in effect legally endorsed 
since Jordanian labour laws, guided by the 'male breadwinner ideology,1 do not 
mention the fact that the families of working women are entitled to such work 
benefits. It makes an exception, however, for divorced or widowed women, who 
therefore can claim such benefits.
In other firms, notably the hairdresser, hotel restaurant and travel agent, employees 
work on an informal contract basis which means that apart from the social security 
scheme, they have no job security or benefits. In some cases benefits depend on 
the employers' attitudes and/or benevolence. The owner of the restaurant, for 
example, reported that one of his employees asked for a holiday and: 'I gave him a 
permanent one.' On the other hand, the owner of the hairdresser claimed that he 
likes to keep his employees happy and tries to accommodate their holidays or give 
them their monthly wages in advance when they need it in order to foster long 
term loyalty and a better working environment.
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Occupational Segregation within Firms
The trade and services sector is varied in terms of gender segregation within firms. 
Within the bank, computer consultancy and shipping agents, both vertical and 
horizontal segregation are comparatively less pronounced than in the smaller 
firms. In terms of specific occupations these three larger firms have women who 
work alongside men, albeit fewer in numbers, as managers, accountants, and in 
marketing and public relations. The wage differentials in these occupations are not 
particularly pronounced (see Table 4.5). It is of note that women in these 
occupations are young professionals who are highly educated. In contrast, other 
occupations are evolving as 'female occupations,' such as the case of the increasing 
numbers of female bank tellers which is a relatively recent phenomenon in 
Amman and is developing as a prestigious female occupation.
Table 4.5 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and Females in the Trade and
Services Sector
Occupation
Males % Females %
Average Wages 
(in JD) 
Males Females
Administrative 12 (53)* 12.4 (20) 210 195
Managers/executives 7.4 (33) 3.7 (6) 450 419
Accountants 6(26) 5(8) 214 209
Computer technicians 15 (68) 13.6 (22) 400 400
Clerks/ secretaries 0.8 (4) 25 (40) 190 180
Marketing/sales 7(31) 2.5 (4) 294 281
Public relations 4.4 (20) 2.5 (4) 315 298
Beautician/hairdresser 0.2(1) 2(3) 200 150
Cleaner/ waiter/cook 23 (104) 8(13) 79 65
Packer/janitor/driver 5(22) - 178 -
Receptionist/telephone
operator
2.6 (12) 2.5(4) 186 121
Bank tellers 15 (70) 22.3 (36) 210 210
Other 1.6(7) 0.6(1) - -
Total 100(451) 100(161) 231 220
Source: Employer Survey 
* Absolute numbers in brackets
If we look at the smaller firms, both vertical and horizontal segregation become 
more pronounced. Despite the fact that the restaurant, dry cleaners, and movers
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and storage company do not hire women at all, the real estate agency and travel 
agency only hire women as secretaries and receptionists. The hairdresser's is 
owned by a man who is the principle haircutter while the women employees 
perform everything else.13 According to him men are better at using scissors. So, 
women workers in these firms rarely achieve upward mobility. Wage differentials 
in these occupations are also more pronounced. Male secretaries, for example, 
earn marginally higher than females but male receptionists, telephone operators 
and hairdressers earn substantially higher than females (see Table 4.5).
Finally, in terms of occupations that entail cleaners washers and cooks it is 
important to point out that the number of women performing these jobs are few not 
only in this sector but throughout the different sectors in Amman. The hotel 
owner for example, expressed his frustration at the lack of availability of women 
willing to work as chambermaids or waitresses due to the pre-existing social 
stigmas (see earlier). A related factor here is age. It is possible to find older 
women who work as cleaners and cooks but for younger women this would be 
considered a compromising profession (i.e. draws attention to their propriety and 
could avert marriage prospects) (see Chapter Six).
Spatial Segregation Within Firms
Apart from the firms that do not employ women, spatial segregation in this sector 
is virtually impossible and is not in the interests of employers. This sector 
demands that even with occupational segregation spatial integration is necessary. 
Women who work as professionals are more likely to interact in the same 
workspace as men. This includes the bank, computer consultancy and shipping 
agency. In fact, in these cases, the desegregation of work spaces are part of 
employers' interests who's quest for promoting a 'modernised' atmosphere includes 
open-plan workspaces. This also includes promoting some woi^en to senior 
positions which according to employers reflects positively on the image of their 
firms. Despite this, however, concepts of gendered space persist. For example, 
the employer in the shipping agency stated that they are currently looking for a 
new recruit as a computer analyst. Since the computer team is already comprised 
of three women, he plans to employ a woman although there are many qualified 
male applicants. According to him the women will be more comfortable together 
and this will make a more congenial team work.
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4.2.3 Retail Sector
According to the Amman Chamber of Commerce, retail firms are part and parcel 
of trade and commerce (see above and Chapter Three). However, since employer 
strategies and practices in labour recruitment vary considerably, the following will 
explore retail firms separately. The gender composition of this sector in Amman is 
predominantly male. From the firms interviewed the proportion of women 
working in retail is 12% (see Table 4.1). It has to be noted here, that until recently 
and apart from shops that deal with women's items, it would have been difficult to 
find women working as shop assistants in Amman, since the amount of exposure 
to strangers that such occupations entail was deemed culturally unacceptable. In 
many respects, therefore, the young women working in this sector reflect recent 
changes in attitudes to gender in sales related occupations.
Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices
Employers' preferences of the age and marital status of their employees in the 
retail sector vary (see Table 4.6). For example, the florist does not consider age or 
marital status of male or female employees important. The supermarket, on the 
other hand, prefers young men who are needed for their muscular strength in 
moving and shelving items. In contrast, they do not pay attention to the age of 
women who are at the pay tills. The pharmacy does not pay attention to the age of 
men but prefers young women from the point of view that they are better skilled 
and educated than older women. The tea and coffee wholesalers prefer both older 
and married women and men because according to the employer this provides a 
more stable and mature workforce. Finally, in terms of the food wholesalers the 
employer prefers young men and women because door-to door-marketing requires 
energy and patience plus attractive physical appearance. While the marital status 
of the male labour is unimportant the employer prefers single women on the 
pretext that door-to-door marketing is: 'not a respectable job for a married woman.'
97
Table 4.6 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female
Workers in the Retail Sector
Type of Firm
Age*
Males 
Marital Status
Females 
Age Marital Status
Florist n.i n.i n.i n.i
Optician n.i n.i (20-30) n.i
Bookshop (18-30) n.i (20-25) n.i
Supermarket (18-25) n.i n.i n.i
Pharmacy n.i n.i below 30 n.i
tea/coffee wholesalers above 35 married above 35 married
Food wholesalers and 
distributors
below 30 n.i below 30 single
Source: Employer Survey 
* Age in years
n.i = not important/ no preference 
n.a = not applicable
In terms of other entry requirements, education seems to be an important factor 
with the pharmacist as well as the optician but is largely insignificant for both 
sexes in the other retail firms. For the bookshop as well as the wholesale 
marketers some form of education is important but not specialised education. 
Other requirements for the wholesale food marketing and optician include good 
appearance for women. A pleasing character is of importance for the optician, 
florist and supermarket.
Differences in Working conditions
Working hours in the retail sector are the longest of most sectors interviewed. All 
except for the tea and coffee wholesalers and door to door marketers work from 
eight am till at least eight pm. Furthermore, some retail firms, the supermarket 
and the florist, do not close on Fridays, the weekend. So basically, in spite of 
lunch breaks and the rotation of days off, employees in this sector work the longest 
hours. As a young woman optician explained: 'I do not see the daylight.'
Next to the manufacturing sector it can be said that this sector is the least protected 
form of employment as most workers are non-formal contract or no contract 
employees. It is only the pharmacists and opticians, who work on formal contract 
basis with social security benefits. Most of the employees of this sector are semi- 
informal labour with limited job security and benefits. In terms of health
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insurance it largely depends on the benevolence of the employer. The owner of 
the supermarket explained that he paid the hospital bill of a work-related injury of 
one of his men but refused to be 'blackmailed' in paying for further compensation. 
Perhaps due to this lack of labour protection, gender differentials in working 
conditions are not very perceptible in this sector. In fact, if anything women seem 
to be in more advantaged positions since they tend to be the specialised 
pharmacists or opticians and therefore more likely to be work on formal contract 
basis.
Occupational Segregation Within Firms
It appears that occupational segregation within the firms in this sector is also not as 
marked as other sectors. One of the reasons for this is that perhaps skill 
differences are not as varied and mostly includes sales. In addition, firm size tends 
to be small which adds to the lack of variation in occupations. One salient 
observation is that a substantial proportion of women workers work as specialised 
sales persons, compared to more men who work as non-specialised sales workers 
(see Table 4.7).
In fact, in Amman today, most pharmacies and opticians are run by young women. 
These specialised sales occupations have evolved as culturally acceptable, if not 
prestigious, female occupations, despite the fact that until recently sales 
occupations were traditionally male occupations. One of the reasons for this 
transition is the fact that such occupations usually require a college degree, which 
in turn has tended to 'professionalise' these types of sales work. In addition, a 
substantial number of florists are increasingly becoming run by women. Again 
this is a result of changing attitudes where such an occupation is increasingly 
perceived as requiring 'taste' (i.e. a female trait) as well as a certain amount of 
expertise and/or education. The two women workers in the florist were those who 
managed the shop and did the flower arranging leaving the men to do the cleaning, 
delivering and general assistance. Thus, in general, occupations in the retail sector 
are becoming increasingly desegregated although numbers of women are still 
limited in quantitative terms.
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Table 4.7 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and Females in the
Retail Sector
Occupation Average Wage
Males % Females % (in JD)
Males Females
Sales Person (in shop) 20.6 (20)* 14.7 (5) 190 140
Marketing and promotions 
(door to door) 34 (33) 29.4 (10) 200 **100
Managers/executives 9.2 (9) 3(1) 600 550
Secretaries/ clerks 4.2 (4) 12(4) 180 110
Janitors/cleaners/packers 19.6 (19) 5.8 (2) 90 80
Specialised sales person 7.2 (7) 29.4 (10) 190 195
Other 5.2(5) 5.8 (2) - -
Total 100 (97) 100 (34) 212 150
Source: Employer Survey
* Absolute numbers in brackets
** Added to monthly wages are commissions
Despite this occupational desegregation, however, wage differentials between men 
and women persist (see Table 4.7). While these differences are minimal among 
the specialised sales persons, the men who work as door-to-door sales and 
promotions earn double the amount that women earn in the same occupations. 
According to the employer, this is because the men have been longer in this type 
of employment and have thus acquired skills over the years. Women, on the other 
hand, have less experience. In addition, the employer was clear in explaining that 
women’s pay is not less but on different terms. Apparently, they earn a 
commission on the amount they sell which can add up to be equal if not more of 
the men's wages. The employer explained this difference on the basis that, 
compared to men, women tend to be shy and need an incentive to become better 
door-to-door marketers. He later conceded to the fact that he needed women 
workers because during the day time, when most males are at work, women have 
an easier access to housewives than men to sell their products.
Spatial Segregation Within Firms
There are no firms in this sector that depend on single sex employment. Spatial 
segregation at work is also limited. In some ways, the bookshop and the coffee 
and tea wholesalers had occupational segregation that amounted to spatial 
segregation. In the bookshop, the only female is the accountant/secretary who sits 
in an office in the back of the shop. In the tea and coffee wholesalers the only
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female also sits in the back room packaging the products before distribution. In 
the other firms, one equally encounters women and men. In fact, in the pharmacy 
and the florist it is the women who deal with clients while the men are the invisible 
labour.
4.2.4 Community and Personal Services Sector
This sector includes health, education and community services. Its particular size 
either, in terms of number of establishments or size of employment is difficult to 
ascertain. This is because unlike the above sectors, which are governed by the 
Amman Chambers of Industry and Commerce, there are no governing bodies. 
Such establishments generally follow Ministry of Health or Education rules and 
regulations. For health workers, there are also the professional syndicates.14
The gender composition of this sector has a relatively high proportion of women 
(see Table 4.1). This is because it includes the profession that is seen as most 
appropriate for women: teaching. It also includes health professionals who despite 
the social stigmas on nursing (see Chapter Six) include a substantial amount of 
female workers in other health related occupations besides nursing. Finally, it 
includes a community fitness centre that has equally divided services between a 
men's section and a women's section.
Employer Recruitment Preferences and Practices
There seems to be a definite preference for young women in the schools and 
nurseries interviewed in the survey. Out of the four educational institutions, two 
prefer unmarried women (see Table 4.8). There are no preferences for either 
young or single men in the schools that do hire men teachers. In fact, one school 
prefers married men since they are seen as more dependable with regard to their 
behaviour towards young female colleagues. The community fitness centre prefer 
both young men and women because of the nature of their work which requires 
physical fitness. The marital status of the employees, however, is not considered 
of any importance to work performance and workplace behaviour. As far as the 
hospital is concerned, marital status also seems to be unimportant for both sexes 
while all applicants are preferred to be below the age of 30 years. The reason, like 
the community fitness centre, is due to the nature of the job that needs physical 
energy.
Other entry criteria such as education levels are not gender specific and vary 
according to the different occupations. Education qualifications for both education 
and health professionals and training qualifications for fitness instructors are
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equally required from both men and women. The two nurseries hire women who 
have limited qualifications since it is not seen as a job that needs specialisation, 
only patience and love of children. Female nurses' aids also do not require high 
qualifications.
Table 4.8 Employers' Preferences for Age and Marital Status of Male and Female 
Workers in the Community Services Sector
Type of Firm Males
Age* Marital Status
Females
Age Marital Status
Elementary school n.i married n.i single
Day care centre n.a n.a (20-30) n.i
Elementary and secondary n.i n.i (20-28) single
school
Kindergarten n.i n.i below 35 n.i
Hospital below 30 n.i below 30 n.i
Community fitness centre 20-32 n.i 20-28 n.i
Source: Employer Survey 
* Age in years
n.i = not important/ no preference 
n.a = not applicable
Differences in Working Conditions
Differences in working conditions between men and women are minimal in this 
sector. They consist of 8 hour shifts in the hospital, reasonably short working 
hours in the schools and quite flexible hours in the fitness centre. In terms of type 
of contract it appears that women tend to be more concentrated in jobs that are 
based on informal contract than men. Among the institutions interviewed it is the 
hospital that mostly hires its professional staff on a formal contract basis while the 
semi-professional and the unskilled staff are hired on an informal contract basis. 
Almost all the workers in the community fitness centre are formal contract 
employees. Most of the schools, on the other hand, have loose hiring practices 
with high turn-over rates. Only the teachers that taught older students in the 
secondary school had formal contracts and were paid throughout the summer 
vacation.
Due to the high supply and crowding of young women teachers there are some 
reports of exploitation in the schools and nurseries. One of the most common 
involves young women who are graduates of teacher training programmes and are
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employed as unpaid trainees, which supposedly is due to their young age and lack 
of experience, before the employee can guarantee permanent employment. At the 
end of the training period, which is usually a month, the employer switches to 
another trainee rather than take on the previous trainee as a permanent staff thus 
utilising a source of a free labour.
Occupational Segregation Within Firms
Occupational segregation in this sector revolves around a clear skill hierarchy. 
There are professional nurses and health related occupations and teachers who are 
university graduates and there are semi-professional teachers and nurses who have 
either finished school or attended some form of non-university training. While in 
the firms interviewed there are two women school headmistresses and the fitness 
centre had a woman manager (for the female section), this does not diminish the 
existence of vertical segregation. There is only one male who is a nurse's aid and 
no males who were not fully qualified teachers. Furthermore, there are no women 
doctors in the hospital despite increasing numbers of women health professionals 
(see Table 4.9).
Horizontal segregation in this sector is closely related to skill but also to cultural 
practices. While vertical segregation exists between predominantly skilled males 
and predominantly semi-skilled females, vertical segregation also exists between 
those females performing semi-skilled work, such as nurses and teachers' aids, and 
the male cooks, drivers, janitors. In other words, because of social stigmas 
regarding such jobs, in terms of vertical segregation, women tend to be 
sandwiched between the all male lower and upper rungs of the hierarchical ladder.
Finally, in terms of the other health professionals (see Table 4.9), these include the 
hospital, x-ray technicians, lab technicians, nutritionists, pharmacists and so on. 
Although there are more men than women in these occupations, the number of 
women is on the increase because these occupations are becoming prestigious 
especially as they involve specialised educational qualifications and memberships 
in syndicates. However, one cannot help but speculate on the reasons behind this 
increase in female health professionals while there are limited numbers of female 
doctors. One of the reasons could be the result of culture and practice where 
female students who are inclined towards medicine, upon entering university, are 
not encouraged to pursue such careers by their families.
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Table 4.9 Occupations and Average Wages of Males and Females in the
Community and Personal Services Sector
Occupation Average Wages (in JD)
Males % Females % Males Females
Qualified teachers
Assistant teachers ( no 
qualification)
10.5 (15)* 17 (21) 
23.3 (29)
210 175
100
Doctors 6.8 (9) - 800+
Qualified nurses 20.3 (27) 14.5 (18) 208 200
Practical nurses ( limited 
training)
Other health related 
occupations
0.8 (1) 
9 (12)
7.3 (9) 
6.4(8)
140
248
140
240
Fitness trainers 7.5 (10) 7.3 (9) 205 205
Administrative workers 16.5 (22) 6.5 (8) 154 150
Managers and executives 3.8 (5) 2.4(3) 550 480
Secretaries and clerks
Receptionist/telephone
operator
2.2 (3)
6.5 (8) 
2.4(3) 128
139
125
Janitors/cleaners/ drivers 
cooks 19.5 (26) 3.2(4) 130 80
Total 100(133) 100 (124) 231 158
Source: Employer Survey 
♦Absolute numbers in brackets
Wage differentials in the teaching occupations are closely linked to the horizontal 
and vertical segregation. When men and women perform the same tasks, men are 
still paid more as a result of perceived gender differences. Male teachers tend to 
teach older children and subjects such as mathematics and science. They are seen 
as those who prepare the students for national the national level examinations 
(Tawjihi). In this sense, female teachers have less prestige attached to their job, 
even when they teach older children. One of the results of this is that male 
teachers are paid more. Furthermore, teachers can even be paid less than other 
unskilled male school staff. In one nursery and elementary school, as an example, 
where all teachers were female and earned as little as 80 JD ($118 US) per month, 
the bus drivers earned 100 JD ($148 US). According to the headmistress this was 
due to the fact that bus drivers:' Have more responsibility' (i.e. children’s safety). 
However, it is more likely to be that bus drivers do not accept a lower wage but 
young female teachers will!
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In terms of health professionals the same rationale exists. Semi-skilled female 
professional staff earn as much if not less than unskilled male staff such as the 
janitors, cooks and cleaners. Finally, in the community fitness centre there are no 
wage differentials based on the fact that divisions between men's and women's 
sections are identical.
Spatial Segregation Within Firms
It is inherently difficult for a hospital to have any form of spatial segregation. For 
the schools, the dominance of female teachers, and the lesser numbers of male 
teachers, result to some extent in de facto segregated working environments. As 
for the divided services of the community fitness centre, spatial segregation in this 
case is not based on occupational segregation but on providing identical but 
separate facilities for men and women.
4.3 Gender Segregation at Work in the Jordanian Context
In synthesising the above, it has to be stated that while gender segregation at work 
in Jordan closely follows other cultural contexts in terms of gender typing of jobs 
and female attributes on the part of employers, culturally specific influences 
emerge as well. The first is that a large part of segregation at work rests on the 
conservative societal codes of custom and practice that influence the nature of 
female labour supply in terms of notions of 'appropriate' and 'respectable' 
occupations (see Chapter Six). The second is the spatial organisation of work 
which, in congruence with the larger societal norms of sex segregation, influences 
the gender composition of the labour force within firms. Furthermore, it has to be 
reiterated here that employers' demand for female labour is a relatively new 
phenomenon in certain sectors. Therefore, employers find themselves adapting to 
increasing female employment despite the above mentioned conservative cultural 
norms. In this sense, the interconnections between workplaces, households, and 
ideologies in determining female employment in Amman cannot be 
underestimated.
Within this context, the chapter now turns to a detailed account of employers' roles 
in determining the current patterns of gender composition in the firms interviewed 
in Amman. The first dimension of this is looking at how employers perceive 
gender differences and how perceptions influence gender segregation. Secondly it 
explores the extent to which new patterns of female employment are emerging and 
how these intersect with employers' interests in the different sectors. Finally it
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investigates the particular links between spatial and occupational segregation at 
work which are deemed necessary in a culture where interaction between the sexes 
is closely guarded.
4.3.1 Employers' Perceptions of and Rationales for Gender Differences 
Employers usually have rather fixed ideas about male and female characteristics. 
Many of these directly relate to the wider concepts of gender differences 
(particularly in terms of roles and skills) regardless of whether they have any direct 
relevance to work performance. These perceptions are the basis of employers' 
rationale for gender and age segregation at work. According to Table 4.10 most 
employers interviewed claim that by nature men are more productive at work 
(36%) and remain longer in employment (47.2%) (see also Papps, 1993 on Jordan, 
Egypt, Morocco and Turkey). Women's attachment to work, in contrast, is 
perceived as weak. It is important to point out, however, that employers see this as 
an 'inherent' female characteristic rather than a result of low level kinds of 
occupations that women tend to be in (see also Chant, 1991a, on Mexico; 
Humphrey, 1984, on Brazil). The same Table illustrates that employers are ready 
to concede to a set of 'positive' attributes to female employees. Women, for 
example, are considered to be more punctual (41.6%), more accurate in work 
(38.8%), and more likely to accept orders (44.4%). The attribute with the least 
gender gap, according to most employers, is adherence to rules and regulations 
(44.4% claimed no gender differences).15
Table 4.10 Employers Perceptions of Male and Female Work Performance
No
Difference
Males
Better
Females
Better
Not
Applicable* Total
Productivity
Punctuality 
Duration in 
Employment 
Adherence to 
Rules
Accuracy in 
Work 
Accepting 
Orders
27.7 (10) 
27.8% (10) 
22.2% (8)
44.4% (16)
27.8% (10)
30.6% (11)
36% (13) 
19.4% (7) 
47.2%(17)
13.9% (5)
25% (9)
13.9% (5)
25% (9) 
41.6% (14) 
19.4% (7)
30.5% (11)
38.8% (14)
44.4% (16)
11.1% (4) 
11.1% (4) 
11.1% (4)
11.1% (4)
11.1% (4)
11.1% (4)
100% (36) 
100% (36) 
100% (36)
100% (36)
100% (36)
100% (36)
Source: Employer Survey
*Single sex establishments where comparisons could not be made.
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One point that should be raised here is that most of the positive attributes assigned 
to female workers have to do with the fact that they include women performing 
'female' jobs. These attributes are perceived to be part of their 'nature' and/or an 
extension of their domestic roles. For example, women are inherently more 
punctual because due to norms of sex segregation their social freedoms are more 
limited than men's (see Chapter Six). Therefore, they are more likely to adhere to 
working hours and less likely to skip work since the repercussions of tardiness 
include raising suspicions and risking public reputation, and for young women this 
may have long term implications especially in marriage prospects. In other words, 
since women are accountable for their movements outside of family control, they 
make sure that they are at work on time and afterwards at home.
Women are also thought to accept orders more readily than men because: 'they are 
used to it at home.' In the hierarchical power structures within households women 
are expected to obey men's authority and young people are expected to obey older 
people (see Chapter Six). Employers, who are aware of this power structure see 
young women as more likely to be obedient. On the other hand, it is almost 
tolerated by employers that males do not accept orders since it is part of their 
'manliness' to resist being ordered.
Lastly, employers in the manufacturing sector in particular perceive women as 
more accurate and patient in manual work than men.16 This reflects the 
widespread stereotype of women's 'nimble fingers’ that has been documented in 
many other countries (see for example, Elson and Pearson, 1981; Joekes, 1995). It 
is such perceptions that have increased women's share of employment in 
manufacturing industries worldwide. Thus, in general, employers' perceptions of 
women's positive attributes revolve around their passivity and assumed position as 
secondary earners, as well as, secondary status at home which in effect increases 
their exploitability at the work place, particularly in terms of lower wages.17
A further dimension of employers' perceptions of the performance of women 
workers has to do with their age and marital status. Young single women are 
considered more productive than married women. Their lack of household and 
child care responsibilities are perceived to make them better workers. In fact, 
according to some employers marriage is incompatible with the concentration 
needed on the job. Single women are also identified as more docile and more 
willing to accept orders than married women. Employers are aware that young 
women are not usually exposed to male 'strangers' before starting work and 
therefore are perceived as more timid and passive. Married and older women, on
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the other hand, are regarded as more exposed, vocal and willing to fight for their 
rights (see also Chant and Mcllwaine, 1995a on the Philippines and Safa, 1990 on 
the Caribbean). Indeed, the socialisation of women prior to entering the labour 
market, via education, family community makes them less confident and more in 
line with employers' stereotypes (Jenson, 1989:149). Having said this, differences 
in the work performance of men based on the age and marital status are seldom 
considered by employers.
Therefore, because the jobs that many women perform conform to social 
stereotypes about women's abilities, gender divisions of labour, perceptions of 
women's demure behaviour and obedience to authority, most employers reinforce 
this by inserting young women workers in jobs that are seen appropriate and where 
their 'female advantages' can be of use. The suitability of men and women for 
different jobs thus results from social definitions of skills and biological 
differences regardless if they are verifiable in practice (Dex, 1989; Sinclair, 1991). 
In addition, jobs are more likely to be defined as unskilled when held by women 
than by men (Philips and Taylor, 1980). This gender bias in the definition of skill 
feeds into the grading of jobs where men are recruited and trained for primary 
sector jobs while women are recruited to the secondary sector. This in turn defines 
the persistence of gender wage differentials. Therefore, the underlying factor in 
the various beliefs about the character and ability of women workers is: 
'employers' persistent unpreparedness to pay women equal wages to men's (Joekes, 
1995:15).'
Finally, when assessing the male female wage gap as related to differentials in 
skills, conventional labour market theories, such as the neo-classical and the 
institutional approaches, do not fully address the distinctions between actual and 
perceived skills. As a result, they have failed to recognise the ways in which 
perceptions of women's roles affect employers' decisions and the extent to which 
this influences women's positions in the labour market (Joekes, 1995:16; Sinclair, 
1991:14).
4.3.2 Occupational Segregation Within Firms
Gender and age segregation within firms in Amman can be described through 
three generalised occupational groupings. The first are occupations that have 
traditionally been seen as 'female' occupations such as teaching and clerical work. 
Such occupations are probably not only the most gendered in Amman but also 
world-wide (see for example, Crompton and Jones, 1984; Game and Pringle,
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1984). The reasons that lie behind the fact that these occupations are designated as 
'female' vary. Teaching is seen as an extension of women's natural roles as 
mothers and nurturers. Clerical work, however, is a reflection of women's 
secondary status in society at large, where secretarial skills, which entail repetitive 
tasks, have somehow become feminised skills (Crompton et al. 1981). Both these 
occupations can be described as vertically and horizontally segregated with limited 
mobility. We have seen how male teachers, for example, are invariably perceived 
as more specialised and earn more on that basis. In contrast, the exploitability of 
young female teachers in terms of pay and conditions of work is quite visible (see 
above).
In terms of clerical workers, it has been noted in other cultural contexts that the 
increase in the number of female clerks has been accelerated by the widespread 
introduction of computerised word processing where clerical workers have become 
increasingly identified with simple routine tasks (Crompton et al. 1981:44; Pringle, 
1989:50-1). In addition, and related to the case of firms in Amman, the 
hierarchical designation of clerical jobs depend on a gendered occupational 
classification and women's place as secretaries within it. This is partly because the 
actual boundaries between clerical work per se and administrative or managerial 
work are usually unclear and differ from one establishment to the next. Therefore, 
the men in the sample who perform clerical work, unlike the women, are not 
perceived as secretaries and in many instances are paid more on that basis. The 
result is that male clerical workers have more occupational mobility than female 
clerical workers. Although some women may have achieved a certain status 
within their firms as a result of competence, the classification of their job as 
'secretary' (i.e. traditional female job), and the secondary status that this entails, 
persist.
The second occupation group includes a relatively new group of young female 
manufacturing workers whose existence partly relates to global trends towards the 
feminisation of the industrial workforce (see Chapters One and Three). 
Employers' interests in this sector are closely linked with an expansion in the 
numbers of young low paid unskilled and dispensable female workers. The reasons 
behind this are stereotypes about women's abilities as manually dexterous, patient, 
capable of performing repetitive work, precision and so on. So, because women 
are perceived as more suited for labour intensive tasks they are assigned to 
positions that reinforce their secondary status at the workplace and are consistently 
paid less than men even when skill differences are minimal (see above). In
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addition, job security and worker benefits in such jobs are usually limited. The 
result is that there are some aspects within manufacturing employment that are 
inherently discriminatory as a result of employers' perceptions and stereotypes.
The third occupation group is linked to new occupations as a result of 
technological and economic change, that are resulting in new employment 
opportunities for women such as, laboratory technicians, pharmacists, opticians, 
computer technicians, engineers and so on. Women's involvement in such 
occupations is, to a large extent, a result of increasing education levels. Not only 
have these jobs not yet been gendered by employers stereotyping but they are 
socially acceptable and even prestigious for women in society at large. Horizontal 
and vertical segregation between men and women is less pronounced in these 
cases. There are also no significant gaps in work benefits and pay. One of the 
reasons for this is perhaps that employers' current interests lie in obtaining a 
skilled workforce.18 This does not mean, however, that with time, as the forces of 
supply and demand change, these occupations will remain non-gendered and 
desegregated. As Shirely Dex (1989:299) points out:
New jobs and new technologies only modify the gendered 
distribution of jobs, and when new jobs are created, old 
symbolism is drawn on to decide whose jobs they are.
Therefore, in short there seems to be two divergent paths in occupational 
segregation within firms. The first includes a variety of occupations that are 
highly segregated and reveal strong patterns of gender typing. These include both 
traditional occupations, such as teachers and clerical workers, as well as the new 
emerging occupations within the manufacturing sector. Most of these jobs are 
masculinised or feminised even if skill differences are marginal or non-existent 
(see also Dex, 1989; Sinclair, 1991). This extends to include wage levels where 
average male earnings are consistently higher even within the same occupations. 
Indeed, gendered employment in these occupations goes beyond a simple 
reference to skill and relates to the content status and identification of different 
types of work with wider cultural mores (see also Chant and Mcllwaine, 
1995a:288). The second trend includes less segregated occupations that require 
modem and technologically advanced skills. This demonstrates that employers 
stereotyping and gender ideologies regarding male and female work are not static 
and in fact can actually be flexible when they serve their business interests. Also,
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in such situations women are relatively well represented in the higher grades of 
employment. It has to be noted however, that this encompasses a more limited 
number of occupations and includes educated and/or skilled workers only.
4.3.3 Spatial Segregation Within firms
Spatial segregation at work is constructed around symbolic social and economic 
boundaries between men and women in society at large and exists in almost all 
cultural contexts. Some studies on the subject maintain that spatial segregation is 
simply a by-product of occupational segregation and women's positions as the 
secondary workers (see Hanson and Pratt, 1995, on the United States; Massey, 
1994 on Britain). Other studies further discuss spatial segregation as a means of 
maintaining staff morality and harmonious working environment as well as 
increasing staff efficiency (see Chant, 1991a, on Mexico; Dex, 1989 on Britain; 
Hein, 1986 on Mauritius). However, an underlying factor in discussions of spatial 
segregation is the extent to which sexuality structures work relations and power 
hierarchies (Adkins, 1995). According to Lisa Adkins (1995:18) sexuality is the 
key to understanding both the gendered organisation of work and the forms of 
control to which women workers are subject. Indeed, in Jordan, space is 
sexualised. For women, this means working in occupations that do not risk their 
sexual reputations (see Chapter Six). As far as demand for female labour is 
concerned this has various implications for employers especially in terms of 
workspace arrangements and the gender composition of labour. The differences in 
the spatial organisation of firms in the different sectors outlined above, reveals that 
the gendered nature of work goes beyond occupational segregation per se. Having 
said this, the following synthesises types of spatial arrangements in the firms 
interviewed in Amman that reveals the variety of options available for employers 
and employees.
Figure 4.1 demonstrates the various forms of segregation based on both spatial and 
occupational arrangements. The extent of segregation within these firms is that 
men and women workers rarely communicate or socialise with one another. This 
does not necessarily mean that women are disadvantaged, however. Although this 
arrangement mostly includes low paid manufacturing assembly line women 
workers, it also includes spatially segregated women professionals.
It is important to mention here that sometimes it is the employees in large firms 
who prefer sex segregation. In one large electronics factory where there is 
occupational segregation but no spatial segregation the employer mentioned the
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fact that women workers had requested a separate cafeteria. Since this requires a 
commitment of time and money on part of the management, an alternative 
arrangement, where women will have separate breaks from the men, was being 
considered. This is an example of how spatial segregation, which revolves around 
dominant social mores and appropriate behaviour of the sexes, creates social 
boundaries between workers and acts to exacerbate, rather than diminish, the 
gendered nature of social interaction in society at large (see also Hanson and Pratt, 
1995).
Figure 4.1
Occupational and Spatial Segregation 
Within firms
14%
36%
H  Occupational
Segregation and Spatial 
Integration
□  Occupational and 
Spatial Segregation
I I  Occupational and 
Spatial Integration
■  Spatial Segregation 
Only
Source: Employer Survey
Occupational segregation and spatial integration is the second most common 
workspace organisation (see Figure 4.1). This includes shared workspaces but 
where women are assigned to some occupations and men to others. The most 
common are female clerks and male managers which reinforces hierarchical 
gender relations between men and women. In addition, there are also those 
establishments with occupational and spatial integration. In such cases,
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desegregation somehow works hand in hand with employers' interests. For 
example, some employers are keen to promote a modernised image of their firms 
and achieve this through spatial and occupational desegregation and the promotion 
of women to senior positions.
Finally, there are firms with spatial segregation only. This includes firms that 
provide services for one sex, with single sex employees. An elucidation on this 
type of spatial and occupational arrangement is important here. This is because 
the ideology of spatial segregation in society at large has resulted in women 
entering 'masculine' occupations in order to provide services for the women who 
prefer to function within sex segregated environments. The prevalence of this has 
increased with religious revivalism and increasing emphasis on women's veiling in 
recent years (see Chapter Six). Such examples are photographers, where women 
want to be photographed without their veil by another woman, and entertainment 
professionals, such as singers, musicians and comedians who attend women-only 
activities such as the traditional female-only parties prior to weddings. There are 
also women doctors and health professionals that operate in women-only 
environments (usually these services are provided by Islamic charitable 
organisations). These are examples, where spatial segregation could possibly be 
seen to have expanded female employment opportunities. Perhaps quantitatively 
the number of women professionals in such non-traditional occupations are 
limited, but ideologically it signifies that there is a certain flexibility in the gender 
definition of occupations under the circumstances of spatial segregation.19
Finally, another dimension of spatial segregation, especially in terms of its 
relevance to sexuality, is the age and marital status of female employees. 
Employers are more keen to spatially segregate young women than older women. 
It is assumed that young single women need to be 'protected' while older married 
women can take care of themselves. Now, of course, since many jobs are already 
gendered older and younger women tend to perform the same tasks. The ideology 
of guarding young female labour is visible and in some cases employers stated that 
if they need to fill a job that requires close interaction with men they will choose 
an older woman. Finally, a young age structure of the female labour force helps to 
form a particular working relationship between employers, male employees and 
young women. In congruence with the patriarchal nature of society, respectable 
men are supposed to behave towards women as fathers or brothers. Women 
appear to accept this quite readily since they themselves are confined to their roles 
as daughters or sisters within the home (see Chapter Six).
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4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has explored the ways in which labour demand reflects perceived 
gender differences and gender ideologies in Jordanian society. It has demonstrated 
how gender and age considerations influence employers' behaviour in recruitment 
and job allocation. It had also exposed how employers' interests as well as gender 
stereotyping differ between as well as within different occupational sectors.
One of the major findings of the investigation is that there seems to be two general 
directions in occupational segregation within firms. One is towards less 
segregation, but is limited to occupations that require modem and technical skills. 
The second, includes a variety of occupations that are highly segregated. Within 
these occupations, gendered recruitment practices and job allocation on the part of 
employers often act to reproduce and even exacerbate gender inequality. 
Rationalisations for gendered employment are reflected in women's concentration 
in occupations which are predominantly associated with their domestic roles or 
perceived 'female' attributes and larger cultural notions of what constitutes 
appropriate work for women. Moreover, within firms, women are concentrated in 
the lowest levels of hierarchy with few opportunities for training or promotion. 
Therefore, even as more women join the labour market, employers still tend to 
regard them as secondary and temporary employees, compared with men. To 
exemplify this, one employer said: 'When a man wants to leave we look into the 
matter and try to dissuade him. When a woman wants to leave we say may God be 
with her.'
On a broader level, it can be maintained here that future employment conditions 
and opportunities for young women are largely dependent on the embeddedness of 
gender ideologies in society at large. As we shall see in the following chapters 
women's roles as secondary workers and their limited earnings do not empower 
them to assert themselves among their families or society as a whole. As a result 
patriarchal authority and traditional gender roles remain largely unchanged. This, 
conceivably, will reinforce existing gender stratification in employment in years to 
come.
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Notes to Chapter Four
* Elsewhere it has been suggested that there is a positive relationship between women managers 
and the number of women in the same firm (see Chant, 1991a:70). This is because women in 
higher status supervisory positions are likely to recruit higher than average numbers of women at 
other levels of the firm. 17115 is not the case in Jordan.
2 Source from personal communication with research and information department at the Amman 
Chamber of Industry.
3 It has been repeatedly noted elsewhere that employers prefer men to operate machinery. These 
assumptions are influenced by the nature of female employment worldwide. For further discussion 
on the relation between gender and mechanised production see Cockbum (1985) on the United 
Kingdom; Chant (1991a) and Pearson (1990) on Latin America; Chant and Mcllwaine (1995a) and 
Scott (1987) on Southeast Asia.
4The word ’trouble' repeated by many employers referred to relationships between male and female 
colleagues. A fact that employers seek to curtail for the sake of maintaining 'respectful' working 
environments.
5 Both Helen Safa (1995) writing on export manufacturing in the Caribbean and Susan Joekes 
(1985) writing on clothing industry in Morocco, found that female assembly line workers have 
higher education levels then males which points to gender-based selective recruitment by 
employers.
*>For more on the impact of social networks in obtaining jobs see Hanson and Pratt (1995:7-8) who 
writing on the United States discuss how non-economic knowledge affects the economic practices 
of individuals and groups as well as access to particular occupations. See also Chant and 
Mcllwaine on the Philippines (1995a).
7 The Jordanian labour law forbids the employment of women between 7 pm and 6 am. This is 
supposed to be for safety reasons (for more on labour laws see Akel et al. 1993; government of 
Jordan 1995) (see also Chapter Three).
8 By law, employers can acquire labour through three ways. Formal contract employees who are 
protected from indiscriminate layoffs, have to be registered with the Social Security Scheme where 
some can benefit from health insurance, provident funds and so on. Non-contract based formal 
employees have some benefits such as inclusion in the social security scheme but they have no 
securities against layoffs and the employer is not obliged to cover them in company benefits. 
Another type of employees are temporary and informal workers. These have no securities or 
benefits whatsoever. It is a way for employers to cut costs on benefits and social security payments 
(see Chapter Three for fuller discussion).
9 Although the relationship between male muscular strength and the recruitment of men is plausible 
in some cases, according to Shirely Dex (1989:229), this is not always founded on objective skill 
levels and is usually a result of pressure upon employers from male dominated trade unions to 
maintain control over production. In other words that this association is another device to exclude 
women from male dominated sectors and or skills.
10 It is important to point out that women themselves have hesitation in assuming such roles. 
Supervisory positions require close contact with males a fact that could threaten their reputations 
and their relations with male kin. Men have undeniably higher positions both at home and the 
factory. Thus, it is almost unthinkable for women to be in a position to supervise a group that 
includes men (see also Ecevit 1991 for similar observations on Turkey).
11 There is a social stigma surrounding domestic service and waitressing for women in Jordan. 
These occupations do not have general societal approval especially as they involve direct 
interaction with strange men in unprotected environments (i.e. inside homes and hotel rooms). 
Similarly waitressing involves constant exposure and interaction. It is commonly assumed, for 
example, that prostitutes function in hotels and restaurants, and therefore, respectable women avoid 
such occupations. Domestic service is usually performed by women migrant workers, mainly from 
the Philippines and Sri Lanka, and waitressing is performed by Jordanian men or Egyptian migrant 
men. For more on how women in jobs, such as waitressing, tend to become sexualised objects by 
men, see Adkins (1995) who writes on the context of the United Kingdom.
12 For more on hotel workers and employers preference for 'charming and good looking' female 
employees, see Chant and Mcllwaine (1995a:Chapter Five) on tourism workers in the Philippines.
13 It has to be noted here that despite the male ownership of the hairdresser interviewed here, there 
are many female owned hairdressers and beauty centres that provide a segregated female-only 
environment for their clients.
14 Membership of syndicates is required by law of health professionals but not teaching 
professionals (although a teachers syndicate exists). In addition to the numbers of membership in
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such syndicates does not help in estimating the size of the sector since members are not necessarily 
currently employed as health professionals.
*5 See question 7.1 in Employer Survey, Appendix Three.
16 Susan Joekes (1987) who writes on Morocco and John Humphrey (1987) on Brazil, have also 
observed that employers believe that the quality of women's work is superior to men's, while men's 
work rate is higher.
17 This is by no means particular to Jordan. For similar observations, see for example, Chant 
(1991a) on Mexico.
An example of this is the computer consultancy firm where the employer was keen to recruit 
more males since the number of females in his firm was outnumbering the males. However, since 
recruitment depends on an entry examination, and the women were invariably ahead he is ending 
up by recruiting more females despite his preference for males.
19 This is an interesting phenomenon in need of further investigation. Ironically, although much of 
it is supposedly based on religious/cultural principles, it is not unlike feminist demands in the West 
for safer female-only environments such as women's rooms in large institutions, women's health 
clubs, taxi drivers and buses and so on.
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CHAPTER FTVE 
GENDER. AGE AND LABOUR SUPPLY
Households are rooted in social networks which provide support and solidarity as 
well as exchange of goods and services (Moore 1994:3). Yet, households are not 
homogeneous units. Household members have individual interests as well as 
different experiences and expectations. Furthermore, they are dispersed 
throughout the labour market in terms of their occupations and wages which has 
significant implications for each member's relative position within the household 
(Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1994:8). Households are also dynamic units. There are 
continuous changes as a result of the transitions in individuals' life courses, as well 
as the evolving life span of the household itself (Kertzer, 1991:19). Gender and 
generation are among the lines that mark this diversity and changing nature of 
households. Within this context, the main aim of the present chapter is to 
investigate the positions of working daughters, who are in a specific life course 
trajectory, as well as at a specific stage of the household domestic cycle when the 
number of adult members is usually at its largest.
Through the analysis of the household survey data, this chapter explores household 
level factors that influence the labour supply of young women. The organisation 
of the chapter is as follows. The first section outlines the characteristics of the 
study settlements and the respondents. The second section focuses on gender and 
age differences in the labour supply of household members. This investigates the 
individual characteristics of employed adults within households including 
employment status, education levels, occupations and wages. Section three 
investigates household characteristics linked to female employment such as 
household size, structure and income. This is followed by an exploration of young 
women's own explanations of their reasons for working in section four. The fifth 
and final section investigates household divisions in the management of income. 
It attempts to provide a typology of patterns of management of young women's 
income and compares this with that of young men's income which ultimately gives 
an insight into patterns of inter-generational gender stratification in Jordanian 
households.
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Map 5.1 Amman: Location of Study Areas
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5.1 The Household Survey
The household survey included 14 locations across the city of Amman (see Map 
5.1). The sample could be argued to be reasonably representative since it is a sub­
sample of an earlier national level survey conducted in 1991 (see Chapter One and 
Appendix Two). In total, out of 2877 households in the 14 locations, 302 (10.5%) 
were interviewed (see Table 5.1). All households in each location were visited but 
only those with unmarried daughters were interviewed. All the households that 
were interviewed were family based.1 The interviews were conducted with adult 
women aged between 20 and 30 years, who were living with their parents, not 
married and were not enrolled in education at the time of the interview. In other 
words, these were daughters who were working, unemployed or economically 
inactive. Since many households contained sisters (more than one woman 
between 20-30 years) the number of respondents was 402. The following section 
outlines the study areas and the socio-economic characteristics of the female 
respondents and their households.
5.1.1 Study Locations
The study locations were quite varied in terms of income levels (see Table 5.1). 
The income distribution of the 14 locations varied with an average per capita 
income of 651 JD ($963 US) per annum for the entire sample population. The 
lowest per capita income was found to be in Al Qweismeh at 376 JD per annum 
($557 US). The highest per capita income was in Jabal Al Hussein at 1667 JD 
($2467 US) per annum.2 This coincides with the average family size where in 
Qweismeh it was the largest at 10.2 and in Jabal Al-Hussein the smallest at 5.4 
persons. The average household size for the entire sample population was 7.9.
The percentage of home owners in the sample was quite high at 70%, although 
home ownership in Jordan is not necessarily indicative of higher income levels. 
As an example, in Jabal Al-Hussein and Jabal El-Weibdeh, both of which are 
middle and upper income areas, home ownership was less than lower income areas 
such as Qweismeh and Wihdat (see Table 5.1). The reasons for this are as follows: 
some Jordanians of tribal origin actually live on their tribal lands and thus already 
own land. Palestinians in areas designated as refugee camps have also been 
provided with their homes by the Jordanian government and UNRWA on the 
assumption of their refugee status. Other reasons for this are that some low 
income areas are actually squatters and who's claims of home ownership inflates
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the above mentioned percentage.3 Finally, there is a high priority attached to 
home ownership in general in Jordan since it is regarded as a form of security. 
Thus, even when resources are limited, these are directed to building a home.
Table 5.1 Study Areas, Sample Size, and General Characteristics
Location
Number
of
households
Number of 
households 
interviewed
Percentage 
of sample
Average 
annual 
income per 
capita (in 
JD)
Average 
family size
Percentage 
of home 
owners
Hai Nazzal 250 29 9.6 636 7.4 69
Jabal Al-Akhdar 284 27 8.9 420 10 74
Wihdat 141 27 8.9 435 9.5 93
Jabal Al-Nathif 193 19 6.3 683 7.7 42
Jabal Al-Weibdeh 290 24 7.9 954 6.1 45.8
Al-Qweismeh 103 12 4 376 10.2 91.7
Marka Al Junubieh 114 12 4 402 8.1 75
Jabal Al-Nasr 381 40 13.2 472 7.9 80
Al- Hashimi 348 36 12 909 7.4 72
Marka Al- 116 13 4.3 736 8.1 92
Shamalieh
Jabal Al-Taj 130 14 4.6 497 8.3 42
Al-Nuzha 194 21 7 564 9.1 76
Jabal Al-Hussein 217 22 7.3 1667 5.4 54.5
Marka 116 18 6 656 7.1 72
Total 2877 302 100 651 7.9 70
Source: Household Survey
There were ethnic variations within the sample as well. Some locations were in 
the midst of a Palestinian refugee camp, such as Wihdat. Others were not refugee 
camps per se but exclusively inhabited by Palestinians such as Hai Nazzal, Jabal 
Al-Nathif, Al Nuzha and Jabal Al-Taj. These areas were inhabited according to 
the same town of origin in Palestine. For example in Jabal al-Nathif, people were 
mostly from Hebron while in Wihdat they were from Jaffa. Other areas were 
inhabited by Jordanians of tribal origin. These are Marka Al-Junubieh and Marka 
Al-Shamalieh. The inhabitants of these locations were actually occupying their 
traditional tribal lands that are now in the midst of the city. Therefore, they 
belonged to the same lineage with most families sharing the same family name.
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The other locations were mixed and apart from Palestinians included Kurdish 
families in Qweismeh, Armenian and Circasean families in Marka and El- 
Weibdeh.
5.1.2 Female Respondents
Female respondents were mostly daughters living with their parents, at 98% 
(n=296). The other 2% included cases where the respondents were the household 
head (n=2),4 or lived with their brothers (n=4). The highest work force 
participation was found in Hai Nazzal, followed by Al- Hashimi (see Table 5.2).5 
Highest unemployment rates were found also in Al-Hashimi followed by Jabal Al- 
Nasr. In terms of the economically inactive women, these consisted of the least 
number of respondents. A large proportion were in Jabal Al-Nasr.
Table 5.2 Female Respondents According to Employment Status and Study Area
Location Working % Unemployed % Economically Inactive %
Hai Nazzal 13.1 (33)* 4.9 (5) 11.8 (6)
Jabal Al- Akhdar 10.8 (27) 4.9 (5) 3.9 (2)
Al-Wihdat 4.8 (12) 5.8 (6) 5.9 (3)
Jabal Al-Nathif 6.8 (17) 5.8 (6) 5.9 (3)
Jabal Al-Weibdeh 9.2 (23) 4.9 (5) 2 (1)
Al-Qweismeh 2.8 (7) 2.9 (3) 7.8 (4)
Marka Al-Junubieh 1.6 (4) 5.8 (6) 5.9 (3)
Jabal Al-Nasr 10.8 (27) 13.7 (14) 19.6 (10)
Al-Hashimi 12 (30) 15.7 (16) 11.8 (6)
Marka Al-Shamalieh 4.8 (12) 6.8 (7) 2 (1)
Jabal Al-Taj 4.4 (11) 0.9(1) 5.8 (3)
Al-Nuzha 5.6 (14) 9.8 (10) 13.7 (7)
Jabal Al-Hussein 7.6 (19) 6.8 (7) -
Marka 5.2 (13) 10.8 (11) 3.9 (2)
Total 100 (249) 100 (102) 100 (51)
Source: Household Survey 
* Absolute numbers in brackets
It is important to note here how the employment status of respondents sometimes 
reflected personal definitions that did not always translate into their actual 
employment status. During the interviews, the young women were asked to
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identify their work status and many described themselves as unemployed. 
However, further questioning revealed that a substantial number of these were not 
actively seeking employment.6 These women wished to work but were either not 
qualified for their desired area of work or faced family objection (see Chapter 
Six).7 Others were adamant to obtain public sector employment and were on long 
waiting lists where jobs will probably never materialise given the contraction of 
employment opportunities in this sector (see Chapter Three). However, it is not 
possible to consider these women as economically inactive since they described 
themselves as wishing to work. Other women, who also might wish to work were 
resigned to the fact that they will not be able to and hence identify themselves as 
inactive.
The ethnic variation in female labour force participation, although not one of the 
objectives of the current study, revealed that women of Palestinian origin are more 
likely to work than Jordanian women. The areas of Marka Al-Shamalieh for 
example, has the lowest participation rates at 1.8% and Qweismeh at 2.8%. These 
areas represent a homogeneous population of people with the same Jordanian 
tribal origin. In these locations, opposition to female employment are very 
marked. The only acceptable work for women is the civil service. Factory work, 
on the other hand, is considered shameful. These attitudes are also reflective of 
male employment in these areas as manual work is uncommon. Most men are 
public sector employees or in military service. The areas of Hai Nazzal and Jabal 
El-Akhdar have the highest percentage of female employment in the sample and 
are inhabited by a largely Palestinian population. Opposition to female 
employment is also visible in these areas. Despite this fact, however, female 
employment seems to be more readily accommodated through restrictions on types 
and forms of work (see Chapter Six). Thus, women in these areas engage in a 
wider variety of occupations including factory work.
5.2 Gender and Age Differences in the Labour Supply of Household Members
This section constructs a profile of the employment characteristics of different 
adult household members in Amman with a view to exploring the intersecting 
influences of gender and age on household labour supply and the specific positions 
of daughters. As mentioned in Chapter Two most of the households in the 
following discussion tend to be in the consolidation phase of their life courses (i.e. 
when there is a maximum number of adults).
122
5.2.1 Employment Status of Household Members
Among adult family members the highest economic activity is that of sons aged 
between 20 and 30 years, at 71.7%. This is followed by 64.4% among fathers and 
62% among daughters. The economic activity of mothers is significantly lower at 
5% (see Table 5.3). Unemployment rates seem to be significant for sons and 
daughters and negligible among parents (see Table 5.3). Youth unemployment has 
been an increasingly visible phenomenon in Jordan (see Chapter Three). One of 
the major reasons are the increasing education levels where the supply of skilled 
workers is outpacing demand.
Table 5.3 Household Members According to Employment Status
Employment Status Father % Mother % Son % Daughter %
Currently employed 64.4 (170)* 5 (14) 71.7 (205) 62 (249)
Unemployed, previously 
emp. 7 (18) - 16.8 (48) 15.4 (62)
Unemployed, never emp. - - 6.3 (18) 10 (40)
Retired 12.5 (33) 0.7 (2) - -
Old & does not work 9.3 (24) - - -
Own income & other 
sources 6.8 (18) 3.6 (10) 2.1 (6) -
Housewife - 87.5 (245) - -
Does not plan to work - 0.3 (1) - 12.6 (51)
Other - 2.8 (8) 3.1 (9)
Total 100 (263) 100 (280) 100(286) 100 (402)
Source: Household Survey
♦Absolute numbers in brackets.
The classification of employment status among family members by the young 
women respondents, however, is largely determined by perceptions embedded in 
gender and family ideologies. For example, non-working mothers were invariably 
described as housewives, at 87.5%, and non-working daughters describe 
themselves as not planning to work, despite the fact that such women, whether 
mothers or daughters, could be active in a range of home-based productive 
activities.8 On the other hand, no men, whether fathers or sons, would be 
described as not planning to work (let alone as housewives!). This is largely 
because of the dominant male breadwinner ideology where men do not stay at 
home. Non-working fathers were described a either unemployed, at 7%, retired, at 
12.5%, or old and unable to work, at 9.3%. Non-working sons, on the other hand,
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were described as unemployed, at 23%, even if they were not actively seeking 
employment. So the perceived employment status of family members is directly 
influenced by their perceived gender roles .
The age specific economic participation of both males and females in the 
household survey indicates that the majority are concentrated between the ages of 
20 to 30 years (see Figure 5.1). For the males this substantially decreases but is 
still apparent among the older age groups. Among the women, however, 
economic participation is virtually non-existent after the age of 30. This 
distribution is largely reflective of the stage in the domestic cycle of most survey 
households. This specific life stage includes the following: the existence of 
economically active young adults, the relative absence of members between the 
age groups of 30-40 years and the decreasing economic activity of older men (due 
to retirement).
Figure 5.1 Male and Female Household Members According to Age-Specific
Economic Participation
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However, one of the more significant observations in Figure 5.1 is the difference 
between the labour force participation between older and younger women. In 
other words, between mothers and daughters. Almost all the economically active 
females are daughters below the age of 30 years. This is probably a result of the 
substantial increase in the age at marriage. In Amman young women today are not 
replicating their mothers' early age at marriage, and accordingly live for longer in
124
their parents' households. This raises the much discussed question on the relation 
between female employment and increasing age at marriage (see Lazreg 1990; 
Salaff 1990). Indeed, the work force participation of young women peaks at 24 
years then gradually drops until 30 years. It is probably not coincidental that 24 
years happens to be the average age at marriage for females in Jordan which 
indicates that a number of young women drop out of the labour force at this age.
5.2.2 Education Levels of Household Members
Education levels are commonly considered to be one of the important individual 
'human capital' variables that influence female labour force participation (Anker 
and Hein 1986). In the context of a household domestic cycle it is important to 
investigate the gender as well as age differentials in the educational attainment of 
adult family members. It is a fact that education has been one of Jordan's major 
achievements in the past two decades (see Chapter Three). School enrollment of 
both boys and girls has been steadily increasing. Therefore, in investigating the 
education levels of household members in Amman the main issue is not so much 
the gender gap as the generation gap: adult daughters and sons within households 
have higher education levels than their parents. Illiteracy is almost non-existent 
among daughters and sons while it is quite high for mothers, at 35.%, and even 
among fathers, at 11.4% (see Table 5.4). Furthermore, the substantial difference 
between daughters' and mothers' education signify a major transition in gender 
disparities in the education levels of households in Amman.
Table 5.4 Education Levels of Household Members*
Education level Father % Mother % Son % Daughter %
Illiterate 11.4 (30)** 35 (95) 0.6 (2) 0.5 (2)
Read/Write 19.4 (51) 11.8 (33) 0.6 (2) -
Elementary 24.7 (65) 20 (56) 3.1 (9) 5(20)
Preparatory 15.2 (40) 16.7 (47) 22.3 (64) 11.3(45)
Vocational 1.1 (3) 1 (3) 5.2 (15) 1.2(5)
Secondary 12.9 (34) 11.4 (32) 29.3 (84) 24.4 (98)
Diploma 6.8 (18) 3.2 (9) 23.4 (67) 43 (173)
Higher educ. 8.4 (22) 1.7 (5) 15 (43) 14.6 (59)
Total 100 (263) 100 (280) 100(286) 100 (402)
Source: Household Survey
* This is based on all adult household members who are not currently enrolled in 
education
** Absolute numbers in brackets
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In addition, within the same generation, daughters have higher education levels 
than sons and consequently have the highest education levels within their 
households. As many as 82% of daughters in the sample survey have secondary 
education or more, compared with 67.7% among sons (see Table 5.4). This 
phenomenon where the gender gap among the same generation has been reversed 
is likely to continue as school enrollment of girls currently outweighs the 
enrollment of boys in Jordan as a whole. In 1994, the primary level enrollment 
rate of boys was 90% compared with 92% for girls (UNICEF, 1995:17). 
Furthermore, drop-out rates in Jordan, unlike many other Arab countries, are 
higher among males than among females (ibid: 18).
The reasons behind the fact that daughters achieve higher education levels than 
sons are several. First, the public school system in Jordan is free of charge and 
generally segregated by sex. Thus, parents find no objection to daughters' 
schooling because it entails minimal cost and does not challenge the ideology of 
sex segregation. In fact, it is becoming prestigious for parents to keep their 
daughters in school, especially as it could entail better marriage options for them 
in the future (see Abu Lughod, 1993). Second, boys have a gender advantage 
within the household as opposed to girls and this leaves girls in continuous need to 
gain the approval and acceptance of their parents.9 One of the ways for achieving 
this includes good school performance. A third factor, is the greater emphasis on 
girls' propriety and restricted social freedom compared to boys which could 
translate into lesser distractions and better school performance and attendance. A 
fourth factor is that girls are more likely to respond to school authority and 
discipline than boys as a result of their gender conditioning at home.
Moreover, schooling has taken on a different meaning for some of the young 
women themselves. In general, choices concerning their own lives are limited. 
There are many forms of restrictions especially in choosing careers and partners 
(see Chapter Six). Within this context, education becomes a major route to 
personal achievement and fulfillment. Also, for the young women who are 
adamant on breaking away from ascribed gender roles, higher education becomes 
a tool. These women do their best in the national school exams (Tawjihi) in order 
to secure admittance or scholarships at university or in their desired area of 
study.10 In contrast, however, higher educational attainment for some young 
women is linked with the prevalent ideology that educated women make better 
wives and mothers.11
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Regardless of the reasons as to why daughters have the highest education levels 
within their households, the fact remains that these education levels are closely 
linked to young women's increasing labour force participation. One of the striking 
observations from the household survey data is that economically active young 
women have higher education levels than inactive women (see Table 5.5). As 
many as 84% of employed women and 91% of unemployed women have at least a 
secondary education. This compares to 53% of the economically inactive women.
Table 5.5 Female Respondents Education Levels According 
to Employment Status
Education Level Working % Unemployed % Inactive %
Illiterate 0.4 (1)* 0.9 (1) -
Read/Write - - -
Elementary 4.8 (12) 0.9 (1) 13.7 (7)
Preparatory 8.8 (22) 6.9(7) 31.4(16)
Vocational 2(5) - -
Secondary 21.6 (54) 26.5 (27) 33.4 (17)
Diploma 
University and 
higher
44.2 (110) 
18.1 (45)
53 (54) 
11.8(12)
17.6 (9) 
3.9 (2)
Total 100 (249) 100 (102) 100(51)
Source: Household Survey
♦Absolute numbers in brackets
University education in particular is closely linked with economic activity. Only 
3.9% of inactive women have university degrees compared with 18.1% of those 
working and 11.8% of the unemployed (see Table 5.5).12 This finds parallels with 
evidence elsewhere of a significant relationship between female education and 
employment (see Anker and Hein 1986 for a general overview; Bustani and 
Mufarrej 1995 on Lebanon; Farrag 1991 on Arab region; Lazreg 1990 on Algeria).
On one level, this relation between education and employment for young women 
is determined by family and community. It is considered respectable for women 
with higher professional degrees to work in what would be viewed as prestigious
127
occupations. In contrast, it is 'shameful'13 for uneducated women to work since 
the only occupations they can join are much lower in status (see also Macleod, 
1991; Rugh, 1985 on Egypt).14 On another level, however, this positive relation is 
related to young women's increasing aspirations. Higher education positively 
affects women's desires to participate in public life and improve their standard of 
living (Moghadam, 1993:19).
In short, it is clear that there is an expanding generation gap in the education levels 
of household members. What is more significant however, is the reversal in the 
gender gap where young women seem to be attaining the highest education levels 
within their households. We have also seen that salaried work for women is 
generally a function of education, especially post secondary education. However, 
as noted in Chapter Four, high education levels do not necessarily result in women 
attaining positions of responsibility at work nor equal pay. The rest of this chapter 
will also reveal that, at househpld levels, daughters' high human capital does not 
necessarily result in diminishing gender and generation inequalities (see also 
Chapter Six).
5.2.3 Occupational Distribution of Household Members
Within any household, members are likely to be distributed throughout different 
sectors of the labour market. This section investigates the extent to which it is 
possible to see patterns of public/private and formal/informal distribution along 
lines of age and gender, and then goes on to consider key occupations in more 
detail.
In terms of the distribution of household members between private and public 
sectors, Table 5.6 reveals that more sons and daughters hold government jobs than 
their parents. The reason for this owes to the nature of the current study itself, 
which situates household members in a specific life course trajectory, many 
parents, especially fathers, are already retired from the public sector. There are 
also stark differences, however, between the public sector employment of young 
women and men. The vast majority of young men, are in the military or the civil 
defense, which often does not require higher education qualifications. In 
comparison, most young women in the public sector are professionals with higher 
education levels and are mostly teachers.
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As for the distribution of family members in the private sector, differences 
between those who work as employees or employers provide a key point for 
exploring gender and age differences. According to Table 5.6, there is a higher 
proportion of sons and daughters who are employees (49.2% and 62.2% 
respectively) than fathers and mothers (39.4 % and 35.7% respectively). These 
differences are clearly a function of age where sons and daughters, owing to their 
young age, are more likely to be employees as compared to their parents. 
Concurrently, according to the same Table, the highest proportions of employers, 
that is people owning their own businesses, are the fathers, at 26.5%. This is 
followed by sons at 11.7%. In comparison there are no mothers who are 
employers and a mere 3% of daughters.15
In other words, men are more likely to set up their own businesses than women. 
Young men for example are often encouraged to set up their businesses and scarce 
family resources are often channeled into such endeavors. Women, on the other 
hand, old or young, are rarely encouraged likewise. In addition, very few women 
have independent resources for any potential venture. Besides, when they do own 
resources they usually put it in a family project that is controlled by men. One 
mother, as an example, inherited an amount of money from her father. She gave it 
to her son who bought a taxi cab and who is not expected to give her any of the 
profits but to contribute occasionally to household expenditure (see below). In 
addition, very few women are able to obtain credit to embark on any business 
venture since many do not have resources and therefore are not able to provide 
collateral for loans.16
Table 5.6 Work Status of Family Members
Work Status Father % Mother % Son % Daughter %
Public sector employee 
Private sector employee 
Private sector employer 
Self employed/informal sector 
Trainee/unpaid worker 
Total
11.7 (20)*
39.4 (67)
26.5 (45) 
22.4 (38)
100(170)
14.3 (2) 
35.7 (5)
50 (7)
100 (14)
21 (43)
49.2 (101) 
11.7 (24)
15.2 (31) 
2.9 (6)
100 (205)
20 (50) 
62.2(155) 
2.8 (7) 
11.2 (28) 
3.6 (9) 
100 (249)
Source: Household Survey
* Absolute numbers in brackets
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There is also a substantial proportion of household members who are self 
employed and in the informal sector (see Table 5.6). This consists of as many as 
50% of working mothers and 22.4% of working fathers. The participation of sons 
and daughters in the informal sector is substantially less at 15.2% and 11.2% 
respectively. These differences are a function of age where parents are more likely 
to engage in the informal traditional sector than young people. Due to their levels 
of education and skills, young people are more likely to be formally employed in 
the modem sector. Therefore, in some ways the changing occupational structures 
within the labour market in Amman, especially those pertaining to new 
technologies, are influencing sons and daughters more than their parents.
In addition, unlike men, the nature of informal sector activities among women 
seems to interact with the life course stage. For younger and older men alike it 
ranges from all forms of petty trade to casual labour on construction sites or in 
manufacturing. For older, and a minority of younger women, it includes home- 
based sewing, embroidery or food production, or jobs outside the home as cooks 
and cleaners.17 There is a substantial number of self employed young women, 
however, who engage in typing and translation services at home or private tuition 
for neighbourhood children. Furthermore, the dividing line between employed 
young women and those engaged in home-based production is not palpable. 
Women within households often engage in collective income generating activities 
such as embroidery that all female members partake in finishing.18 Thus, there are 
gender and age differences in the work status of household members. Within this 
framework it is the daughters whose participation in the informal sector is the least 
and daughters who mostly work as employees.
The specific occupations of household members are marked by gender and age 
diversity. A high proportion of fathers and brothers are workers in the service 
sector (37% and 29.3% respectively). For fathers this is followed by a significant 
number who are sales workers (at 21%). As for sons this is followed by 20% who 
are professional and technical workers. As for the limited participation of 
mothers, most seem to engage in the manufacturing sector followed by the service 
sector (see Table 5.7).
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Table 5.7 Distribution of Family Members According to Occupation Groups
Occupation Father % Mother % Son % Daughter % Row Total
Professional and 
Technical 14 (23)* 21 (3) 21(44) 40.2 (100) 27%
Administrative 12 (21) - 8(17) 8(19) 9%
Clerical 5(8) - 7(14) 14 (35) 9%
Sales 21 (36) 7(1) 15(31) 6(14) 13%
Services 37 (63) 36(5) 31 (63) 12.9 (32) 26%
Agricultural 2(3) - 0.5 (1) - 1%
Manufacturing 9(16) 36 (5) 17 (35) 20 (49) 16%
Column Total 100 (170) 100 (14) 100 (205) 100 (249) 100 (638)
Source: Household Survey
♦Absolute numbers in brackets
As for daughters, the most striking fact is that as many as 40.2% work in 
professional and technical occupations (Table 5.7). This is probably a result of 
their high educational levels. The vast majority of women in this category are 
teachers. In fact, as many as 21.3% of employed women respondents as a whole 
are in teaching occupations (see also Chapter Four). This is followed by 11.2% of 
women in medical occupations including doctors,19 nurses, pharmacists, 
laboratory and x-ray technicians or dental assistants. Following professional 
occupations are young women in manufacturing occupations, at 20% of the 
sample survey (also see Chapter Four). Female manufacturing labour are mostly 
in unskilled jobs in textile, food and electronics production. It is of note here that 
young women in sales related occupations are as little as 4.8%. This minimal 
participation of young women in sales related occupations is unlike other parts of 
the world where this is considered a 'female occupation' (see Chant 1991a, on 
Mexico; Dennis, 1990 on Nigeria; Game and Pringle, 1983 on the United 
Kingdom). This has to do with traditional notions of female propriety in Jordan 
(see Chapter Four).
In light of the above, the rest of this section investigates how this occupational 
distribution of households and the concentration of young women in technical and 
professional occupations is largely determined by family ideology regarding 
gender and age. There is a general attitude that young women need protection and
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this sometimes involves restrictions in job selection. In many instances, therefore, 
women are only encouraged to engage in what is considered as appropriate work 
(see also Chapter Six).
Sales and service related occupations, for example, are deemed by many 
households as inappropriate for young women. Such occupations imply a certain 
amount of interaction with unknown men whether colleagues or customers. Also, 
workspaces are also rarely segregated by sex (see Chapter Four). Therefore, there 
is a general attitude that a job as a sales person, for example, is not 'respectable' 
owing to the exposure that it entails. Teaching, by contrast, is deemed appropriate, 
and even prestigious, since it does not only reinforce women's roles as the 
nurturers but it also ensures minimum interaction with men. Within this vein, 
factory work although not prestigious in terms of skill and pay is acceptable since 
most workspaces are spatially sex segregated.
In other words, women's access to employment revolves around notions of female 
protection and gendered space. The result of this is that there are differences in the 
symbolic meaning of occupations for the different sexes within households. In 
addition, life course trajectories play a crucial part in the gendering of space. For 
example, it would be acceptable for a young man to be earning a living through 
street vending but it is unthinkable for a young woman. It is also common for a 
father to be a petty trader with limited or no education while the daughter is a 
teacher. Therefore, because of daughters' young age and the perceived need for 
protection together with the general notions of gender division of space, young 
women become limited to occupations such as teaching or manufacturing work. 
These notions of gender and space are somehow non-existent in public sector or 
banking employment, however. It is likely that the benefits and securities 
provided by work in such establishments outweigh and diminish the general 
inhibitions towards gendered space. The relation between gender occupational and 
spatial segregation in female labour demand has been discussed in Chapter Four. 
However, households also play a role in releasing an already segregated female 
workforce (see also Chapter Six).
5.2.4 Differences in Wages Among Household Members
Given these occupational differences along gender and generation, it is hardly 
surprising that there are also differences in the average earnings of household 
members. The average monthly earnings of males are 168 JD ($249 US) 
compared to an average monthly earning of 105 JD ($155 US) for females. These 
are notably wider than the official national statistics for 1993 where the average
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male wage was 195 JD ($289 US) per month compared with 157 JD ($232 US) 
per month for females.20 The reasons behind this are unclear especially as the 
household survey was not limited to interviewing low income groups but mixed 
income groups. One justification is the formal/informal sector divide and where 
wages in the informal sector, not quantified by official statistics, tend to be lower 
than the formal sector. Indeed, many household members who are engaged in 
informal sector activities, not only earn less but also have unstable incomes and 
can only provide rough estimates of their earnings.
Examination of age differences within household members reveals further gender 
disparities in earnings. Within households, mothers and daughters earn the least, 
and fathers earn the most, followed by the sons. As many as 71.4% of mothers 
and 54.2% of daughters earn less than 100 JD per month ($148 US) (see Table 
5.8). Most fathers and sons, on the other hand, earn between 100 and 299 JD 
($148 US and $442 US) (at 52.8% and 57.1% respectively). Therefore, wage 
differentials between household members reveal a gender gap rather than a 
generation gap. There are more similarities between the education and skills of 
brothers and sisters. Yet, it is mothers and daughters who share similar earning 
levels. In other words, there are clear age cohort similarities between brothers and 
sisters but it is the gender differences that seem to influence earning levels.
Table 5.8 Distribution of Employed Family Members According to Monthly
Wages
Monthly 
Wages (in JD) Father % Mother % Son % Daughter % Row total
0-99
100-199
200-299
300-399
400-499
500-699
700+
Column Total
17.1 (29)*
28.1 (48)
24.7 (42) 
11.2(19)
4.7 (8) 
9.4 (16)
4.7 (8) 
100 (170)
71.4 (10) 
28.6 (4)
100(14)
38 (78) 
47.8 (98)
9.3 (19)
3.4 (7)
1.5 (3) 
100 (205)
54.2 (135) 
36.1 (90) 
7.6 (19) 
0.8 (2) 
0.8 (2) 
0.4 (1)
100 (249)
38% (225) 
13% (80) 
4% (28) 
2% (10) 
3% (20) 
3% (20) 
1% (8) 
100 (638)
Source: House lold Survey
♦Absolute numbers in brackets
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In addition, as many as 25% of young women with post secondary education earn 
less than 100 JD ($148 US) per month. This compares to 9% for young men and 
0.5% for male household heads. Therefore, household data from Amman reveals 
that while wages are positively affected by increased education levels and skills 
for men this is not the case for women. Young women have higher education 
levels compared with other family members and this has not translated into higher 
wages. This contradicts the precepts of human capital theory which assumes that 
wage differentials between men and women can be explained by differences in 
levels of education (for example, see Anker and Hein 1986) (see Chapter Two). 21
The household survey data also reveals that skill differences do not explain wage 
differences between men and women either. Figures 5.2a and 5.2b, compare the 
wages of family members who are professional and technical workers and 
manufacturing operatives. These occupation groups represent starkly different 
skill and education requirements. Wages in these different occupation groups 
seem to vary for men but remain low for women.
Figure 5.2a Monthly Wages of Family Members in Professional and Technical
Occupations
I  Daughter
D  M other
I  Father
Source: Household Survey
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Figure 5.2b Monthly Wages of Family Members in Manufacturing Occupations
100
Daughter
Son
Q  M other
F ather
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CM w  co
Source: Household Survey
Note: The absolute number of Fathers who earn more than 300 JD per month is 
limited.
In terms of family members who are professional and technical workers, most 
fathers and sons fall in the higher earning categories (see Figure 5.2a). The 
majority of daughters and all mothers, on the other hand, fall in the lower earning 
categories. As for household members who work as manufacturing labour, all 
mothers and daughters fall in the lower earning categories. The sons fall in the 
middle, leaving fathers exclusively in higher earning categories (see Figure 5.2b). 
The distribution of the monthly wages of family members in manufacturing 
occupations reveals an obvious segmentation of wages.
Therefore, although young women have high human capital in comparison to other 
household members this has not translated into an increase in earning power. The 
reasons behind this as discussed in Chapter Four pertain to employers' roles in 
maintaining a gender division of labour through the sex-typing of jobs and 
relegating women to the lower paid jobs, especially in the manufacturing sector. 
Not all the wage differentials between men and women can be explained as a 
result of labour demand factors, however. Some of these differentials are a result 
of gendered household constraints on individual choices that result in differential 
employment opportunities for men and women (see Chapter Six). Furthermore, 
women's lower earning power acts to reinforce definitions of male breadwinner
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ideology, whereby, women's labour is consigned to a supplementary status (see 
below). The result is that gender divisions and roles within households remain 
largely intact despite the increasing labour force participation of young women. 
Yet, the age-specific labour participation of women reveals distinctive roles since 
daughters emerge from the household survey data as those with the highest human 
capital in terms of skill and education and those most involved in the formal 
modem sector. None the less, daughters' earning powers remain considerably 
weak in comparison to men in both generations. Therefore, it seems that the 
increasing participation of young women is a result of two factors: First, their high 
human capital is directly influencing increases in household labour supply. 
Second, their low wages ensure that the status quo of the male provider ideology is 
not threatened. In other words, it appears that the connections between these 
polarised differences of high human capital and low wages that are facilitating 
women's entry into the labour force.
5.3 Household Factors Affecting Female Labour Supply
The focus of this chapter thus far has been a particular trajectory of the household 
domestic cycle. While the previous section looked at the differences between 
adult household members in terms of their individual employment characteristics, 
the current section looks at household level characteristics that shape young female 
labour supply. This includes variables such as household size, composition and 
income which have been considered in other studies to explain women's entry into 
labour markets (see, Chant, 1991a; Safa 1995; Stichter 1990).
5.3.1 Household Size and Dependency Ratios
Household size in the study sample is comparatively large. The mean average is 
7.9 persons (see Table 5.9). Given that the economic participation rate of the 
whole sample population is only 32%, this means there is a relatively high 
dependency ratio of 3.1:1 (i.e. 3.1 non earners per worker).
One reason for the high dependency ratio relates to the fact that 24% of the sample 
population are aged 15 years and below (only 5.5% of the sample population were 
aged 60 years and above). So, the high dependency ratio is largely a result of the 
large family size and the number of small children within it. This might seem to 
contradict the fact that this study focuses on households in the advanced stages of 
the domestic cycle and where there are adult children in working age. However, it 
has to be kept in mind that two decades ago the age at marriage for women was
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low. This meant that women had children across a wide range of their life span. 
So the existence of adult working children does not mean that there are no young 
children present.
Table 5.9 Mean Household size, Number of Income Earners and Dependency 
Ratio by Young Women's Work Status
Employment Status 
of Daughter
Average
Household
Size
Number of 
Workers
Number of 
Young 
Women 
Respondents
Dependency
Ratio
Employed 7.4 504 249 1:2.9
Unemployed 8.1 205 102 1:3.1
Inactive 8.4 61 51 1:3.3
Total 7.9 770 402 1:3.1
Source: Household Survey
Household size and number of workers may be influential in whether daughters 
work or not. Yet this relationship between household size and female labour force 
participation has been usually the subject of research that only looks at married 
women. Some of these case studies, many of which are based on countries outside 
the Middle East, suggest that women in larger households may be more likely to 
be employed than those in small households (Chant, 1991a on Mexico; 
Fapohunda, 1986 on Nigeria; Moser and Sollis 1989 on Equador). Other case 
studies suggest that these variations are dependent on the kinds of employment in 
which women are involved. Women in professional and modem occupations tend 
to belong to smaller households than women in the informal sector (see Brydon 
and Chant 1989:155-6). Within this, there has been little attention to the variations 
across women's life course. Household size as well as women's employment status 
are likely to vary across the different stages of their life span. With this mind, it is 
pertinent that the household survey in Amman reveals that the labour force 
participation of young single women is higher among smaller households.22 In 
contrast, unemployed and inactive young women belong to larger households (see 
Table 5.9). Consequently, the dependency ratio in households of employed 
women is less than the dependency ratio of in those households with either 
unemployed and inactive women. However, it has to be noted here that some 
women with different employment status may belong to the same household (i.e. 
sisters). Therefore, household size alone is not clearly indicative of all factors that 
influence the household labour supply of young women.
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5.4.2 Household Composition
For example, household composition is affected by different residential as well as 
income earning arrangements throughout a household's domestic cycle. Therefore, 
possibly as a result of the particular stage in the domestic cycle of households in 
the current study, household types are relatively homogeneous. Of the total 
sample survey, 78% of households are male headed nuclear units (see Table 5.10) 
(see also Shami and Taminian, 1989:44). In terms of the extended households, a 
majority of these consist of married sons and their respective families. This is also 
a result of the specific stage of the domestic cycle. It is common for sons in 
Jordan to start their married lives with their families (see also Hatem, 1986:291 on 
Egypt). Some of these sons, however, will eventually separate from their natal 
households (see also Shami and Taminian, 1989:43).
Table 5.10 Distribution of Households According to Family Types
Household Type %
Nuclear
Male headed 78 (236)*
Female headed** 4 (12)
Elder son headed 1.3 (4)
Extended***
Polygamous 0.7 (2)
Married sons 10.3 (31)
Relatives (grandparents, uncles, etc.) 0.7 (2)
Married sons and relatives 5 (15)
Total 100 (302)
Source: Household Survey 
♦Absolute numbers in brackets
** These are mostly mothers except for two cases headed by daughters.
***A11 extended households are male headed except for one case where a married 
son lived with his mother.
In terms of female headed households only 4% of the survey sample could be 
described as such. This is even lower than national level statistics which in 1991 
estimated female headed households at 6.4%. Female headed households are 
mostly widows, or wives of male migrant workers in the Arab Gulf region.23 
Desertion by husbands, or single motherhood (phenomena noted in other parts of 
the world) are rare in Jordan (see Fonseca 1991 on Brazil; Chant 1997, on Mexico,
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Costa Rica and Philippines). In addition, it is not uncommon, for divorced women 
to return to their natal homes, and widowed women to live with their husband's kin 
(see Sawalha, 1993 for a fuller discussion on Jordan).
Finally, young women and men, irrespective of income levels, never set up home 
on their own before marriage so there are almost no single person households 
(Shami and Taminian, 1989:43). In some circumstances young men who come 
from rural areas and work in the city may reside on their own. Most of these 
young men reside in rooms within houses during the week and spend their 
weekends and holidays in their family homes. If young single men or women live 
independently of their parents, for reasons other than work, it is assumed that they 
are 'deviants' first, in terms of being likely to have problematic relations with their 
families and second, in terms of their likelihood of engaging in extra-marital 
relations (see also White 1994 on Turkey).24 In fact, landlords usually refuse to 
rent to single people and/or insist on meeting their parents to ascertain the 
circumstances behind their living apart, as work-related reasons provide the only 
legitimate grounds.
Therefore, there is a prevalence of nuclear household forms in Amman a fact 
which contradicts general assumptions that describe the Arab family as extended 
and dependent on kin relations (see Minces 1982; Sharabi, 1988; White 1994, see 
also Chapter two). If, we are to accept the fact, however, that in Amman there is a 
broadly linear transition from extended towards nuclear household forms, then it is 
not inconceivable that the increasing work force participation of young women is a 
response to a situation where extended households which were characterised by a 
greater number of male income earners are in decline.25 In other words, changing 
household structure is resulting in a re-organisation of labour arrangements. 
Income earning is currently distributed between members of a nuclear family 
irrespective of gender while previously (i.e. in extended households) it was 
distributed between male members.
In addition, attempts to categorise households into specific forms (nuclear, 
extended, female headed or single) often intersects with identifying a household 
head who is usually assumed to be the main breadwinner and decision maker. 
Household headship, which revolves around a patriarchal ideology assumes that 
fathers are the 'natural' source of authority (see Chapter Six for discussion on 
patriarchy in Jordan).26 During the questionnaire survey in Amman when the 
father was not present, young women respondents would state that the eldest 
brother was the household head. This identification was persistent in
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circumstances when the mother was present, when the sister was older in age or 
when the son was not an income earner. In other words, the ideology of the male 
head of household is resilient even when circumstances might challenge it. An 
illustration of this is one household where the father is deceased and the mother is 
economically inactive. There are two unemployed sons and a daughter who is the 
only member of the family with a stable income. The head of the household was 
identified as the elder of the two sons even though the working woman was older. 
In other words, male household headship revolves around the gender ideology of a 
male protector as well as the male provider. This is also an example where gender 
considerations, as a result of patriarchal ideology, eclipses age considerations (i.e. 
the presence of the mother and age of working daughter).
To a large extent, the ideology of the male head extends itself beyond the physical 
confines of households. Household organisation in Amman may be increasingly 
contained to one family but the symbolism and social relations that revolve around 
the extended family are still prevalent (Shami and Taminian, 1989:44). In other 
words, changes in family arrangements revolve around material changes in the 
organisation of the residential unit and income earning activities but not on social 
and symbolic levels. Because of the primacy of kin relations, therefore, there are 
fluid boundaries between households and the term head of family has greater 
relevance than head of household in Jordan. Married sons, for example, who 
move out of their parents homes often live in adjacent dwellings (ibid:44). So 
although a married son has a separate living unit the real head of the family is his 
father. Furthermore, in many areas in Amman, extended kin groups live in the 
same vicinity. Within these kin groups there is always a male elder to whom 
different individuals in the different living units defer to for decisions and problem 
solving.
Therefore, it could be said that in terms of household structure there are two 
conflicting forces that affect the supply of young female labour. The first is the 
fact that the decreasing numbers of male income earners in nuclear households is 
pushing young women into the labour force. The second, is the persistence of the 
ideology of extended family networks which puts constraints on the supply of 
female labour. These constraints revolve around the symbolic patriarchal control 
of female kin and will be discussed further in Chapter Six.
5.3.3 Household Income
The effects of household income on women's employment has been addressed 
fairly extensively in the literature. On the whole, empirical evidence suggests that
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the lower the household income the greater women's economic participation 
(Bruce and Dwyer 1988; Chant, 1991a; Gonzalez de la Rocha 1994; Stichter 
1990). Perhaps, because of this, many studies look at this relationship between 
women's work force participation and household incomes within low-income 
settlements (see for example, Rugh, 1985; H.Standing, 1991; Toubeh, 1994). Yet, 
in the context of young women's participation in Amman, this relationship does 
not apply. Indeed, there is a significant work force participation among women in 
middle and upper income households.
According to Table 5.11 the mean annual household income of working daughters 
is significantly higher than either the unemployed or inactive daughters.27 There 
are two possible and mutually reinforcing explanations for this. The first is that 
women from higher income and socio-economic backgrounds are more likely to 
work, possibly as a result of better education and employment opportunities. The 
second is that the involvement of young women in paid work generates higher 
levels of overall family income.
Table 5.11 Mean Average Annual Household Income According to Daughters
Employment Status
Employment Status Average annual 
household 
income (in JD)
Standard
deviation
Number of 
cases
Employed daughters 5,591 5,727,51 249
Unemployed daughters 4,557 3,718,20 102
Inactive daughters 4,557 3,389,59 51
Entire sample 5,145 5,407,70 2393
Source: Household Survey
In general, the impact of household income on female employment can be 
understood as an outcome of the domestic cycle, since different stages are 
characterised by varying capacity of the households to generate income (Gonzalez 
de la Rocha 1994:10). The average household income of the sample population is 
relatively high. This is precisely because most households are at a stage in the 
domestic cycle when they are likely to have maximum number of income earners. 
At the same time it is a stage where current household income could decrease quite 
rapidly with the marriage of any of its younger members or retirement of older 
members.
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Despite this, however, the precise relation between household income and the 
labour supply of daughters is hard to ascertain in Amman. This is because first, in 
some cases sisters in the same household my have different employment status 
with would slightly alter the above Table which calculated household income 
according to number of respondents. Second, young women's wages tend to be 
low irrespective of the overall household income. The majority of working 
women, 90.3% (n= 225) earn less than 200 JD ($296 US) per month irrespective 
of their household income. In contrast, males with higher wage levels usually 
reflect in higher household income levels.28 Therefore, the overall impact of 
daughters' wages on household income is not significant. In other words, even in 
low income households where daughters waged employment is necessary, the sole 
dependence on daughters wages is not complete.
Class position, rather than household income, can also be related to female 
employment. Class differentiation encompasses a wider criterion than mere 
differences in income levels between households. This includes education level of 
heads, area of residence, type of work of head, level of urbanisation, and so on. In 
Amman, class position affects household attitudes towards female employment, 
and consequently female labour supply, more than household income per se. 
Restrictions on female employment seem to be much stronger among those whose 
class positions are considered lower. Despite their low earnings, the necessity for 
their contributions is perhaps threatening to the dominant male breadwinner 
ideology.29
Thus far, this chapter has looked at a variety of both individual and household 
level characteristics that influence the supply of female labour. In terms of 
individual characteristics, it has been found that young women have relatively 
higher human capital as compared to other household members. Despite this 
however, their earning power is weaker than male family members. The 
occupations of household members are diverse with a concentration of young 
women in professional and technical jobs and manufacturing work. In terms of 
household characteristics, young women from smaller households are more likely 
to work than others. As far as household forms are concerned, there is a general 
transition towards nuclear forms. The latter may be increasing labour supply of 
young women in so far as young women's incomes are substituting for those 
formally provided by additional male members. Finally, it has also been found 
that compared to male household members there is no significant correlation 
between household income and female labour supply.
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In some respects, the findings depart from factors that are often cited as significant 
in influencing women's entry into the labour force in other contexts. For example, 
an increase in female labour supply, is usually linked to extended forms of 
household structure (see for example Chant 1991a and Gonzalez de la Rocha 1994 
on Mexico; Safa 1995 on the Caribbean) and likewise, to lower household income 
(see for example Bruce and Dwyer 1988; Stichter 1990 for general discussion). 
Notwithstanding the fact that the distinct findings of the current study are due to its 
cultural specificity in Jordan, it is also due to the emphasis on a particular, and less 
researched, trajectories in both women's lives and households' domestic cycle. 
Young women in Jordan are more likely to work than women in other parts of 
their life course. In addition, the presence of young adults significantly affects 
domestic organisation and income earning strategies in households. So, despite 
this comparative dissimilarity, and apart from education, there is no single 
overriding variable that appears to be linked to women's entry into the labour force 
in Amman.
5.4 Reasons for Young Women's Work
There is a need, therefore, to further analyse the reasons for young women's work. 
For that we turn to their personal rationalisations and explanations and investigate 
possible household circumstances that may act to facilitate young women's work.
5.4.1 Young Women's Views on Reasons for Work
A substantial number of young women, 28.5%, claimed they work in order to 
increase family income (see Table 5.12).30 As one young woman explained:
My parents brought me up and spent on me all my life. It is not 
wrong if I help them out now.
Not all young women, however, worked to increase family income willingly. In a 
substantial number of households young women are required to surrender all their 
income. One young woman describes this:
Basically I see my money for an hour each month because as 
soon as I get home on pay days my wages are handed over to 
my father. On those days when I am walking home and my 
money is my pocket I think how wonderful it would be if I 
could keep it.
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A further 20% of women worked to achieve economic independence. These 
young women worked to fulfill their personal financial needs rather than those of 
their families. As one young woman stated:
At my age, I am not capable of asking my father for money 
every time I need a new dress.
Others, however work for financial independence with a view to the future, as one 
young woman explained:
I try to save my wages because these days women need their 
independent income. The future is uncertain for us. Husbands 
do not provide for their families like they used to. Who knows 
how my future will turn out?
This young woman was referring to an uncertainty that was present throughout the 
interviews. Young women seem to think that 'today's' men are no longer capable 
of fulfilling their traditional roles as providers. Indeed, unemployment, inflation 
and falling real wages have made it more difficult for young men to get married 
and fully provide for their brides as is the tradition. In fact, young men usually 
depend on their parents' financial support for marriage. However, some young 
women seem to perceive these economic constraints as a decline in men's 
'masculinity.' In other words, it appears that the masculine identity grounded in 
the role of the economic provider is in doubt. There is an evident anxiety among 
young women that involves a decreasing certainty in getting married and/or that 
marriage does not provide the financial security for them as women.
Table 5.12 Working Women's Reasons for Labour Force Participation
Reasons for Work %
Increase household income
Cover personal expenses/ economic independence
Gain personal confidence, exposure, and 
motivation
Establish social relations and/or fill free time
Use education qualifications obtained 
Total
28.5 (71)*
20 (50)
15.5 (39)
21 (52) 
15 (37)
100 (249)
Source: Household Survey 
* Absolute numbers in brackets
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The rest of working women do not work for financial reasons but for personal 
reasons such as gaining confidence, access to new social networks outside their 
households or just breaking the monotony of their otherwise restricted lives (see 
Table 5.12). This is illustrated by the following:
If I do not work I will forget who I am and the years of hard 
work I spent to obtain my degree. Work is part of life's 
experience.
I do not work for money. I work in order to get out of the 
house. My father is old and spends his days ordering us around 
and my mother would expect me to do more of the domestic 
work if I stayed home. So instead I go to work.
You know how it is in our society. A girl cannot go here and 
there. A girl cannot do this or that. Work has become my life.
I have friends and we always arrange outings and activities 
during lunch breaks or after work. My friends at work are 
currently the most important thing in my life.
In light of the above, it would seem that there are a group of women who work for 
material reasons and another for non-material reasons. These are not necessarily 
exclusive of each other and in some cases can overlap. We can also detect 
evidence both of work motivated by personal needs and household needs which 
again are not easily disentangled. The economic well-being of households and 
young women's individual interests can be intertwined (see Chant, 1996a: 10; 
Kabeer, 1994b: 108). For example, women who apparently work for reasons 
relating to their households' well-being may do so in order to gain long term 
assurance of their families' attention and support (see below).
5.4.2 Daughters Paid Labour and Mother's Domestic labour 
Research on women's employment has repeatedly acknowledged that women's 
reproductive and domestic burdens reduce their access to employment (Jelin 1982; 
Stichter 1990). What needs to be explored in the context of the current study is 
whether daughters' paid employment is facilitated through the existence of mothers 
as full time domestic workers.
Domestic labour in Jordan is solely identified with women. In the majority of 
households mothers carry out the daily domestic labour. Daughters, regardless of 
their employment status are substantially involved as well. Of the total of
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daughters interviewed, 76% performed daily domestic responsibilities (see Table 
5.15). Within this there are some considerations that mainly have to do with 
household income. It has been noted elsewhere that the burden of housework 
varies according to type of housing and as the quality improves the burdens 
decrease (Chant, 1984:14 and 1996a: 13). The household data in Amman reveals 
that the lower the family income the more daughters share domestic 
responsibilities with their mothers. It is important to note that in low income 
households young women face the highest obstacles in entering the labour force. 
In poor crowded neighbourhoods, female employment is more likely to be 
considered shameful. The reasons behind this, which are mostly related to gender 
ideologies, are diverse and will be discussed in the next chapter. However, in 
terms of domestic labour and the gender division of labour, it is not inconceivable 
that the increased domestic burdens, as a result of poor housing conditions, inhibits 
the release of daughters into the labour force (see also Wolf 1990a:48). In one 
particular household where 10 family members share 3 rooms in Wihdat refugee 
camp this rationale was clearly put forth:
My father is old and does not work. My married brothers, who 
live with us, are financially burdened by their own children.
My mother is diabetic and frequently ill. Therefore, I stay 
home and perform the cleaning, and cooking with my sisters-in- 
law. Whenever I mention my desire to work my parents get 
furious.
In terms of the relation between domestic labour and daughters' workforce 
participation, Table 5.13 reveals that unemployed and inactive women perform 
more domestic labour on daily basis than young women who are employed. This 
could be seen as a natural consequence of staying at home. However, unemployed 
male family members rarely perform any domestic labour and as much as 48.5% 
of working daughters perform work on daily basis. A number of working women 
claim that at the weekend they are expected to perform all forms of chores and, as 
a result, do not get a day off. One particular young woman spends her weekend 
cleaning up her uncle's house who is unmarried (it was her mother who instigated 
this arrangement).
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Table 5.13 Daughters Involvement in Domestic Work According
to Work Status
Domestic Work Employed % Unemployed % Inactive %
Daily
Occasionally/irregularly
Seldom/never
Total
48.5 (121)* 
43.3 (108)
8 (20) 
100 (249)
86.2 (88)
9.8 (10)
3.9 (4) 
100 (102)
98 (50) 
2 (1)
100 (51)
Source: Household Survey 
♦Absolute numbers in brackets
On the whole, therefore, young women continue to be identified with domestic 
roles despite their employment. Yet, a crucial factor in the release of young 
women to the labour force is household domestic organisation and the presence of 
other adult females. For example, in the absence of an able mother in some 
households, one daughter would be released to the labour market while another 
would be assigned the household management.31 Indeed, non-working daughters 
are de facto household managers. It is also common for mothers in the later stages 
of their courses to hand over all responsibilities to daughters. Such mothers claim 
that they are getting older and it is time for their daughters to give them a 'rest.'32 
Besides this, however, there is also the notion of housework as 'good practice' for 
young women. Many mothers are quite proud of their daughters' performance as it 
reflects on their own roles in training them, or more precisely, engendering them.
In other words, it is only through the existence of mothers as full time housewives 
that daughters are able to work (see also Safa 1995:79 on the Caribbean). Because 
of this, the acquiescence and support of mothers of daughters' employment is 
crucial. In this way daughters are relieved of the double burden which working 
wives usually face.
5.4.3 Daughters as Contributors to Household Income
One important aspect that needs to be addressed is the extent to which the labour 
supply of young women is regarded by parents a means of increasing the income 
available for household expenditure. Indeed, daughters are extra income earners 
and a substantial number of women contribute to household expenditure in some 
form or another. However, attempts to assess daughters' specific amount or form 
of contribution is problematic.
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As outlined above, 28.5% of daughters stated that they work to increase family 
income. However, when questions about income expenditure were posed, the 
number of those who contributed to family income vary substantially.33 For 
example, when daughters were asked to specify how they tended to spend their 
income, 43% stated that they contribute to household expenditure. When they 
were asked to specify the size of their contribution, 57% stated that more than half 
went to household expenditure. Finally when they were asked to specify the form 
of their contribution, 77% responded with a range of items such as monthly bills, 
education of siblings, food, luxury items and so on.34 Therefore, regardless of the 
exact form, it appears that a substantial number of daughters contribute to 
household expenditure in some way or another. However, the extent to which this 
makes a difference to potential household expenditure and family-well being, and 
how this contribution in managed in light of existing household gender divisions is 
discussed in the following section.
5.5 Gender and Age in Household Management of Income
The issue of household management of income has been continuously highlighted 
not only as reflecting gender divisions of labour but in acting as a primary basis of 
household inequality as well:
The control and allocation of resources within the household is 
a complex process which has to be seen in relation to a web of 
rights and obligations. The management of labour, income and 
resources is something which is crucially bound up with 
household organisation and the sexual division of labour 
(Moore, 1988:56).
Besides gender divisions in control of resources, working daughters also succumb 
to the divisions based on age. The current section argues that because of their 
gender and age, the value of daughters' employment and wages are symbolically 
minimised by other family members. Daughters' generally low remuneration from 
paid employment gives material reinforcement to ascribed gender divisions. 
Simultaneously, this legitimises the appropriation of their income.
To illustrate this, the following section first looks at general patterns of household 
resource management and how they relate to intra-household hierarchies. 
Secondly, it considers patterns of daughters income management and, third, 
compares this with sons' income management. The overall aim is to demonstrate 
how household gender divisions result in engendering daughters' labour and 
wages.
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5.5.1 Patterns of Household Resource Management
Research has drawn attention to the importance of household management systems 
which structure the distribution of rights, resources and responsibilities between 
members (Kabeer, 1994b: 117).35 These have tended to look at gender divisions 
in household responsibilities and resource management between spouses and 
where according to Anne Whitehead (1981:117), there is a 'conjugal contract' 
between husbands and wives in terms of right and obligations. It has also been 
suggested that household management systems are dependent on factors beyond 
spousal relations, such as the family domestic cycle, age of members, the nature of 
subsistence activities and the level of aggregate household income (Gonzalez de la 
Rocha 1994:113; Hoodfar, 1988:126).
Patterns of household resource management in Amman vary which suggests that 
they cannot follow a rigid typology (see Kabeer, 1994b: 116). The following will 
describe household resource management according to broad classifications. This 
is because it is difficult to capture the complexity and variation in the social and 
economic life of each individual household.
Male Head Management
In 43% of households interviewed in Amman, the male head both manages and 
controls resources. In such households, it is the male head who also performs the 
daily shopping. The reasons behind this are twofold. The first is that shopping 
provides a means for greater control over household expenditure (see also Chant 
1991b on Costa Rica). The second is that, traditionally, market places were male 
dominated spaces and male heads who are still not accustomed to the increasing 
presence of women in market places do the shopping themselves.
Female Head Management
In another 34% of the households men as well as other working members give the 
elder female (wife/mother) a substantial amount of their earnings for household 
use and only keep a little for themselves. In such households the responsibility for 
monthly expenditure and daily shopping falls on the elder women. This group of 
women can be divided into those that are considered household 'financial 
managers' and 'keepers of housekeeping allowance' (Hoodfar, 1988). The 
differences between these two groups reflect the existing power relations within 
the household. 'Household managers' are women who are acknowledged to be 
'good with money' or have a 'tight hand' (i.e. do not dispense of money easily). 
The management skills of these women are recognised and they usually have 
active roles in family decisions. These cases reflect more trust in spousal relations
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where a wife would know, how much her husband, or other working members, are 
earning. The 'keepers of household allowance', on the other hand, do not 
necessarily know how much the husband or other family members earn. The 
amount of money they receive, unlike women managers, does not enable them to 
actively participate in family financial decisions, since it is exclusively for 
household expenditure.
Shared Management
Finally, in 23% of the households adult working daughters and sons take part in 
managing resources and performing daily shopping (see also Gonzalez de la Rocha 
1994:113 on Mexico).36 These cases reflect a specific stage in the domestic cycle 
where there is more than one adult working member and where resource 
management is not necessarily exclusively controlled by spouses. The lack of 
centralised control of household income management is another reflection of less 
authoritarian household forms. In many instances, however, this type of 
management system included a father/family head who was retired or 
unemployed. To a large extent, therefore, gender and generation variations in 
resource management reflect different bases of power relations amongst the 
different households which also influence the ability of different members to 
participate in the intra-family decisions.
5.5.2 Patterns of Daughters' Money Management
Having identified the general tendencies in household resource management we 
now turn to how these affect the management of daughters' wages. Here, 
typologies developed by Jan Pahl (1989) that describe how income is managed 
between spouses in Britain is helpful in identifying how daughters income is 
managed in Amman. The following classifies the different systems within two of 
Jan Pahl's categories: 'whole wage management' and 'independent wage 
management.'
Within this framework, however, it is also important to identify individual and 
family centered perceptions of daughters wages. Here we will utilise Amaryta 
Sen's (1990:126-27), distinctions between 'perception,' 'personal interest and 
welfare' and 'agency.' 'Perception' is one of the important parameters in the 
determination of intra-family divisions and inequalities. In the present study this 
functions on two levels. The first is household perception of young women's work 
and the second is young women's own perceptions of their income and 
contribution to family maintenance. In this sense, daughters' self identification in 
terms of the value of their work is mediated by the overall perceptions of women's
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subordinate roles which resisted identifying them as income earners (see also 
Bruce and Dwyer, 1988:8-9). Secondly 'personal interest and welfare' in the 
context of the present study functions in the sense that young women's 'self 
interest' is intertwined with the well-being of their families as a whole and 
therefore their financial contributions are seen as part of their 'self interest.’ The 
third influencing factor 'agency' denotes a situation where a person may have 
various goals and objectives other than the pursuit of individual and family well­
being, although it would be hard to imagine no links of 'other factors’ with an 
individual's interest/well being. In the present study this refers to daughters who 
see their contributions to household expenditure as facilitators for a certain goals.
Whole Wage Management
In the 'whole wage management' system, daughters, as well as other working 
members, hand over their entire wage to one parent, who is responsible for 
household expenditure. Only a portion of the income is retained for daily 
expenses and transportation while the rest is pooled with household income. The 
variation within this system depends on whether it is the father or the mother who 
controls daughters' income. When fathers control daughters' income the 
management or disposal of that income tends to include an expansion of capital 
assets. There are two relevant case studies that illustrate this particular pattern. 
The first is of two sisters working in a toy factory. These women were working to 
enable their father, a petty trader of vegetables, to finish building the family home. 
The young women were unhappy in their work because their father had more or 
less forced them to work and appropriated their income. They also considered 
their job as below their educational standards and therefore, demeaning in some 
ways. The second case is that of a family of nine sisters. The father, who is a 
teacher, had opened a hairdressing salon for them and as each daughter becomes 
old enough, they join the enterprise, leaving only on marriage. Meanwhile, the 
father, enriched by his daughters' efforts, has built a four storey building that he 
rents out. The income of this family has substantially increased over the years. 
These are examples of fathers expanding their own resource base from their 
daughters' wages. In other words, when daughters' earning capacity increase so 
does male interest in the control of their labour.
Yet, it is also important to recognise that daughters may get returns from fathers' 
control over their income and therefore there is clearly an element of 'personal 
interest' involved. In some cases, for example, fathers' control means that 
daughters can achieve a certain amount of status either in family or in personal 
decision-making (see also Salaff, 1990:126; and Chapter Six). One working
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daughter, for example, explained how she has recently interjected in a family 
decision for her unemployed brother to get married as she thought it was not an 
economically sound decision and her father had apparently agreed with her. In 
other cases, however, fathers control over daughters' income means increased 
patriarchal authority where daughters have few visible returns and in fact may 
experience heightened control over their lives especially if they have no say in the 
decision to work or not. This relates to 'perception' of female wage which is 
bound by larger family gender divisions and inequalities. This was the case cited 
above of the two daughters working in the toy factory:
So our father is proud of his new building that our wages helped 
him to finish. But what did we get? He does not even allow us to 
join the social activities with our workmates or even visit our 
neighbours, after work.
When mothers fully control daughters' income its management is significantly 
different. It mainly includes poorer households and where daughters' incomes are 
directly pooled to daily family needs and as a result there is more recognition of 
daughters' contributions to the family well-being. Also, more often than not, 
mothers put some money aside for their daughters needs and occasionally buy 
them gold as a form of saving.37 These same mothers are usually very meticulous 
in household expenditure as they are always keen on saving the extras for their 
daughters. In general, the daughters who give their incomes to their mothers feel 
more at ease than those who give it to their fathers. Mothers are more concerned 
about their daughters' hard labour and often state: 'I am spending the sweat of my 
girl.'
The difference between father's and mother's control of daughters' income stems 
from the fact that fathers already have access to, and control of, their own personal 
resources and within this context daughters wages are an addition. Therefore, 
fathers often use daughters' wages to supplement investments beyond immediate 
household needs. Although theoretically this entails an improvement in the 
standard of living of the young women's families which can only reflect positively 
on themselves, it has to be mentioned that within the context of prevailing 
ideologies, any expansion of capital assets usually reflects on the status and power 
base of the male head. Other fathers might not necessarily use daughters income 
to build on family resources but again as a result of the male provider ideology, 
simply control it as an expression of authority within the household. Mothers on 
the other hand, rarely have any other source of independent income and are more 
likely to spend daughters' wages on immediate family needs. So in general,
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mothers' management of daughters' income occurs in situations where it is not 
likely to threaten the established role of the male provider since it is pooled within 
the overall household resources. In other words, the main distinction to be made 
here is that mothers pool and/or manage daughters income while fathers control 
it.38
It is important to point out, however, that mothers' or fathers' 'full wage 
management' is not always a predetermined fact and intra-spousal conflicts can 
result through attempts to control young women's earnings. A daughter can 
become personally embroiled in her parents' struggle over her income. One such 
case is a working woman whose parents both demand that she give them her 
income in full. Apparently, the father squanders the money and leaves the mother 
to manage the family. For a while, the young woman would give half her income 
to the father and the other half to the mother keeping for herself an amount enough 
for her transportation to work. For this her father gave her a beating for 
disobeying him and her mother stopped talking to her as she saw that her daughter, 
who is the eldest, did not support her in her problems with the abusive husband.
Independent Wage Management
In terms of 'independent wage management' a distinction must be made between 
daughters who control their income and contribute to household expenditure with 
those who do not. The methods of daughters' control and contribution to 
household income varies. Some women give an unspecified amount of money to 
their parents on a monthly basis. The amount is usually determined by their 
personal needs as well as their perceptions of household needs. Another group of 
women 'help out' through making specific monthly payments such as electricity 
and telephone bills or paying off family loans. Finally, there are the women who 
do not contribute on either a regular basis or for specific items but contribute now 
and then in response to need or desire. This includes a variety of items ranging 
from education expenses for brothers and sisters,39 to luxury items such as a new 
television or stove. Daughters' control of wages in such cases means that it is 
within their power to increase the standard of living of their households. The 
result is that some gain the family's affection and respect as well as personal 
satisfaction in fulfilling filial duties (see also, Kabeer, 1995:24; Salaff, 1990:126). 
In other words, this reflects cases when family 'well-being' is closely related to 
'self interest'
153
Other women's contributions go further than meeting family needs and achieving 
'self interest'. Some see this as an 'agency' factor to improve life's options for 
themselves. The plans of one young woman lab technician exemplifies this:
This summer, God willing, I plan to re-tile our courtyard and 
the entrance to our house. I have this plan where die sides 
along the wall will be planted with flowers. My sister had a 
suitor last month. It is important for the house to look good if 
we are to have suitors.
This young woman's contribution was part of an 'agency' factor to better marriage 
prospects. Another form of 'agency' is when young women contribute parts of 
their wages to family expenditure as a measure of future assurance of family 
support against insecurity once they are married. This is especially so when 
daughters contribute at times when their families' are in need of material input. In 
these cases contributions are not regarded as temporary but part of long term 
reciprocal exchanges . These reflect cases when young women's 'self interest' and 
family well-being' are closely tied to the 'agency' of future emotional and financial 
security through family ties.
As for the daughters who do not contribute to household income, the majority 
belong to middle and upper income households. Although theoretically these 
daughters control their incomes however, in many cases, this is not without the 
involvement of parents. Many daughters give their incomes to their mothers 
(surprisingly few gave it to the fathers) who would either save it and buy gold 
jewellery for their daughters or open a savings account in the bank in the mother's 
name.40 This is reflective of the fact that daughters do not want to bother 
themselves with financial matters and regard their mothers as better equipped to 
take over. This could be in part as a result of their own gendered 'perceptions' of 
their incomes. On part of the mothers, however, this could be a form of social 
control over their daughters whereby they make sure that daughters' wages and 
consequently behaviour is closely monitored. So, on closer examination, these 
daughters do not have full control over their incomes. If they need money their 
mothers have to provide it. In effect, therefore, their spending power is not that 
much different from those women who hand their wages to their parents.
Very few daughters in the sample survey who do not contribute to household 
income have a bank account. This might be reflective of their low earning 
capacity (see above). In fact, the standard of living and spending patterns of some 
women sometimes forces them to take money from their parents at the end of the
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month. The result is that even when women do not contribute to household 
income they rarely become self sufficient in money matters. This extends itself to 
many other aspects of their lives (see Chapter Six).
5.5.3 The Income of Sons Compared to Daughters
The existing variation in daughters' money management in Amman is largely 
determined by the mixed income sample and the relative need for daughters' 
income in each household. It is also reflective of the ideological differences 
between the individual households in terms of the appropriation of the female 
wage. What needs to be further analysed, especially in terms of lower income 
households where daughters wages are part of family maintenance, is whether 
inter-generational gender stratification is being reproduced through differentials in 
sons' and daughters' income management.
An underlying factor in differentiating the disposal of sons' and daughters' incomes 
in Amman are differences in gender role expectations and this is closely tied to 
differential 'perceptions' of the male and female wage. Unlike daughters who are 
expected to marry and live elsewhere, parents consider their sons as their old age 
security. As such, daughters' earnings are considered temporary, not to mention 
supplementary (because of their low monetary value). Sons' earnings, on the other 
hand, are considered permanent and are therefore guarded more carefully.41 So 
gender role expectations result in the appropriation of daughters' earnings more 
often than sons'.
Within this context, sons tend to be provided with the freedom to develop skills 
and contacts that enhance their future earning potential. Expanding economic 
opportunities not only ensure a better future for sons but also for parents who are 
careful to cultivate their sons' loyalties (see also Greenhalgh, 1988:50 on Taiwan). 
This, however, coincides with a time in daughters' lives when parents exercise 
increased control over their lives and play a major role in choice of employment 
(see Chapter Six). Therefore, as sons are free to explore income earning 
opportunities daughters' labour as well as wages become increasingly controlled. 
The result of this asymmetry is that daughters contribute to household income 
more than sons (see also Joekes, 1985:204-7 on Morocco). Although many sons 
do contribute as well, it is generally on a different basis than daughters. A son 
could be implicitly expected to contribute. Of course, the extent to which this 
occurs varies according to the economic needs and class positions of the individual 
households. However, irrespective of this variation, there is a uniformity in the 
differential treatment of sons' and daughters' wages across most households.
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Beyond sons' expected roles as the parents' future security, sons have to save in 
order to get married. In Jordanian society a man is expected to provide brideprice 
as well as housing upon marriage (see Chapter Six for fuller discussion on 
marriage customs). Therefore, marriage is costly for men and it is customary for 
parents to facilitate their sons' marriages through financial help. This, together 
with the importance of marriage itself, makes the marriage of a son a costly affair 
that involves all family members. Within this context, there are several cases in 
the household survey of young working women contributing to their brothers' 
costs of marriage. Often, daughters with steady jobs take out loans that they have 
to repay from their own wages to cover some of the matrimonial expenses of their 
brothers. Such daughters regarded their contribution as going to the household 
'well-being' in general rather than to the brother as a separate entity, however.
In addition, since in Jordanian society sons have more social freedom than 
daughters, it is generally accepted that sons' daily expenditure is higher as they 
need to spend on recreational activities. Daughters’ restricted social lives and 
emphasis on modesty, on the other hand, are translated into a perceived lack of 
need to control income. When daughters do spend their money on personal needs 
they are considered frivolous by other family members. This is particularly 
interesting since employers and parents alike often describe young working 
women as spending their incomes on personal luxury items such as clothes and 
makeup (see also Joekes, 1985 on Morocco). In reality, as compared to young 
women, it is the young men who are more inclined to spend their income on 
personal consumption and recreational activities.42
Therefore, notions about appropriate gendered behaviour are mediated through the 
disposal of sons' and daughters' incomes. Men are supposed to have individual 
consumption needs and, as a result, develop individual expenditure patterns. On 
the other hand, women have been conditioned to perceive their individual well­
being as part and parcel of their households'. An example of this is found in a case 
of a young woman factory worker who for three months had been subsidising her 
younger brother's unemployment by giving him 20 JD ($30 US) per month of her 
80 JD ($118 US). According to her:
He's a man. How can he go out with his friends with no money
in his pockets?43
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In short, we have seen that households maximise the use of daughters wages and 
expand benefits and advantages for sons at this specific stage of the domestic 
cycle. However, the advantageous position of sons compared to daughters at the 
present stage of their life courses is because there are high expectations from sons 
and no expectations from daughters in the future (i.e. as the household domestic 
cycle progresses).
6. Conclusions
Through the analysis of the household survey data, the main concern of this 
chapter was to explore household level factors that influence female labour supply 
at a specific stage in households' domestic cycle as well as young women's life 
courses. It highlighted the fact that gender and age places different household 
members in different positions in the labour market. Aside from education levels, 
no particular supply side factor could be systematically linked to the increased 
waged employment of daughters. However, it is a significant fact that daughters 
are not replicating their mothers' early age at marriage and limited labour force 
participation. Compared with other family members, they have the highest 
education levels, and, compared with male family members, their earnings are 
lower. In other words, there are stark differences between daughters and mothers 
as well as stark differences between young women's high human capital and 
limited earnings.
Despite their waged employment, however, young women continue to be 
identified with restrictive gender roles. It has been revealed, for example, that 
daughters work because they do not threaten spousal relations. In addition, their 
low wages do not threaten power relations that are dominated by gender and age 
hierarchies. Finally, the appropriation of their wages, compared with their 
brothers', is legitimised because wages become engendered.
Finally, it has to be mentioned here that the engendering of young women's work 
and wages is not consciously calculated. Young women's work is a new 
phenomenon that is occurring hand in hand with many other changes in the lives 
and organisation of Jordanian households. These include, first, economic changes 
through decreases in real wages, rising costs of living and rising unemployment. 
Second, there are changes in social relations, such as the decline of the extended 
family, which has an impact on household level labour supply and income
157
management. Third, there are demographic changes where one of the results is that 
more daughters and sons live with their parents for longer years as single adults 
which, until recently, was a non-existent life course trajectory in the lives of both 
Jordanian men and women. Finally, and related to the above, Jordanian 
households find themselves faced with changes in gender and generation 
household relations. For the implications of this we now turn to Chapter Six.
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Notes to Chapter Five
1 Given this fact, the terms family and household are used interchangeably here. However, it 
should be noted that a household usually refers to a unit of residence and shared consumption while 
a family encompasses broader concepts of kinship and ideology. For more detailed discussions on 
the social organisation of households, see Barrett (1980), Harris, (1981), Moore (1994).
2 A jabal translates as mountain. Since Amman was originally built on several mountains 
different parts of the city are named after the mountains.
3 For more detail on squatters, land conflicts and property rights in the metropolitan Amman area 
see Razzaz, 1991.
4 These cases are not young woman living independently, but an orphaned family where the elder 
sister is the breadwinner, and a young woman whose parents are migrant workers living in Kuwait 
and who is entrusted with younger siblings and ailing grandparents.
5 'Work force participation', 'employment' and so on are used throughout this chapter to describe 
involvement in income earning activities of all kinds including informal labour and family based 
activities. The term 'economically active,' also describes those who are unemployed provided they 
were actively seeking employment. 'Economically inactive' refers to women who are unemployed 
but are not seeking employment.
6 Officially the unemployed are defined as those individuals who are actively seeking employment. 
The study here does not adopt this definition and instead relies on the young women's self 
identification of their employment status (See Chapter Six).
7 As an example, one young woman in the sample identified herself as an unemployed nurse. Her 
father, sitting in the next room during the interview inteqected that he would never consent to her 
working as a nurse. Yet, this particular woman was defined as unemployed and not as inactive in 
the survey sample because she wanted to work despite family opposition. If she continues 
negotiating her employment conditions, possible accommodation might be reached where her 
father would eventually consent to her employment
8 Upon discovering home based productive activities during the household interviews, the women 
involved were then described as economically active and usually asked a different set of questions 
(see Appendix Two).
9 Preferences for sons in Middle Eastern societies is a widely accepted fact. Male children are 
considered a source of prestige for parents since they are supposed to carry on the family lineage 
and provide security for parents in old age. For more on son preference in the Middle East see 
Beck and Keddie (1978); Maher, (1981); UNICEF (1990a). See also Chapter Six.
*0 Admission to one of the public universities is quite difficult for both men and women. There are 
always more applicants than places in universities although new public and private institutions are 
being opened. Furthermore, the sole admission criterion in public universities is the results of the 
national school exam (Tawjihi). The cumulative average determines the area of study. Higher 
averages secure admittance to the sciences and lower averages to the arts and social sciences.
1 1 In the household questionnaire survey (see questions 53 and 54 in Appendix Two), respondents 
were asked to state if and why they think education is important for women. They were free to 
choose any answer and 6.2% (n=25) thought that education was a precondition for finding an 
educated husband and for being better mothers (see also Hatem 1987:293 on Egypt; Papps, 
1993:103 on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Turkey; Zuhur 1992:93 on Egypt).
12 This strong relationship between female higher education levels and employment has been 
identified in previous studies based on Jordan. One such study reveals that the probability for 
female employment increases by 26 times if women have post secondary education (Abu Amra and 
Takriti, 1994:30-1).
13 For more on the concept of 'shame' in Arab societies see Khayatt (1990) on Iraq; Rugh (1985) 
on Egypt; Shalhoub-Kevorkian, 1993 on Palestine; Wikan, 1982 on Oman and Memissi, 1975 for a 
general discussion. See also Chapter Six for a further discussion in the Jordanian context.
14 As an illustration, one woman respondent who has not completed school and was working in a 
food manufacturing firm claimed that apart from her immediate family no one knows that she 
works as an unskilled factory worker. Neighbours and friends believe that she is a clerk in an 
office.
These were women who owned hairdressing salons. The relatively low cost of setting up a 
hairdressing business together with the fact that it is strictly sex segregated has made this 
profession popular among women.
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*6 In an investigation of the three major credit institutions in Amman, the Housing Bank, 
Cooperative Bank and Industrial Development Bank, Kawar and Takriti (1992) found that women 
were the beneficiaries of approximately 4% of the total number of extended loans.
17 Until recently women engaged in agriculture for home-based consumption of seasonal 
vegetables. With increasing congestion and scarcity of land this is no longer a common activity. 
Only one mother in the household survey still plants an empty lot of land not far from her home.
18 Embroidery is a traditional female activity especially among women of Palestinian origin. This 
is especially the case in the areas of Al-Nathif, Al-Taj where a Save the Children income 
generating project operates and pays for finished items. Another area was Hai Nazzal where the 
Hai Nazzal Community Centre markets the finished items on behalf of the women.
19 These were only two in number. One was a general practitioner and the other a dentist.
70 These figures are drawn from the 1993 Employment Survey that include establishments which 
employ five people and above in both the private and public sectors. In other words, these figures 
are based on formal sector employment only and excludes the informal sector.
71 An analysis of variance estimation reveals that only 16% of daughters' variance in monthly 
income can be explained by their educational achievement. The adjusted R(2) when running the 
same regression for brothers' income is even less significant at 9.2%. For fathers the result gives an 
adjusted R(2) of 10.8%. Therefore there is no significant relation between daughters', sons' and 
fathers' education achievement and wage levels.
72 A correlation analysis reveals that the probability of women from smaller households (less than 
7 members) to work, increases by 28%.
73 Until the mid-1980s male out-migration to oil-rich Gulf states was significant (see Chapter 
Three) which caused an increase in de-facto female headed households during that period. For 
example, 1986 study in Amman revealed that 12% of households were female headed (see Bisharat 
and Zagha 1986). However, as a result of recession and the 1990 Gulf War, work opportunities for 
males decreased and many were repatriated decreasing the number of female headed households.
T4 Another reason, to be discussed further in Chapter Six, is the universality of marriage.
75 In terms of social history, there is little evidence that documents the pervious prevalence of 
extended household forms as compared to nuclear forms in present day Amman. The speculation 
here is based on the household survey results as compared to traditional notions which describe 
households. It is also derived from parents' descriptions of their living arrangements in the past, 
much of which was in rural areas (i.e. before urbanisation). In addition, evidence that suggest that 
this transition towards nuclear households is likely to continue came from the women respondents. 
During discussions of future marriage prospects many women stated their desire for a future 
husband who has his own home. Living in an extended household is generally not desired by 
young women today.
76 For a fuller discussion on definitions of household headship see Chant (1997: Chapter One), 
Folbre (1991) and Harris (1981).
77 In a study on female employment in Puerto Rico, Helen Safa (1995:78) also found that the 
annual income of households with working daughters was higher than the rest of her sample.
78 The correlation coefficient between monthly wages and household income for males is (0.2889) 
and significant at 5% level. For females the correlation is less significant, although positive at 
(0.1301). Therefore, there is a stronger relation between male monthly wages and household 
income.
79 In a study based on Greece, Constantina Safilios-Rothschild (1990:223) found that husbands 
from middle and upper social classes are less threatened by their wives income earning activities. 
Yet among lower social classes, where income is needed, women's employment is threatening to 
the husband's role as the breadwinner and protector. As a result, their income earning activities are 
minimised in order to avoid destabilising ascribed gender relations.
30 See Question 17 in household questionnaire survey in Appendix Two. Further details (i.e. 
quotes) were obtained through the semi-structured interviews, also Appendix Two.
31 The percentage of households in which one sister is in employment and another is economically 
inactive are 5.6% (n=17). The reasons behind this, however, vary. Some economically inactive 
women choose not to work, while in other cases it is out of an obligation to perform domestic 
work.
32 A considerable amount of mothers complained of physical ailments such as rheumatism, heart 
conditions and so on. In other words, that there was a legitimate need for daughters to take over 
domestic maintenance.
33 See questions 25-27 in the household questionnaire survey in Appendix Two. Further details on 
specific expenditure patterns were obtained through the semi-structured interviews.
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34 It has to be noted here that these contributions to household income may have been over-stated 
in some cases and under-stated in others.
33 In a study of money allocation and power relations between spouses in the United Kingdom, Jan 
Pahl (1989) identifies four types of income management and allocation systems. These are the 
'whole wage management', the 'allowance,' the 'shared management' and the 'independent 
management' system. For a comprehensive review of different types of household wage and 
expenditure management between spouses see also Kabeer (1994b) and Young (1992).
3^ There is a household gender and age division in shopping when expenditure is not solely 
controlled by the male head. On the whole, women buy the vegetables and fruits; young boys or 
girls buy bread and adult men buy meat. Meat is bought in less frequency and is higher in cost then 
fresh produce. Perhaps this is the cause behind the gender divide. In terms of the age divide, bread 
is bought most frequently and usually entails queuing, therefore, because children's time is seen as 
more disposable they are often assigned to this task. Some children have the additional task of 
being sent out as scouts to find the day's bargains in seasonal vegetables and fruits and report back 
to their mothers (Shami and Taminian, 1985)
32 There are prevalent views that gold jewellery are the best form of saving for women. This stems 
form the fact that traditionally gold jewellery is one of the only from of wealth that women had 
exclusive ownership rights (see also Kabeer 1995:23 on Bangladesh).
3& Compared with other research on male versus female control of wages, the differences between 
mothers' and fathers' control of their daughters wages is noteworthy. It is consistent with evidence 
elsewhere that women's spending is more focused on household needs as opposed to men who 
invariably keep some of their income for their own expenses (see Blumberg, 1991b; Bruce and 
Dwyer 1988 for general discussions; Engle 1995 on Guatemala; Hoodfar, 1988 on Egypt). In 
Amman, therefore, these differences are extended to spouses' inter-generational control of 
daughters' wages.
3^ Kabeer (1995) writing on Bangladesh and Greenhalgh (1988) writing on Taiwan also found that 
working daughters often fund or part-fund sibling education.
40 The difference between those mothers who buy jewellery and those who open bank accounts for 
their daughters is education levels as well as class position. Lower income mothers attach more 
importance to jewellery as the best form of saving for women than middle income mothers.
41 Despite the fact that nowadays sons tend to move to independent homes after marriage. Yet, 
parents still tend to expect their support in old age.
42 Indeed, this is not restricted to Jordan for as Judith Bruce (1989:986) observes with reference to 
spousal relations cross-culturally :'...although the specifics of women's consumption responsibilities 
vary, it is quite commonly found that gender ideologies support the notion that men have a right to 
personal spending money, which they are perceived to need or deserve, and that women's income is 
for collective purposes.’
43 Nevertheless, this young woman was upset because instead of going out to search for work her 
brother was spending her money and his time on his hobby which was a pigeon-house on the 
rooftop of their house.
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CHAPTER SIX 
PATRIARCHY. GENDER AND GENERATION IN AMMAN
This chapter examines the implications of young women's work on gender and 
generation relations at both household and workplace levels. Given the fact that 
women were previously married at an earlier age, the existence of adult daughters, 
for a longer number of years within natal households is a relatively new 
phenomenon. These women have also been allowed and even encouraged to 
acquire education and a substantial number work as a result of expanding labour 
opportunities. One of the main aims of this chapter, therefore, is to examine the 
implications of Jordanian women's new life course trajectory: single employed 
adulthood. In this light, and since Jordanian society is based on rigid gender and 
generation hierarchies, it is imperative to examine how gender and generation 
relations are manifested and negotiated.
In addressing these issues it is necessary to look at the over-arching system of 
patriarchy and in particular its dynamic interaction with the evolving life course 
stage of young single women. In order to do this, the chapter utilises case study 
material and to a lesser extent quantitative data, and is divided into the following 
sections. The first section sets out the normative/ideal life course stages of 
Jordanian women. The second section deconstructs these ideal life course stages 
of women through highlighting changing interactional patterns between gender 
and age relations in the home and in the workplace. The third section focuses on 
patriarchy's adaptation to young women's new life course stage. It will examine 
how elements of patriarchy are currently being renegotiated, not to mention 
reconstructed, in order to control young women's prolonged singlehood and 
possible autonomy. The fourth section investigates the issue of young women's 
dress and the particular uses and causes of the current trend of veiling. This will 
illustrate how young women's dress is evolving as an integral part of gender 
negotiations during this trajectory of women's lives. Having identified the 
changing gender and generation hierarchies, section five turns to women's 
experiences of this new life course stage. It assesses how they see employment 
and income earning affecting their roles within their households. It also assesses 
the impact of their employment on their personal autonomy, social freedom and 
self-differentiation. The sixth and final section explores dominant attitudes 
towards young women's future gender roles. It considers marriage expectations 
and how young women's attitudes are evolving in divergent directions from that of
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their parents. One of the main findings of the chapter is that single adulthood may 
have expanded opportunities and aspirational horizons for some young women but 
it has not brought about a substantial redistribution of either power relations or 
gender divisions in society at large.
6.1 Patriarchy and the Life Course of Jordanian Women
Before any discussion of the challenges that gender and generation relations are 
facing, it is important to set out a scheme of the normative/ideal life course stages 
of women in Jordan and how these interact with the overarching system of 
patriarchy. However, while the following describes normative gender relations it 
has to be kept in mind that, like in any society, there are considerable variations. 
Moreover, while it describes the typical sequences of women's life course stages, 
there is no way of predicting the precise age a particular woman will experience 
these stages, only the order in which they occur.
As a definition, patriarchy is a system of male dominance that is not only rooted in 
the family, where it determines gender roles and relations, but also in the belief 
systems of a culture and in the functioning of an economy as well (see Benerfa and 
Roldan, 1987; Chant, 1991a; Lim, 1983). In the Arab world, in particular, besides 
the male privilege that patriarchy ascribes there is a strong age privilege as well. 
Females are taught to defer to fathers, brothers and other male kin and young 
people are taught to respect and defer to older kin. In turn, males are taught to take 
responsibility of female kin and elders are taught to protect and take responsibility 
of those younger than themselves (Joseph, 1994a:2).1
In terms of Jordanian women's life course stages, from the onset of family 
formation, it is more desirable for parents to have boys (UNICEF, 1995, also 
Chapter Five).2 One of the reasons for this is that societal norms of family honour 
make girls more of a burden than boys. Family honour is based upon the fact that 
every household member is accountable for his/her public behaviour which 
ultimately reflect on the status, dignity, and identity of the family as a whole, but 
especially on male elders who are deemed responsible for their kin's behaviour 
(Joseph, 1994a:5-6). In this respect parents see themselves as responsible for 
controlling the potential sexuality of their unmarried daughters, which poses the 
greatest threat to family honour (see also, Shalhoub Kevorkian, 1993 on Palestine).
Therefore, from a life course perspective, gender differentials and female 
dependence on male protection are created not in adulthood but much earlier 
during childhood and adolescence. Unlike boys, girls are taught from an early age
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the rules of moral behaviour and shame. For example, while boys and girls need 
to be obedient towards elder family members, disobedience on the part of sons is 
more easily tolerated (see Wikan, 1982 on Oman). As young children, girls are 
conditioned to stay at home and help their mothers in household tasks which 
includes cleaning-up after their brothers, while boys can freely play with 
neighbourhood children and spend as much time in the male world of their fathers 
and the female world of their mothers (see also, Gulick and Gulick, 1978 on Iran; 
Wikan, 1982 on Oman). Unlike girls, therefore, boys are allowed to develop their 
socio-spatial autonomy early on in their life course.
At puberty, pressures and expectations of girls' behaviour takes a new shape (see 
also Katz, 1993 on Sudan). Menarche is the age at which a young girl spends 
more time with other women and children and becomes increasingly isolated from 
the public sphere. In some cases, girls are expected to wear longer dresses or 
cover their hair and no longer have the same freedom in playing with 
neighbourhood children. It is also the age when girls become fully endorsed as 
assistants to their mothers in both housework and taking care of younger siblings. 
Traditionally, this is also an age at which girls tended to be withdrawn from 
schools. Adolescence is thus the life course stage in which girls are actively 
prepared for their future roles by both of their parents. Fathers consider their 
relationships with their daughters as a model for their relationships with other men 
as adults. Therefore, the father-daughter relationship becomes formal and distant 
as fathers attempt to instill male respect and deference into their daughters (see 
also Wikan 1982 on Oman). In this way fathers do not just teach daughters gender 
roles but relations too (see also White, 1994 on Turkey). The basis of father- 
daughter relationship develops into one of irrefutable authority and conditions girls 
into accepting obedience to men. Meanwhile, mothers not only teach girls their 
responsibilities but also inculcate them into accepting male authority (see also 
Manasra, 1993 on Palestine). At this age, in order to ensure girls' eventual virginal 
marriages, both parents increase their control of girls' social freedom.
Just as adolescent girls' freedom are restricted, adolescent boys gain more freedom 
as they are increasingly drawn by their fathers into the public and 'masculine' 
world. As a result, fathers are usually considered the idols of young sons, and 
their greatest aspiration is usually to become like their fathers (see also White 1994 
on Turkey). Within this vein, brothers attempt to replicate their fathers’ behaviour 
towards their sisters. Because of their gender, brothers feel that they are the 
legitimate guardians of their sisters. According to Suad Joseph (1994b), who 
writes on Lebanon, brother-sister relationships are central to the reproduction of
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patriarchy in Arab families. Joseph (p.52) asserts that it is culturally acceptable for 
brothers to control their sisters which results in brothers' empowerment and 
’masculinisation' and sisters' domestication and 'feminisation'. In other words, a 
brother is encouraged to learn to become a patriarch through disciplining his sister, 
and, in the process, a young woman learns submissiveness to male authority 
(ibid.).
Marriage prospects for girls start earlier than for boys. Parents (and elder brothers 
and other male kin) are eager to discharge their responsibility for daughters' 
chastity through an early marriage (see also Wikan, 1982:60-1 on Oman). For the 
same reasons parents prefer young brides for their sons. Young men, on the other 
hand, are not under the same pressures, although traditionally they are also 
encouraged to marry young as parents are anxious to secure male grandchildren 
and the continuation of the family lineage. Early age at marriage does not only 
ensure female chastity but also preserves patterns of male dominance and female 
seclusion since women are placed at a young age in positions dependent upon their 
husbands and very often mothers-in-law (Gulick and Gulick, 1978:517). 
Marriage, therefore, is in one sense an aspect of gender relations that cannot be 
isolated from the ideology of control and family honour (Tapper and Tapper, 
1992:4).
In accordance with patriarchy's emphasis on male lineage, traditional marriage 
partners in the Arab region are paternal cousins (see Peters, 1978; Rugh, 1984; 
Tapper and Tapper, 1992). This ensures that young women are not 'strangers' in 
their new household and that they will be well-treated. This strengthens the pre­
existing ties between the brothers who are betrothing their children and also 
ensures that the bride price (mahr) is not too high (Tapper and Tapper, 1992). 
Arranged marriages are usually instigated by the parents of the future groom 
where his family chooses either the suitable paternal cousin and/or a number of 
other potential brides of which he can state his preference (see Rugh 1984).
Generally, choice of marriage partners are made on the girl's behalf by the men 
who represent her (Wikan, 1982:196). By and large, this is motivated to ensure a 
daughters' happiness (see Rugh, 1984; Wikan, 1982) but family interest, which 
includes political and economic alliances, are some of the other considerations that 
encompass these choices (Tapper and Tapper, 1992; Wikan, 1982). In religious 
terms young women cannot be forced into marriage as their assent is necessary for 
the marriage contract. Therefore, women have the right to refuse any suitor. 
However, it is not tolerated if she keeps refusing with no justification and
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occasionally coercion and threats can be posed upon young women to accept 
particular suitors (Manasra 1993). Upon a marriage proposal, therefore, a young 
woman's family take their time in answering in order to consult with their daughter 
and larger kin group about the potential match. If the groom is unknown to them, 
they might make inquiries about his social, financial and educational position. 
After a positive answer, discussion and negotiation will turn to brideprice and 
more specific arrangements for the marriage.
When women marry they move from dependence on their families to dependence 
on their husbands. It is their husbands who make decisions which can cover issues 
such as what the wife wears, whom she is in contact with and so on. Young brides 
in traditional settings who live in extended households also have to adapt to the 
authority of their mother-in-law (Kandiyoti, 1987:331). In other words, by virtue 
of their age and gender the status of young brides is considerably lower than other 
family members (it is here that marrying cousins is advantageous). A good 
daughter-in-law is supposed to be obedient and perform her domestic duties under 
the supervision of her mother-in-law.
It is only after married women bear male children and after they progress in age 
that they can assume some authority over their children and daughters-in-law 
(Kandiyoti, 1987:331). In turn, they often replicate their own restricted life cycles 
on both their daughters and daughters-in-law (see also Memissi, 1975).
6.2 The Deconstruction of Gender and Generation Relations in Amman
Although normative/ideal life course stages of Jordanian women include 
variations, it is clear that single employed adulthood, has traditionally been a non­
existent life course stage. Women are daughters as children and adolescents, after 
which they are wives and mothers as adults. So assuming that young Jordanian 
women are now encountering a new life course stage, what challenges does this 
pose for normative and actual patriarchal relations within urban Jordanian society? 
And what does it mean in the context of the household?
6.2.1 Fathers and Daughters: Negotiating Patriarchy
Young women's later age at marriage means that fathers' (and brothers', see below) 
roles in protecting female kin lasts for a longer period of time then any previous 
generation. Young women today also pursue higher education and a substantial 
number work (see Chapter One and Five). This not only challenges fathers' 
authority but also makes their roles in controlling the behaviour of female kin 
more elusive. The result is that single working daughters are likely to be either in
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negotiation or conflict with their fathers. These negotiations or conflicts 
sometimes include access to education and employment and in other cases include 
the conditions or accommodations that this access to education and/or employment 
entails (see below). Another point of negotiation or potential conflict is the 
question of choice in marriage. Many young women no longer accept arranged 
marriages and insist on knowing potential husbands (see also Schaefer Davies, 
1993 on Morocco).
It is evident from the case study material that fathers are in a dilemma as to 
appropriate behaviour and/or expectations from their adult daughters. The result is 
a variety of reactions including fathers who, by denying their daughters' choices, 
become severe and repressive. These cases sometimes end up in family conflicts 
often involving other family members and relatives. For example, one young 
woman wanted to work with her school friend who had opened a hairdressing 
salon but her father did not see this as a respectable occupation. As a response the 
young women went to her maternal uncle's house one night and refused to go back 
home unless her father relented. This spiralled into a family confrontation, where 
old conflicts between the young woman's father and maternal uncles re-surfaced. 
More often, however, fathers concede to daughters wishes but demand a set of 
conditions. For example, a young woman may be allowed to choose a desired 
career if her working place is close to home and/or employment is in a segregated 
workplace, or she might be required to wear the veil (see below).
Finally, the basis of the father-daughter relationship which is also based on a 
daughter's moral obligations and values towards her elders means that any 
accommodations and even conflicts usually occur in a clandestine fashion. If they 
can help it, daughters do not openly challenge their fathers' authority. They 
normally adopt strategies of long term negotiation and persuasion. Therefore, on 
the surface, daughters still behave with deference and servitude towards their 
fathers and an onlooker may not detect any conflict. One case study illustrates 
this. During an interview with a family of five daughters living with their mother 
and who's father has taken on a second wife and rarely visits them, the main focus 
of the discussion was his semi-desertion but also his restrictive attitude towards 
their lives. During this discussion the father arrived, after an extended absence, 
bringing with him a considerable amount of food items. Upon his appearance the 
5 daughters rushed, out some helping him with the packages, others in preparing 
coffee in the kitchen. With such commotion it was difficult to believe that 
moments ago they were complaining about an existing conflict.
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6.2.2 Mothers and Daughters: Gender Bonding and Generational Conflicts 
Compared to their daughters, a large percentage of mothers are illiterate, few had 
ever contemplated working for wages and were married at a young age. Today, 
while mother-daughter relationships may be based on some cooperation, as a result 
of their common gender, there is also conflict, as a result of their different 
generations and life expectations. In terms of cooperation, mothers see the need to 
support their daughters in their endeavours whether education, work, social life or 
choice in marriage. Perhaps because their own life options were more limited they 
feel the need to expand such options for their daughters. The conflict, however, 
arises from the fact that 'good mothers' are those who succeed in nurturing girls 
who abide by ascribed gender roles. In other words, daughters are supposed to 
become like their mothers. As a result, mothers see themselves as often pressuring 
their daughters on appropriate behaviour in some issues and supporting their 
independence in others. For example, one young woman complained how her 
mother actively negotiated with her father, and even borrowed money from her 
relatives, in order that she would be sent to university. After completing her 
degree in engineering, however, the mother remained passive when the father 
refused to allow the daughter to work.
The social norms that revolve around concepts of 'good motherhood' are extended 
to the role of a 'good wife' who not only provides comforts for her husband, but 
also maintains a harmonious household by not bothering and involving him in 
irksome daily details. This actually provides women with the powers of 
conveying household conditions to their husbands as they please. Therefore, as far 
as the mother-daughter relation is concerned, a mother becomes the mediator 
between father and daughter. This is important since daughters rarely approach 
their fathers independently. If a daughter desires something that she expects her 
father to oppose, the mother will provide all forms of preambles before the actual 
demand is put forward. One such example is of a young woman government 
school teacher who was transferred to Jerash, a town about 50 km outside Amman, 
which entailed living away from home. For a while, the mother would tell the 
father of cases of friends' and neighbours daughters' who had to work away from 
home, starting with the neighbour who works in Saudi Arabia and whose family 
has benefited tremendously from her wages. The mother finally informed him of 
their daughter's predicament. Many mothers use such tactics to appease their 
daughters and to maintain household harmony.
Issues that are seen as unnecessary or disturbing for the father are kept away from 
him. Therefore, some mother-daughter conflict occurs simply because mothers are
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more aware of their daughters' plans or activities than fathers. A father's wrath at a 
daughter's misbehaviour is supposed to be more severe than that of a mother's. A 
conflict with a mother, therefore, minimises the scale of the confrontation and 
family harmony is more easily restored, even if superficially. In a way, therefore, 
raising conflicts with daughters is partially a strategy, albeit inadvertent, of 
mothers protecting daughters' relations with their fathers.
However, it is also within mothers' powers to hide facts from their husbands in 
support of their daughters, with the following case study being an illustration. 
One young woman was a talented singer and belonged to a musical group during 
her college years. The father was vehemently against this as it meant that his 
daughter was in public view. The mother realising the daughter's talents, kept this 
fact from the father. In order to justify the late nights that performing in a music 
group entailed, the mother always accompanied the daughter and later found all 
forms of excuses to give to the father, such as visits to relatives outside of town 
and/or difficulties in finding transportation. Yet, this type of subterfuge is also 
accompanied by the fact that mothers usually feel a need to protect their daughters. 
In this case, the mother felt it imperative to accompany her daughter in order to 
preserve her moral/sexual reputation. In other words, the mother was lenient 
enough to understand her daughter's talents and desire to sing, but was also bound 
by broader social rules where it is not respectable for women to be performers and 
also to be alone at night. By her presence she was making a statement that her 
daughter's public reputation (i.e. chastity) remained intact.3
Within the above context of both conflicts and cooperation between mothers and 
daughters which are a result of the larger restrictions on gender roles, it is notable 
that mothers invariably encourage their daughters’ education and rarely oppose 
their employment. Indeed, in lower income households, the need for income is 
such that mothers would often actively negotiate their daughters' employment with 
their husbands. Other mothers, however, although not opposed to daughters' 
employment are not ready to negotiate with their husbands as they do not deem the 
conflict it is likely to engender worth it. Indeed, mothers are actually in awkward 
positions since they want their daughters' happiness but need to fulfill their own 
culturally ascribed roles as good mothers and wives. This tends to become 
especially contradictory where providing daughters with a certain amount of 
freedom may result in them risking their daughters' reputations, and hence chances 
for marriage, not to mention damaging their own credibility as 'good mothers.'
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6.2.3 Brothers and Sisters: Threatening Ascribed Gender Roles 
Brother-sister relationships in the sample survey could be described as being 
fraught with conflict. Sons, who are reared to be in power, are currently facing 
obstacles and challenges in assuming their ascribed gender roles. In other words, 
they are also facing changes in their life course trajectories. Young men live 
longer at home as single men under the authority of their fathers (due to father's 
longevity). High unemployment rates, inflation and falling real wages make it 
harder for them to start their own families and assume their roles as family heads 
(regardless of whether they continue to live in their parental home or not). On the 
whole, this lack of access to ascribed gender roles that they have been reared to 
assume causes great frustration (Fergues, 1995:188). The overwhelming reaction 
is that brothers try to increase their control over their sisters who are regarded as 
subordinate by virtue of their gender if not their age (see also Wikan, 1982:85 on 
Oman).
Many young women interviewees reported that brothers are a greater threat to 
them than fathers. Fathers are distant and not concerned with everyday household 
details especially as many do not spend much time at home. Together with the 
generation gap, it is easy for fathers to be unaware of daughters' daily activities or 
plans. Brothers however, by belonging to the same generation and spending more 
time at home, are more aware of their sisters' daily lives and can try to exercise 
control over their sisters' movements or behaviour (see Joseph, 1994b:54 on 
Lebanon; Rugh, 1984:97 on Egypt). Some young women tried to justify their 
brothers' behaviour on the basis that they are more aware of the 'perils' of modem 
life, than their fathers, and therefore feel the need to protect them. What this 
entails is that there are gender differentiated codes of permissible behaviour, where 
brothers feel entitled to more social/sexual freedom than their sisters. One 
particular case study is of a woman nurse who, after a lot of persuasion, convinced 
her father to be allowed to work night shifts at a distant hospital. The brother was 
vehemently against this and after two months of work managed to persuade the 
father to forbid his sister from working. The young woman's explanation for her 
brother’s behaviour is that he has had several liaisons with his women co-workers 
and does not want his sister to enter a similar situation at her workplace.4
Two major points can be made about brothers. The first is that they influence their 
fathers' decisions not only by virtue of their gender but by their generation. By 
their gender they have privileged access to intimate exchange with fathers and to 
influence decision-making; by their generation they can claim to 'know better'. In
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other words, because of similar education levels and involvement in modernised 
occupational sectors, they are exposed to the same kind of world as a young 
woman. Within this vein a father is likely to take a brother's opinion regarding a 
young woman seriously. For young men living at home, this provides a major 
route to exercise power over their sisters. Second, it is likely that brothers find 
excuses to control their sisters as a means of compensating for their lack of 
household authority as single men. Given the disadvantage of their young age, the 
control over sisters' behaviour represent an avenue of control that also outline their 
future relations with their sisters.5
So the fact that brothers and sisters belong to the same generation and where both 
live in their natal homes for longer years is producing a new and more problematic 
set of gender relations within households in Amman. Within the narrowing of the 
gender gap among Jordanian youth, young women's potential equality is posing a 
threat to the status quo of brothers which can result in sibling discord.
Before concluding this section, it is necessary to mention how family control over 
young women is backed up in the workplace where patriarchal household relations 
are in many respects replicated and reproduced. Indeed, it is during the last two 
decades that female employment in modem sectors in Amman has become visible 
and that some employers have resorted to an all-female workforce (see Chapter 
Four). Within this context, employers, young women and their families alike are 
intent on creating work relations that reflect the correct behaviour and social order 
that is expected from all parties. Replicating a family relationship, can be a 
strategy to adapt to such a new situation where 'strange' men and women have to 
interact. Since gender relations are based on women being daughters, sisters or 
wives, young women become automatically the daughters at work and in the case 
of age similarity, the sisters (see also Kabeer, 1994:179 on Bangladesh).6 Male 
employers overwhelmingly wish to be regarded as guardians or 'symbolic fathers' 
and most of them refer to young women working for them as banati which 
translates as both 'my girls' or 'daughters' (see Ecevit, 1991 on Turkey; also 
Chapter Four). Therefore, the workplace has therefore evolved in many situations 
as symbolic family domain marked by fictive kin relations.
In sum, this section has attempted to reveal that young women's changing life 
course stages as a result of prolonged age at marriage and employment are creating 
conflicts and negotiations over normative gender relations. Within this context
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each member, kin or non-kin, is searching for circumstances whereby this new life 
course trajectory can be accommodated within normative codes of acceptable 
behaviour.
6.3 The Reconstruction of Gender and Generation Relations in Amman
In examining changes in women’s positions following migration Tienda and Booth 
(1991:56) refer to 'restructured asymmetries,' whereby the relative position of 
women remains unequal vis-a-vis men but the concrete circumstances of their 
participation are drastically changed. They further state:
...few changes in women's positions are so clear and linear that 
obvious improvements or deterioration result. Rather, and 
because social change is a long-term historical process that 
continuously restructures social relations, we can only explore 
and contrast the mechanisms through which the circumstances 
defining women's position interact with migratory patterns to 
shape changes in gender asymmetries.
The following elaborates on the concept of 'restructured asymmetries' in the 
context of changing gender and generation relations in Amman, bearing in mind 
that patriarchy operates at domestic and extra-domestic levels and in addressing 
the reconstruction of patriarchy in Amman these levels have to be disentangled. 
The first, includes the household concessions in terms of expanding young 
women's opportunities in education, employment and marriage options and which 
had inadvertently facilitated young women's new life course stage. The second 
extra-domestic level, however, revolves around notions of family honour, which in 
the case of young women means preserving sexual reputation (see Joseph, 
1994a:5-6). These have been brought to the forefront as a result of the former 
accommodations which seem to threaten family honour.
Therefore, to illustrate the resulting cross-currents between patriarchy's intra­
household concessions and extra-domestic resistance and the resulting 
'restructured asymmetries' we have to take on board a spectrum of seemingly 
unrelated issues. Some of these reveal that young women's employment is 
resulting in new expectations and conditions which are in effect new forms of 
control. On the other hand, others reveal that traditional values concerning family 
honour are being reinstated. Both of these, ultimately result in the reconstruction 
of patriarchal relations. Relevant issues include the relation between education 
and employment, acceptable types and conditions of work, sexual harassment at 
work and family honour and young women's public behaviour.
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6.3.1. Education and Employment
The positive relation between higher female education and increasing employment 
rates has been already established (see Chapter Five). However, what remains to 
be addressed is whether young women freely choose their areas of higher 
education or whether education type is conditional upon accepted gender roles? 
Also, how aware are families of the linkages between higher education and future 
employment? Are young women free to choose employment type after finishing 
their education or is this also filtered through the accepted norms of gender roles?
Most parents take a more or less egalitarian attitude towards promoting sons' and 
daughters' basic education with the rationale that it is their duty in fulfilling their 
roles as good parents.7 Basically, the interviewees are the first generation of 
beneficiaries of the education policies of the country that provides equal education 
to all as well as subsidised colleges and universities (see Chapter Three). 
However, after basic schooling, choices for young women who plan to continue 
any form of higher education, are filtered through their families. This is mainly 
because the rationale for giving girls education may be different from boys and as 
a result, parents will interfere in the type of education a woman may acquire while 
sons are free and even encouraged to choose for themselves.8
In the sample survey, higher education of daughters across all income groups was 
linked to prestige. Employment, on the other hand, was not (see also Rugh 1985 
on Egypt). On the whole, women are encouraged to embark on studies related to 
their gender roles. This primarily involves acquiring teacher skills which includes 
a 'mothering' element and tend to entail sex segregated working environments. 
The result is that many young women enroll in teacher training programmes.
In other situations, however, young women insist on studying specialisations that 
are considered by parents as problematic in terms of ascribed gender roles. In such 
cases young women are usually allowed to continue with their studies. However, 
when it comes to finding employment all forms of restrictions and obstacles tend 
to be put forward. To illustrate parents' contradictory attitudes towards education 
and employment of girls, the rest of this section reveals some of the restrictions 
posed.
In some cases young women are categorically denied access to employment after 
completing their education or training, one case being a nurse who after obtaining 
her degree and training was not allowed by her father to work in an environment 
where she is bound to be in constant physical contact with men (i.e. patients and
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male co-workers). Another case was a woman mechanic who was actually 
encouraged to pursue a government-sponsored youth training scheme. Later, she 
was not allowed to seek employment as her skill is considered a 'male' job and 
therefore inappropriate for a young women. In such situations the parents are 
actually proud of their daughters’ achievements despite the fact that the daughters 
remain unemployed. In fact, the young mechanic was almost regarded as a hero 
within her household and neighbourhood for symbolically breaking gender 
barriers as far as she did.
In other situations the employment of young women who complete higher levels 
of education is dependent on many parental conditions that inadvertently make it 
impossible for the young women to find employment. For example, they tend to 
have to find employment that is within the geographical vicinity of their homes; 
working hours that will always get them home before dark; or single sex working 
environments (see below). Of course, whether all or some of these restrictions 
apply is dependent on the different standards of acceptable behaviour of young 
women among the different households.
Finally, another set of restrictions is dependent on a very narrow view of 
educational attainment. This is to do with the fact that if a young woman insists 
on specialising in something she is confined to work within that specific 
framework. An example is a young woman who has a two year degree in finance. 
According to her parents she could only work in a bank. A bank is viewed as a 
respectable working environment. This particular young woman has had many 
opportunities to work as an assistant accountant in private sector firms. This was 
prohibited by her parents who see small firms as areas of potential risk for their 
daughters' reputation (see below).
So there are a variety of restrictions put on women in looking for employment 
even though these are minimal when embarking on education. Indeed, this is one 
of the perplexing cross-currents in parents', and particularly fathers', behaviour 
regarding young women's single adulthood. Higher education, even if it means 
interacting with men, living away from home and so on, is regarded in a positive 
light. Employment on the other hand, is regarded as a potential threat to the 
traditional norms that encourage sex segregation and control of female autonomy. 
The problem with these cross-currents, however, is that higher education in itself 
entails that young women are exposed to new ideas, different ways of life and 
social freedom. It also nurtures ambition and aspirations for economic and social 
independence. However, this exposure, which could be quickly reversed in terms
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of employment opportunities, has already changed the attitudes and life 
expectations of the young women themselves. This often leaves the young women 
resentful and can result in family friction. As one young woman voiced her 
frustration:
I wanted to be an engineer. My parents convinced me that nursing is 
better for a girl. After obtaining my degree and training I started 
applying for jobs but found out that my parents never intended to 
allow me to work. I do not understand why did they let me go to 
university if they knew very well that I will not work?
6.3.2. Acceptable Types and Conditions of Work
Having looked at the disjuncture between the education and employment of young 
women in Amman, we now turn to what parents see as acceptable work and for 
what reasons (see also Chapter Five). The overarching concern of most parents is 
the preservation of young women's chastity and social reputations. Acceptable 
employment for young women in Amman therefore, revolves first, around notions 
of gender segregation at work. Chapter Four has already established the existing 
strict gender division of labour as a result of the gender typing of jobs among firms 
in Amman. Second, it involves notions of 'respectable' working environment 
which includes the conditions of work for young women. The following will 
discuss these restrictions and illustrate how they are circumvented.
One predominant concern among many families is that a daughter should be home 
before dark (which could be as early as five o'clock in the winter). There is a 
general attitude that since a workday is supposed to be finished by early evening, 
any woman who is not home by then draws suspicion to her behaviour. In general, 
women working as teachers do not face such problems since school days are short. 
So besides the fact that teaching is considered a respectable female job short 
working hours provide another incentive. Most manufacturing industries and 
workshops who employ young women also have reasonable working hours. Such 
employers are aware of the taboos of women working in evenings and their day­
light working hours are more than coincidental.
Another form of restriction placed on young women by their families is the 
location of their workplaces (see also Kabeer, 1995:171 on Bangladesh). Social 
restrictions on women's movement and the importance of women's public 
behaviour, mean that some parents do not allow their daughters to utilise public
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transportation which include predominantly male passengers. However, there are 
solutions to this obstacle. For example, if there is a well known establishment and 
several women from the same community join it becomes acceptable. The young 
women who commute together daily are seen as serving many purposes: they keep 
an eye on one another's behaviour; they tend not to be harassed by strangers since 
they are in a group; and, because more than one woman commutes, it is hard for 
the larger community to disapprove of their employment in distant parts of the 
city.
Another form of restriction is that a young woman's family should know the 
prospective employer of their daughter. Thus, where possible, daughters work for 
relatives, family friends or neighbours. If an employer happens to be unknown, 
the family will make inquiries about him; that is try to ascertain his 'reputation' 
(mainly of his attitude and treatment of women workers). So when a young 
woman finds work, sometimes either her brother or father will accompany her to 
finalise the work conditions of her employment and meet the employer face to face 
(see also Maher, 1981:123 on Morocco). Sometimes it is stated verbally, and not 
just symbolically, where fathers tell the employer: 'I am entrusting you with my 
daughter.' and the employer answers: 'Do not worry. She will be like my own 
daughter as long as she is working here.' In other words, that he will not take 
advantage of here and protect her chaste sexual reputation.
On part of the employers, there are two strategies that accommodate family 
restrictions on female mobility. The first is that employers who depend on young 
female labour set-up their business in proximity to labour supply, usually near 
congested low income neighbourhoods where women need to work.9 The second 
strategy, which involves large manufacturing employers, is to provide 
transportation for their women workers. These factories have several pick up 
points from areas with potential female labour. This is seen as appropriate by 
parents since such large industries are far from residential areas and located on the 
periphery of the city. So employers who are aware of the mobility restrictions put 
on young women and are also in need of young female labour adopt several 
strategies in accordance with these restrictions.
In other types of employment, specifically small private sector establishments, 
many families find the working conditions unacceptable. The reasons for this are 
several, one being that working hours are longer. Also, unlike the public sector, 
banks, teaching professions or manufacturing jobs, employers do not provide
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concessions for female labour such as transport or daylight working hours. 
Finally, very few private sector firms have sex segregated work spaces. So, there 
are family inhibitions about small, unknown working environments. This attitude 
was summed by one father who said:
Work in small private companies is wrong. People do not know
each other these days.
According to this father, if an employer does not know who his female employee 
is, he will take advantage of her. The job of a secretary in particular is regarded by 
many as unacceptable since it entails working for a male boss and exposing 
oneself to sexual harassment. As far as a family is concerned, when their daughter 
works at a school, bank, an industry, or the public sector, everyone knows where 
and who she works for and this provides a safety valve for her public image and 
sexual reputation. In contrast, when a daughter is working for some small 
unknown private sector firm the lack of avenue to clear the reputation of this 
employer act as an impediment for many parents to allow their daughters to work 
in such establishments.
However, this does not include all families since there are a substantial number of 
young women in Amman who work in small private sector establishments. Within 
such firms the general attitude of employers towards young women is that they are 
rarely ready to put in the working hours involved. They generally assume that this 
is due to their lack of motivation towards work. Few employers realise that these 
working hours are devised to suit the males' work patterns and that they are 
actually problematic for young women and virtually impossible for married 
women. Private sector establishments in Amman work a morning shift that is 
usually eight am to one pm with a long lunch break till three or four pm and an 
afternoon shift that lasts to about six pm or more. This is usually with a one day 
weekend or, at the most, one and the half days.10 This tends to be problematic for 
some young women especially those who are in sales, secretarial or administrative 
jobs. The long lunch breaks are actually devised for married men who go home 
have a ready lunch and take a siesta. Younger unmarried men are more socially 
mobile and therefore have options to spend their time at coffee houses with 
friends. This is definitely not the case for young women, first because young 
women's wages are often less then men's; this limits the chances of owning a car, 
and extra trips on public transport, to go home for lunch, become unaffordable. 
Second, young women are less likely to go regularly to restaurants or entertain 
themselves daily like the young men during this period not only because of the
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costs but also because it is not common for young women to be in public places on 
daily basis. This would attract unwanted attention and threaten their reputation.11 
The end result is that they stay at their desks during the long lunch break and are 
effectively at work for 10 hours a day, six days a week.
Because such hours leave young women with little private time, many become 
unhappy and dissatisfied. Indeed, even the most ambitious of the young women 
report being disenchanted and unmotivated and that they are on the look-out for 
better opportunities. The consequent high turn-over rates works to marginalise 
them in such private sector establishments and feed employers' stereotyped 
assumptions about the temporality of female labour (see Chapter Four).
6.3.3 Sexual Harassment and Gender Ideology
Many of the above restrictions put on the conditions of young women's work are 
patriarchal means of preserving the sexual reputation of young women. Within 
this context it is important to know the extent to which employment exposes 
young women to sexual harassment. It is also just as important to know whether 
this pre-existing control of female sexuality acts as a deterrent to sexual 
harassment at the workplace, notwithstanding that in a socially restricted society 
such as Jordan any subject pertaining to sexuality is taboo and therefore the issue 
of sexual harassment was difficult to address. First, young women might not be 
aware of the undertones that could constitute sexual harassment.12 Second, even 
those who are exposed to outright sexual harassment are not ready to admit to it in 
the fear that not only they will lose their jobs or their parents will permanently 
withdraw them from employment, but also damage their sexual reputation. As for 
those young women who are aware and ready to discuss the issue of sexual 
harassment there is a general attitude that such incidences could only occur when 
the women themselves invite them.13 However, the following discussion will 
reveal that the pertinent issue is not as much the occurrence of sexual harassment, 
it is more the preoccupation with preventing it.
Although, sexual harassment is never discussed openly, parents and guardians 
control of women's sexuality, which is primarily intended to prevent pre-marital 
sexual relationships, somehow act as a deterrent. In addition, although women 
exposed to forms of sexual harassment are essentially victims, their reputations, 
and consequently their families', will be tarnished regardless. Therefore, the 
concern regarding employers' reputation, location of work and so on are supposed 
to protect the young women from being taken advantage of.
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In some ways, all male employers are perceived as potential threats to the 
reputation of the female labour in their charge. As a result, any employer who 
needs female labour has to prove his innocence among the young women 
themselves as well as their families. As an illustration, sometimes in small 
workshops with exclusively female labour the wife of the employer works as the 
general supervisor. It was mentioned that the wife's presence was essential for 
making the working environment and the interaction with the male employer 
more comfortable.
Many employers adopt the father figure model to deter attention from themselves 
as possible harrassers (see earlier and Chapter Four). This, however, can 
sometimes allow employers to hide behind the father figure in their harassing 
endeavors as the following case study illustrates:
One day my boss who I respect very much touched my hand 
and then my hair. I screamed. He then said: 'what's the matter 
you are like my daughter.' He never touched me again. I think 
he was testing how I would react and my reaction made him 
treat me like a daughter. He takes care of me and recently 
asked the management to give me a raise. All the other 
secretaries are jealous of me and started rumours about me and 
my boss. He is a very good man and when he was sick I visited 
him in hospital and gave him flowers. His wife does not like 
me.
The contradictions in this case illustrate that, besides the fact that employers use 
their father figure image as an excuse, young women who are exposed to very few 
men, apart from fathers brothers and relatives, not only find it hard to distinguish 
between harassment and filial relations but could themselves become attracted to 
men they work with. Like this case it is innocent, and usually takes the form of 
admiration or respect.
Finally, young women's psycho-social conditioning as the vulnerable sex who also 
need to guard their chastity necessitates them taking preventive measures. For 
example, some young women claim that they applied to jobs where they did not 
trust the boss or co-workers and refused the employment opportunity as a result. 
In other words, that they relied on their intuition. It is also common belief that 
women in dire economic need are more exposed to harassment since employers, 
upon realising this, are more likely to take advantage of them. So the 
overwhelming attitude among the young women is the relief that their own 
families will not put them in such situations no matter what their economic needs 
are. The need to protect their sexual reputation, therefore, seem to function as a
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reinforcement of their economic and psychological dependence on their families. 
And finally, young women always assert their readiness to leave their jobs at the 
vaguest reference to their sexuality by employers or colleagues. An example is a 
young woman who left her assembly line job in a textile workshop after four years 
of employment in solidarity with a colleague who left because the male supervisor 
was making advances towards her. This young woman did not only leave in 
sympathy with her friend and denouncement of the employer but also to protect 
herself from the possibility of this occurring to her. Also, both women's actions 
was a public statement of their honourable behaviour should anyone start 
gossiping about them.
The preoccupation of keeping young women's sexual reputations intact, and 
indeed young women's own concerns regarding their reputations, has resulted in a 
rather rigid form of male-boss female-worker relations in the workplace: 
employers need to act like fathers and young women need to act as daughters, 
and it is necessary for young women and employers alike to constantly prove their 
innocence.14 Within this formula it is male co-workers who remain unaccountable 
for their behaviour and therefore pose the real threat. However, to minimise this, 
employers resort to spatial segregation as well as division of labour (see Chapter 
Four).
However, it should be noted here that young women's fears of sexual harassment 
would seem to be somewhat out of proportion to its actual occurrence. Young 
working women are constantly exposed to accounts about unknown women who 
are taken advantage of in unknown workplaces (there was no way of telling the 
extent to which such accounts are factual or fictional). None the less, for the 
young working women in Amman who are at a trajectory in their life course where 
chastity is paramount, the term sexual harassment which is broadly identified with 
physical or verbal abuse need to be redefined. Women's vulnerability is extended 
to the threat of sexual harassment or mere gossip both of which have far reaching 
implications for their own and their families' reputations. The result is a fear of 
victimisation that could be just as damaging as experiencing it (see also, Salhoub 
Kevorkian on Palestine, 1993: 174).
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6.3.5 Family Honour. Employment and Young Women's Public Behaviour 
The increasing public visibility of young women is bringing the subject of family 
honour in Amman to the forefront of family relations. The fact that so many 
women are working and are consequently outside the immediate control of male 
kin during large parts of the day is causing anxiety. Therefore, young women's 
employment does not only involve relinquishing some of male powers within the 
home but also an increasing emphasis on the males roles' as the public protectors 
of female kin. Since single adulthood is a new phenomenon in terms of life course 
stages, their public behaviour, which is considered as the prime threat to family 
honour is continuously monitored.
The reactions of male kin to the sense that losing control over the behaviour of 
female relatives and becoming publicly disgraced varies, of course, between 
different households. However, one of the stringent reactions to those women who 
breach the family honour codes are what are termed as 'honour crimes'.15 The 
victims of these crimes are young women suspected of illicit sexual relations 
outside of marriage and where death is the only way to cleanse and restore the 
family honour (see also, Joseph, 1994b on Lebanon; Manasra, 1993 on Palestine; 
Rugh 1984 on Egypt). In the past decade (1986-1996) the annual average number 
of such crimes were 23 cases for the country as a whole.16 The alarming fact is 
that there seems to be a gradual increase in such crimes (Husseini, 1994).
Although this is an extreme reaction and generally meets negative media coverage 
and public disdain, it is reflective of current crisis among Jordanian families 
relating to changing gender and generation relations. These crimes tend to occur 
in poor rural or urban areas and against young women (Mansur 1996). It appears 
that economic need and high male unemployment result in men seeing young 
women's work as weakening their own power base. In the urban context, crowded 
housing conditions expose families to increased contact with people outside the 
immediate family which puts more pressures on male family members to protect 
female kin. As a result, women's behaviour becomes increasingly scrutinised in 
order to help avert the tarnishing of family honour. As for middle and upper 
income families, however, there is perhaps less need to publicly reassert their 
honourable family reputation as a result of their already established economic 
prestige. Another factor could be that such families have more means of 
disguising such incidences when they occur. The result is that in families where 
the daughter's work is necessary for survival their public behaviour under utmost 
scrutiny.
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It is of note here that a great majority of honour crimes are committed by brothers 
against their sisters (often, with the father's knowledge) (Husseini, 1994; Mansur, 
1996). This alludes to discussions earlier that brothers who are anxious to assume 
power, but are deterred by the presence of their fathers, become themselves the 
greatest propagators of patriarchy and where the sisters become the victims in such 
extreme cases. Yet, as with sexual harassment, honour crimes as far as the 
interviewees are concerned, happen to other women and not themselves. They are, 
however, conditioned to be horrified by their occurrence. Therefore, the young 
women who are intent on gaining certain freedoms are themselves adamant on 
preserving their chaste sexual reputations. So, ironically, the few advances that 
young women have gained in terms of re-negotiations of gender roles within their 
families has increased the significance of their public behaviour. Women who 
exist as single employed adults, an unrecognised life course stage as far as 
traditional familial patriarchy is concerned, need to abide by strict moral conduct 
in order to maintain and/or expand their new life opportunities, such as 
employment.
To conclude this section, the cross-currents between the intra-household and extra­
domestic aspects of patriarchy has to be reiterated. Accommodations are being 
made internally within households which has resulted in female education and 
access to employment. Male family members however need to ensure their 
authority over female kin publicly. In some instances, this is triggering new forms 
of control over young working women while in others it involves re-asserting old 
forms. These new forms of control include putting limitations and conditions on 
young women's education and work. The re-assertion of old forms of control 
relate to heightened emphasis on female honour and chastity. The result is a 
'restructuring of asymmetries' where male authority patterns have not been 
significantly reduced with young women's employment, but instead, function in 
altered circumstances.
6.4 Religious Ideology, Veiling and Young Women's Work
The above section has outlined the adjustments occurring within households' 
power structures and publicly as related to young women's behaviour vis-a-vis 
family honour. Within this context, women's dress in public spaces has evolved to 
be one of the foremost symbolic gestures that embodies these tensions. This is 
because women's dress reflects the interface between private intra-household 
power negotiations and the public representation of male dominance.
182
The veiling of women in Muslim societies has always been a contentious matter 
with respect to women's rights and status. The veil has been depicted as a symbol 
of women's oppression, seclusion and consequently subordinate role within society 
(see Minces 1982). It has also been depicted from pragmatic viewpoints. These 
suggest that with women's recent increased presence in public spheres, the veil 
acts as a shield that symbolises women's respectability in conditions where they 
have to interact with strange men (El-Guindi, 1981:465-85, Macleod 1991; Zuhur 
1992). In other words, the veil actually facilitates women's mobility and freedom 
and therefore participation in public life (Afshar, 1992:12). While the following 
discussion largely adopt the later view, the concern is not so much the arguments 
regarding how the veil constrains or liberate women, but to illustrate that women's 
dress has evolved into an integral part of the gender re-negotiations that are part of 
the evolving forms of patriarchal relations. In addition, the current section will 
distance the veil from its assumed relation with Islam. This is because, the issues 
of veiling and its causes encompass larger ideologies than religious doctrine per
S(L17
Therefore, to illustrate how women's dress is part of the reconstruction of 
patriarchal forms, the following will discuss the types and different meaning of 
dress. It will then investigate the relation of veiling with age, family and personal 
belief, class, and finally, employment.
6.4.1 Types and Meaning of Different Dress Among Young women 
It is important to recognise at this stage that there are different types of dress, with 
different meanings and relations to social status as well as religious ideology. 
There are three basic dress codes among young women. The differences between 
them reflect among other things social and economic connotations. The first 
might be called 'western' and is adopted as a mode of dress by 35% of survey 
respondents. The majority of these young women come from higher income 
backgrounds (see below) and those who were currently employed tend to be in the 
service sector (see Chapter Four). The second type is what might be termed 
'conservative-western', where western style clothing is worn with a head scarf. 
This represents 39% of the sample survey. These young women are not religious 
per se but wear the head scarf and the loose long clothing more to reflect 
respectability than abidance with religion. This style of dressing reflects young 
women’s adaptation to the concept of fashion in the midst of pressures to conform 
and be modest. The third type might be called Islamic18 and which represents 
26% of the women in the sample survey. This consists of a long coat-like garment 
called jilbab with a head scarf both of which tend to be plain and in subdued
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colours such as beige or gray. The stricter dress code within this group, which 
consisted of a fewer number of women, include those that wore an all black attire 
covering their faces except for their eyes and wearing gloves. Unlike other 
Muslim dress, this particular group of women represent a politisiced form of Islam 
as they might belong to religious groups. The objective of such groups is to return 
to a pure form of religion which includes strict sexual segregation. However, 
because in this day and age women cannot practically be confined to their homes, 
they adopt this strict dress code where they are unrecognisable in public. 
Therefore, what needs to be stressed here is that not all veiled women belong to an 
Islamist movement and certainly that the veil does not represent a uniform group 
of women. These differences have to be kept in mind especially in order to 
capture the multiple implications of veiling.
6.4.2 Age and Veiling
Recent research on veiling use the term of 'new veiling' (see El-Guindi, 1981; 
Macleod, 1991; Zuhur, 1992). This refers to both a new type of veiling as well as 
new reasons for veiling. The new type of veiling refers to the above mentioned 
jilbab. The dominant issue with the new veiling is the age dimension as it is most 
prevalent among young women (see also Zuhur 1992 on Egypt). One of the 
explanations for this are assumptions that older and married women do not need to 
protect their sexual reputation as much (Zuhur, 1992:62). Also, older women, on 
the whole, either wear traditional attire or conservative western clothing, both of 
which are integrally modest. In fact, not only are young women veiled more than 
older women but the relation between age and gender is reflected in a differential 
attitude of men towards veiling with consequently different requirements and 
expectations between wives' and daughters' attire. As one mother explained:
My husband insisted that our daughter puts on the Islamic dress 
when she started working. At work, my daughter got to know 
religious friends who invited us to religious lessons. It was very 
comforting and I decided to change my thob (traditional long 
embroidered dress) for the jilbab. My husband who insisted that 
our daughter wears the jilbab was furious with me and made me 
go back to my old dresses.
So, age is a criterion for the 'new veiling.' The fact that older women, such as the 
one mentioned here, are not transgressing the established patriarchal norms, in 
comparison to their daughters, should not be underestimated. In this respect, a 
daughter's dress code may be a response to their prolonged single adulthood and 
where emphasis on their modesty and chastity is at its highest during this life 
course stage.
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6.4.3 Family Conditioning. Personal Belief and the Veil
On inquiring why and how young women adopt covered dress (in any of its 
forms), a whole range of intra-household generational conflicts, self differentiation 
and power friction surface. On the one hand there are women who adopt covered 
dress as a result of family obligation, which sometimes results with resistance and 
conflict. On the other hand, there are those who adopt covered dress as part of 
personal belief.
Some women who wear covered dress out of family obligation start during their 
teens. In these cases veiling is considered the norm since all women in the 
immediate environment abide by the same rules. These women, therefore, regard 
their covered dress as part of general moral codes and because of their young age 
few pose any resistance. However, there are exceptions. One young woman who 
wears western style clothes explained how when she was 15 years old and going to 
school her father insisted that she adopt the veil if she wanted to continue her 
schooling. She would put her head scarf on in the morning while leaving home to 
school and take it off once she was out of sight. Problems with her father ensued 
as he found out, and now at the age of 24 years she is not veiled and her relations 
with her father are restored.
Other parents insist on covered dress when young women start employment. 
Many young women who feel vulnerable in public spaces as a result of their 
psycho-social conditioning assent to this willingly (see also Kandiyoti, 1991:18). 
However, having to adopt the veil at a young age differs from having to adopt it at 
an older age when young women are more likely to have their own opinion about 
the matter. Fathers tend to see the attire of their adult daughters as reflections of 
themselves as good Muslims. For example one father, during an argument with 
his working daughter who wears western dress and refuse to veil said:
How will God allow me into heaven if my own daughter is
dressed like this?
It is in such cases that generational conflicts are most prevalent for they represent 
the re-negotiation of personal power and authority between fathers (and often 
brothers) and daughters. When a daughter goes to work, fathers are actually 
relinquishing some of the powers that they have always held, and through the 
symbolic adoption of the veil, they hope that their daughters will be protected and 
preserve her own and ipso facto family honour. Young women who refuse to wear
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the veil in such cases are therefore not only challenging their fathers' authority 
within the household but also their public standing vis-a-vis society at large as 
demonstrated by the following case study:
When I started work my father insisted that I wear not only a 
head scarf, which I was ready to do, but also the jilbab. I 
refused to wear it and I refused to leave work. During this time 
he gave me several beatings for disobeying him. Finally I took 
refuge in my married sister's house. I stayed there for three 
months. As a result, my father stopped talking to my sister and 
her husband and would not let my mother visit us. Only she 
(the mother) always managed to come when he was away.
Eventually things were patched up and I returned home. My 
father is not better and still ill-tempered but both my sister and 
my mother were getting into trouble because of me. I am 
working now. I am not veiled and I rarely talk to my father.
This example reveals a father's insistence on his daughter's symbolic use of the 
veil and a daughter's resistance to its symbolic meaning. This particular young 
woman did not face restrictions in going to school, college or work. The one 
concession that her father demanded upon employment was the veil which she 
refused. For her she expects her father's trust when she is in public spaces. As for 
her father, he wants to safeguard his and her reputation and hold on to a form of 
control over his daughter.
The other group of young veiled women are those that wear the jilbab as a result 
of personal conviction. For such women covered dress represents a measure of 
self respect. Socially, these women tend to be more confident at school, work or 
public spaces and as a result attract other young women and form groups. This 
can develop into becoming a peer pressure group that target potential women. In 
this context, when an acquaintance adopts a veil this group of women would 
sometimes have a party and everyone will congratulate her for 'finding her path.' 
One young woman who was getting friendly with a group of veiled women at 
work explained how she was actually coerced into wearing the veil:
I was new at work. It was my first job. All the others were 
veiled except me and another girl. The veiled women were very 
nice to me and convinced me how hateful the other unveiled 
woman was. She kept to herself and never talked to anyone.
Then one morning, the one who I knew to be their leader came 
up to me and said: 'we have a present for you.' She gave me a 
bag which contained a jilbab and a head scarf. Then she said:
'my mother stayed up late last night sewing this for you.' I went 
home that day in a jilbab. I have not taken it off since. Once 
you're veiled it is shameful to take it off.
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An emotional blackmail was exercised by the veiled women in the case study here. 
This reveals that in some ways, covered dress has provided these women with a 
power that was employed against this new work colleague. The other factor 
involved here is that the decision to veil is irreversible. Once a woman adopts a 
veil it is considered shameful to discard it. Unlike women who never wear it, 
those who wear it and then take it off are viewed as abandoning religion itself, 
which is judged harshly in Islam.19
6.3.3 Class and Veiling
Class and family income level play a significant role in young women’s dress. 
Indeed, the lower the family income the more prevalent covered dress becomes 
and the higher the family income the less prevalent. Within this context the 
question arises as to what extent are a family's or community's moral and religious 
values class based? In other words, how is religious ideology filtered through 
class?
Dress in the Middle East has always been linked to class and education as well as 
level of urbanisation. Linkages between mothers and daughters seems pertinent 
here. Urban middle and upper income mothers who have some education are 
unlikely to have daughters who will adopt covered dress. As a result of the 
broadening liberalisation and westernisation of such communities, religious 
conservatism itself is less visible. In contrast, lower income mothers with no or 
little education and who are recently urbanised tend to wear traditional dress. It is 
the daughters of these women that are more likely to wear covered Islamic dress. 
In such environments religious ideology is much more dominant and apparent in 
daily life. Therefore, religion seems to have different meanings among different 
income groups.
Covered dress among the middle and upper income groups is predominantly a 
result of personal choices and tend to happen at an older age. In contrast, covered 
dress for lower income women has several wide ranging purposes. First, it signals 
increased prestige and status and therefore represent women's aspirations for 
upward class mobility (see Macleod, 1991:34-7; Watson 1994:142). In other 
words, a young woman who has achieved a dramatically altered life from her 
family and community through her education and employment can, by adopting 
the veil, symbolically set herself apart from her own community. It is also likely 
that it will attract an educated husband, since religion is often equated with 
learning. Second, for single women it attracts suitors for marriage (see Zuhur, 
1992:130). It is thought that even men who are not religious prefer to marry
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religious women because they are considered to make better (i.e. obedient) wives 
and mothers. Third, as the unveiled women argue, it is cheaper. When young 
working women wear a jilbab  they do not have to use their earnings to buy 
fashionable clothes. Finally, as an ideology, Islam provides poorer women (and 
men) hope, collective solidarity and probably comfort (see Moghadam, 1991:270), 
besides financial support for the very poor. Indeed, Islamic political groups have 
gained popularity in the context of the economic crisis during the late 1980's. 
Support for such groups can to some extent be understood as a response to 
problems arising in every day life from austerity measures (Moghadam, 
1993:136). Therefore, covered Muslim dress fulfills wide-ranging practical and 
symbolic dimensions for low income women.
The relation between veiling and class has caused a significant variation in the 
geographical distribution of dress codes in Amman. In middle and upper class 
neighbourhoods where both mothers and daughters are predominantly in western 
dress, it is common to find some women in covered dress. In low income areas it 
is the norm for young women to be covered and older women to wear traditional 
dress. There would virtually be no uncovered women. Indeed, it becomes 
uncomfortable for any uncovered woman to be in such an environment. This has 
also caused differences between working women in professional modernised 
sectors who tend to wear western style clothing and women in manufacturing or 
low paid jobs who predominantly wear covered dress (see also employers' 
attitudes in Chapter Four).
6.3.4 Work and Veiling
The main question here is does the covered dress induce or hinder female work 
force participation? That is, does it allow young women more freedom to 
participate in public life while continuing to adhere to the traditional codes of 
modesty? Or is it really a new form of oppression that symbolises the fact that 
women in public have not transgressed male control (Keddie 1991:12)? Recent 
research, predominantly based in Egypt, suggest that the veil is actually both: 
liberating as well as constraining. It has been suggested that working women in 
new environments are veiling as a reaction to a new situation. According to 
Arlene Macleod (1992:547) there are two conflicting forces at play: an economic 
ideology, that revolves around the improvement of the standard of living and is 
pushing women into the workplace, and a gender ideology that continues to frame 
women's place within the home as wives and mothers. Therefore, adopting the 
veil upon working is a personal response for such a conflicting situation:
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The paradox of women seeming to support their own 
subordination and even to reproduce it under new conditions 
is part of the generally perplexing story of women's 
participation in the interactions of tradition and modernity, 
and the related re-negotiations of power (Macleod, 1991:93).
We have seen, however, that this friction between economic need and gender 
ideology that results in women's veiling does not encompass all veiled women. 
Covered dress among young women in Amman represents the larger 
transformations occurring within households. Within this vein, women's 
employment may exacerbate and popularise the prevalence of covered dress but it 
does not necessarily represent the root cause of it. The destablisation of 
patriarchal relations is bringing young women's public image to the forefront and 
particular efforts are made to re-establish, at least symbolically, male authority. 
Therefore, the relation between employment and covered dress is part and parcel 
of the restructuring of patriarchal ideology in general.
Furthermore, if young women's work is to be understood as a form of transition in 
gender and generation relations than the dress code could be understood as part of 
a collective negotiating process rather then a personal response to these changing 
relations. Here, it would be helpful to outline from the survey sample young 
women's dress type according to their employment status. Table 6.1 reveals that 
the majority of both working and economically inactive women wear a head scarf 
only (41% and 45.3% respectively) as opposed to Muslim dress (jilbab) or western 
dress. This reveals that the relation between employment and type of dress is not a 
straight-forward matter. These women whether working or economically inactive 
represent a reaffirmation of female modesty as well as a toned-down symbol of 
religious ideology. In other words, they maintain their femininity while abiding by 
the general framework of respectability and public reaffirmation of male authority.
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Table 6.1 Type of Dress According to Work Status of Young Women
Type of Dress Working % Unemployed % Inactive %
Islamic Dress 24.4 (61)* 26.5 (27) 18.9(10)
Head Scarf Only 41 (103) 33.3 (34) 45.3 (24)
Modern/Western 34 (85) 40.1 (41) 32.1 (17)
Total 100 (249) 100 (102) 100(51)
Source: Household Survey 
* Absolute numbers in brackets
On the other hand, Table 6.1 also reveals that the majority of unemployed women 
wear western style clothing (at 40.1%). Some of these women maybe unemployed 
as a result of family restrictions on type and conditions of employment (see 
above). The fact that this group consists of the highest percentage of those who 
wear western dress signify that perhaps this is another form of family restriction 
that they have not met (bearing in mind, of course, the class differences within this 
group of women).
In short, young women's dress and employment provides another example of the 
private and public face of gender ideologies. While it could be a personal response 
to new conditions with conflicting ideologies like the case of Egypt, in the case of 
Amman, it is more likely to be part of household negotiations that aim to 
accommodate patriarchal authority into young women's new life course stage and 
increased public participation.
6.5 Perspectives from Working Women
Thus far the study has looked at the impact of gender ideologies in households and 
workplaces in influencing young women's employment opportunities and patterns. 
Among the major observations are that employers tend to see young women as a 
temporary uncommitted workforce. As far as households are concerned young 
women provide a supplementary income. As a result of these attitudes in both 
household and workplace, young women's employment conditions have in some 
ways become temporary and supplementary. It could be argued therefore, that the 
dominant gender ideology of women's secondary status is regenerating itself 
through young women's employment patterns.
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However, despite these general attitudes, the numbers of young women who are 
joining the labour force are increasing and it is important to know their own 
thoughts on that matter. Thus, the following section explores the perceptions of 
the young women themselves. How do they perceive the existing gender divisions 
of employment? What are their views on their employment experiences? How is 
their employment affecting their perceived roles within the power hierarchy of 
their households? And finally, how is work affecting their personal autonomy?
6.5.1 Attitudes Towards Acceptable Female Work
A substantial number of women in the sample survey believe that women should 
work in professions consistent with their 'nature' as women (44%).20 This 
particular attitude was similar among women in different employment status.21 
Not surprisingly, 66% of the sample survey thought that the most appropriate 
profession for a woman is teaching (see also Hatem, 1986:293, on Egypt; Papps, 
1993:104, on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Turkey). The reasons given were 
identical to those provided by parents and employers who maintain that teaching is 
consistent with women's roles as nurturers and mothers. Also, 65% of the sample 
survey thought that women should work in sewing and embroidery. Again, the 
reasons given were consistent with the fact that such professions are an extension 
of women's 'natural' abilities in handiwork.
It appears, therefore, that young women are influenced by the wider ideological 
constructions of their gender that defines them through their maternal natures and 
domestic skills. The point to make here, however, is that such attitudes are not 
necessarily determined by what these young women think about female ability. 
They are likely to be determined by the options that they perceive are available for 
women (Nawar et al. 1995). After all, the gender division of labour within homes 
and workplaces remains more or less absolute. So, even those who believe that 
women can perform any kind of occupation, would not necessarily take up the 
challenge of any unacceptable occupation. In assessing young women’s attitudes 
of the gender typing of jobs, therefore, differences must be made between beliefs 
and actual behaviour.
6.5.2 Work Satisfaction
In looking at young women's job satisfaction, there are two major issues which we 
might consider. The first, is employment conditions, including pay, hours of 
work, and social relations. The second, is personal fulfillment and sense of 
achievement.
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In terms of the former, the various constraints placed on finding appropriate 
employment means that women are more likely to work in places which they 
and/or their families deem suitable. As such, very few women are in what they 
perceive to be 'unsatisfactory' working conditions. Here, of course, the young 
women are themselves influenced by other peoples' views about what is, or is not, 
a 'satisfactory' workplace. As a result, a substantial number of them are in what 
can be termed as gender ascribed jobs. The overwhelming compromise for these 
appropriate working conditions, however, is accepting low pay. Therefore, a 
number of young women believe that they are under-paid (at 17%). However, 
since other factors, such as family's satisfaction, take more precedence many 
young women assent to becoming underpaid. Women in such situations rarely 
demand a pay raise since they realise that their working conditions are attractive to 
a large supply of female labour in the same position as themselves. So in finding 
appropriate working environments, women are effectively constrained from 
expanding their earning powers. This, in some ways, acts to reinforce their 
secondary status at the workplace as well as prevent them from asserting 
themselves amongst their families.
As far as personal fulfillment, however, it can be stated here that very few young 
women in low paid gender ascribed jobs are in positions that nurture any sense of 
achievement. The majority, who are in the manufacturing sector or in the lower 
echelons of the services sector, do not really enjoy their work. The only, and 
consequently the greatest, satisfaction for the young women is the alleviation of 
boredom in their restrictive home environments and establishing friends and social 
contacts (see below). Most of them realise the lack of future opportunities in their 
occupations and they do not aspire for more anyway.
Women who are in professional occupations and ideally can establish a career are 
defined by their employers and families within the framework of their gender roles 
which effectively limits not only their opportunities but their own ambitions as 
well. In fact, any ambitious and confident woman would be described by her 
employers and colleagues: 'she is like a man.'22 In other words, the aspirations that 
make an enthusiastic or efficient worker are considered 'masculine' traits. As a 
result ambitious young women would be inadvertently marginalising themselves 
from their female and male colleagues as well as deterring marriage prospects if 
they are perceived as overtly serious and professional. In other words, in a society 
with clear gender distinctions such accusations may have a far reaching impact on 
a young woman's life.
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Within this general framework, however, aspiring young women need to 
accommodate their personal ambitions without threatening their ascribed gender 
roles. Many young women professionals in non-segregated occupations have to 
work hard and yet remain carefully feminine and avoid being described as similar 
to men in their behaviour. Achieving this balance is strategised through working 
hard, securing employers' approval while remaining generally undemanding, 
unassertive and not threatening to male superiors. In other words, young women's 
ambitions have to be accommodated to maintaining the balance of the gender 
hierarchy within society. As one young woman architect explains:
I am the only woman architect in our firm. Before my arrival 
the other women were the secretaries. I work the hardest and 
currently have the heaviest load. However, when we need to 
go to the site my boss sends my male colleagues. He says 
the labourers on the construction sites will not take me 
seriously. When clients come he never lets me sit in 
meetings but male colleagues are usually invited in. For this 
he always has excuses like he does not want to waste my 
precious time. I feel that if I want to continue with my 
current work which I enjoy and am given a lot of 
responsibility I need to undermine my achievement 
especially in front of my male colleagues. As for my boss, 
he does appreciate me and never stops praising me, but only 
when we are alone.
This is an example, where a young woman feels she has to over-achieve in order to 
be recognised as a professional yet she remains defined by her gender. Her boss 
who seems to acknowledge her hard work is very careful to maintain the ascribed 
gender roles that exist at all levels: on the construction site where the young 
woman is in a superior position and will have to give orders; at the level of her 
relations with her male colleagues who are supposedly her equals; and at the level 
of the clients who are likely to question her capability.
Other examples reveal that employers do not expect young women to be ambitious 
and when they are they are surprised and perplexed. One young woman who 
became a head of a section in a private sector firm related what her boss said about 
her to another male colleague:
My boss told my colleague how pleased he is with my work but he 
also said: 'I do not understand why she is such a hard worker. She 
comes from a good family and does not need to work.'
So job satisfaction and ambition for young women seems to be filtered through the 
existing gender ideology of male supremacy. Young women who are adamant on 
proving themselves are also wary of not challenging ascribed gender roles and
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marginalising themselves. Therefore, like their employers who maintain a balance 
between young women's achievement and gender relations at work, young women 
have to strike a balance between their own personal ambitions and conforming to 
normative gender identity.
6.5.3 Impact of Income Earning
The impact of income earning on women's roles in terms of decision making and 
power relations within households has been addressed extensively in other cultural 
contexts. Most of the findings discuss how female income earning affects 
relations between spouses (see for example Blumberg 1991a; Bruce and Dwyer, 
1988; Kabeer, 1994b; Safilios-Rothchild, 1990; Sharma, 1990; Whitehead, 1981). 
The limited research that looks at the effects of income earning on daughters as 
compared to wives reveals conflicting evidence. Some suggest that daughters' 
employment is less threatening to male supremacy than that of adult married 
women who are more likely to gain power from employment because of their 
higher ranking in the generation hierarchy (Lamphere 1986). Others, on the other 
hand, suggest that parental patriarchal authority is more resistant to change than 
marital patriarchy (Kung, 1983; Salaff, 1981).
These arguments are hard to explore in the case study of Amman because a very 
small number of mothers are actually engaged in paid employment which makes 
cross-generation comparisons difficult. Furthermore, it has been revealed that 
young women's wages are too low to allow them to assert themselves as 
independent individuals within their households. When assessing young women's 
own perceptions of the impact of their income earning, some seem to gain a certain 
amount of status within their families, whereas others do not.
Perhaps the most revealing assessment among young women were those with 
previous work experience but who were unemployed at the time of the interview. 
These young women had the most poignant perspective on the impact of income 
earning on status and roles within their households. Several such women stated 
that when they were income earners they were more involved in family decisions 
and felt that they were treated with more respect than their current situation. In 
general, it seemed that some fathers, especially those that took part of their 
working daughters' wages, would involve a daughter more in discussions relating 
to household expenditure.
In most cases it seems that mothers also treated their working daughters differently 
from non-working children. In several cases the working daughter is regarded by
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the mother as the favourite. These mothers do their utmost to provide comforts 
when the daughter is at home after a long day's work. These comforts include 
having the meal ready and sometimes, among poorer families, saving the best 
piece of meat for them. Younger siblings are also not supposed to bother the 
working daughters at this time. In general, mothers, who had married young and 
had a different life experience from their daughters, hold respect and admiration 
for their working daughters. Furthermore, relations with brothers are even affected 
where money sometimes gave sisters power. This is exemplified by one young 
woman who was unemployed at the time of the interview:
These days my brothers keep interfering in my life. They 
want to know where I go and who I see. When I used to 
work things were different. They were hard up and I used to 
loan them money. It gave me so much pleasure because they 
could never interfere in my life and I even controlled their 
expenses. As soon as they tried to assume the big brother 
role, I would threaten that I would not give them any more 
money. One day, as I was leaving to visit a friend, my 
brother wanted to know where I was going. I said: 'Listen, 
one more question and you hand back every penny you owe 
me right now.' Now, things have changed. It is them who 
are working and I am unemployed.
There are also many young women who did not feel that income earning had any 
effect on their status within the household. Several even thought that they would 
be better off if they were not working. As one case study stated:
Work has only brought me a headache. My mother expects 
me to do all the housework after my return from work. She 
thinks that since she always cared for us now its my turn to 
care for her. She does not realise that I am exhausted and 
accuses me that I am lazy. All my father cares about is my 
money. One month I could not give him any and he 
Screamed: 'damn you and your money.' He did not talk to 
me until I gave him money the following month. My 
married sisters continuously expect me to loan them money 
and give them presents. When I don't they accuse me of 
being stingy. Work has brought me nothing.
In short, the impacts of income earning on role and status of young women differ 
from household to household. Indeed the two conflicting case studies above are 
both based on low income families where young women's pay is limited. Income 
earning sometimes increases status, and at other times increases subjugation. 
Perhaps these differences have to do with parents' adaptations to their dependence 
on daughters wages. Some parents, resign themselves to this fact and gratefully 
acknowledge their daughters' contributions, while others see this as a threat to their
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positions as household heads and therefore become more authoritative. In higher 
income households the dependence on daughters' wages is not an issue and 
therefore does not pose threats to the position of males (see also Safilios- 
Rothchild, 1990 on Greece). In these cases, daughters' education and occupation 
become the determining factor in status. In other words, type of daughters' 
education and occupation becomes a source of prestige for the male head. 
Therefore, among middle and upper income households, an increased status for 
daughters connotes increased prestige for male family members outside of their 
households.
6.5.4 Impact on Personal Autonomy
This section addresses the impact of employment on young women's personal 
autonomy through looking at two elements: the impact of work on physical 
mobility and social freedom; and, young women's personal aspirations and 
whether they manage to fulfill them within restricted social boundaries. Before 
proceeding however, it is important to point out that the degree to which an 
individual achieves personal autonomy is relative to his/her specific social context 
(Nawar, at al.. 1995:152). In the following, young women's autonomy, often 
interacts with their class position and, as it has been previously suggested, the 
liberalisation of gender norms among the urban middle and upper classes in 
Amman, means that relative to others some young women already exercise a 
certain amount of personal autonomy.
Impact on Mobility and Social Freedom
In addressing whether employment has expanded young women's social freedoms 
despite the various restrictions on their working conditions these have to be 
contrasted with non-working women. Physical freedom, in particular, is closely 
related to young women's psycho-social development as girls, irrespective of 
current work status. Girls learn to fear being alone in certain places from a young 
age and this, in effect, excludes them from the public sphere as adults (see also 
Katz on Sudan, 1993) (see earlier).
Despite this however, there are stark generational differences in concepts 
regarding freedom of movement between mothers and daughters.23 While a 
mother can regard a daughter's employment as freedom of movement (as it 
compares to her youth), a daughter might feel constrained by the fact that she is 
still accountable for all her movements. It is also important to point out that 
concepts of freedom of movement differ among the young women who are in the 
same age cohort. Freedom of movement by one respondent may be perceived as
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visiting relatives while for another, it may mean being able to travel abroad. 
Therefore, the young women were asked to describe their ability to go to various 
specific destinations and their dependence on being escorted or not.
Table 6.2 reveals that working women are more mobile than inactive women, and 
also indicates that there are similarities between the freedom of movement of 
working and unemployed women. This suggests that freedom of movement may 
be expanded through employment. It is certainly consistent with the fact that 
employment in itself provides an opportunity for increased physical mobility. It is 
likely, therefore, that some women who cease to work can maintain the same 
amount of freedom that they had gained through their employment.
Table 6.2 Young Women's Freedom of Movement According to Employment
Status
Destination Market % Doctor % Friends % Relatives % Abroad %
Employed
Cannot go 1.6(4)* 3.2 (8) 11.6 (29) 4.4(11) 36.5 (91)
Can go escorted 22 (55) 33.7 (84) 12 (30) 42.6 (106) 44.9(112)
Can go alone 76.3 (190) 63 (157) 76.3 (190) 53.4(133) 18.5 (46)
Total 100 (249) 100 (249) 100 (249) 100 (249) 100 (249)
Unemployed
Cannot go 2.9 (3) 2.9 (3) 8.8 (9) 2.9 (3) 38.2 (39)
Can go escorted 25 (26) 31.4 (32) 19.6 (20) 44(45) 43 (44)
Can go alone 72 (73) 65.6 (67) 71.6 (73) 52.9 (54) 18.6(19)
Total 100 (102) 100(102) 100 (102) 100(102) 100 (102)
Inactive
Cannot go 12(6) 4(2) 22(11) 4(2) 19.6 (10)
Can go escorted 39.2 (20) 43 (22) 22(11) 53 (27) 80.4 (41)
Can go alone 49 (25) 53 (27) 57 (29) 43 (22) -
Total 100(51) 100 (51) 100 (51) 100 (51) 100 (51)
Source: Household Survey 
* Absolute numbers in brackets
However, Table 6.2 also points to a factor that is well engraved in the societal 
codes of acceptable behaviour which is the significant number of women, 
regardless of employment status, whose freedom of movement is dependent on
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being escorted by a family member or close friend. In general, parents' attitudes 
towards their daughters' social freedom and the necessity on being escorted, is not 
a sign of distrust but a form of protection of their public image. Lone women in 
public spaces are a source of gossip which can be damaging to a young girl's 
reputation (see earlier). Therefore, as far as many parents are concerned young 
women have the relative freedom to choose to go anywhere as long as they are 
escorted.
Within this atmosphere of minimised male-female social contact there is a general 
trepidation among the young women themselves to be on their own in public 
spaces. As one young woman stated:
When I am walking alone in the street I feel everyone is
watching me.
This is typically felt by young women who see themselves as vulnerable and liable 
to attract unwanted attention. So, in general, young women will avoid venturing 
on their own not because they are prohibited from doing so but because many lack 
the self confidence to do so. Therefore, the conditioning of women as the 
vulnerable sex acts as a deterrent to any increase in women's physical freedom. 
Having said this, it is important to mention that women's public presence in 
Amman is starkly visible and this presence does not necessarily mean that they are 
subject to unwanted male attention. It is significant, therefore, that public spaces 
remain to be ideologically constructed as male spheres which women continue to 
regard themselves as vulnerable.
Furthermore, young women's freedom of movement differs between actual and 
symbolic levels. For example, some women state that they are free to go 
anywhere they like but that they do not because they do not see the need to. Often, 
the same interview would reveal that a woman who claims to have freedom of 
movement has never been downtown (city centre and market), or that the last time 
she went on an independent outing was six months previously. It transpired, for 
example, that many women who stated they have freedom of movement, had no 
knowledge of the city outside their immediate geographic vicinity. Thus, there are 
contradictions between the perceptions of both parents and daughters and the 
actual amount of physical freedom that a young woman has.
Moving on to the inter-connections between physical and social freedoms, what of 
young women's autonomy in establishing social relations? For most women these
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revolve around relatives and female friends. Female friends are acquired in three 
main ways. The first are female friends within the immediate vicinity of their 
homes. These could be relatives (normally cousins) or just neighbours. Such 
relations are usually intimate. For example, women, who normally wear covered 
dress can go to neighbours houses uncovered as long as they avoid male members. 
Second, there are school friends. These are an extension of neighbourhood 
friends, since schools are usually within the vicinity of households, and therefore 
largely include friends who belong to the same community. Those who proceed to 
higher education, however, are able to acquire friends from different parts of the 
city and possibly different income groups. The third way of acquiring friends is 
through colleagues at work who could also come from diversified backgrounds. 
Therefore, employed women especially those with higher education levels, tend to 
be able to acquire a larger and more diversified base of friends and acquaintances, 
besides their immediate relatives and neighbours, than non-working women.
Nevertheless, there are variations in the actual amount of social contact between 
women, even among those within the same employment status. Given limitations 
on physical mobility, social relations are predominantly based on visiting each 
other's homes. Some women face problems even in this. One unemployed woman 
quoted her father as saying:
Why do you need to go to your friends? They can come here.
This attitude is problematic because visits among friends usually rotate and if a 
young woman does not reciprocate the friendships are likely to dwindle. A 
substantial amount of young women's social lives, therefore, revolve around 
family and relatives and outside this is dependent on 'special occasions'. This 
includes attending birthday, engagement or wedding parties. Social activities 
beyond home visits are largely confined to working women. These activities are 
adapted to the framework of their work routines. This includes women work 
colleagues going out to lunch together or shopping especially on pay day.
Autonomy and Personal Aspirations
Having looked at young women's physical and social freedom, we now turn to 
young women's personal aspirations and how attitudes towards women's social 
freedom affects them. In other words, this section addresses young women's 
personal aspirations vis-a-vis their existing reality.24 Most young women have 
individual hopes and aspirations. These range from the seemingly simple ability
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to be able to go swimming to more complex ambitions such as wanting to become 
a politician. These aspirations often reflect women's repressed needs for personal 
autonomy.
The context behind this is that the acknowledged stages of Arab women's life 
course excludes youth and single adulthood. Therefore, since youth itself is 
squeezed out of Arab women's life courses, young women learn to suppress their 
personal hopes and aspirations even if they continue, at a deep level, longing to 
realise them. Although the majority of this revolves around romantic ideals, a lot 
of it relates to the actual limitations on their social freedom and mobility, as 
revealed by the following cases:
I used to be a basket ball champion at school and my teachers 
recommended that I join the national Jordanian team. My 
parents, of course, refused. Since finishing school I have not 
played any sport. I have such an urge to exercise that 
sometimes I lock myself in my room and just jump till I am 
exhausted.
My dream is to learn to drive and own a car. Do you drive?
What kind of car do you drive? Can you take me for a ride?25
The happiest days in my life was when I used to sing with the 
college music group. Singing for me is so natural. I am bom 
to sing.
My dream is to be a poet. I write secretly and have to hide 
my notebooks. My brother tore my poems once. He said 
they were blasphemous.
Examples like these are ample. They do not just represent abstract youthful 
dreams but deeply felt needs and aspirations. Young women rarely find avenues 
to express themselves. Their physical and social restrictions deny them any form 
of expression. The irony is that they usually consist of things they are exposed to 
at school, on television or, in the case of the women who wants a car, on the street 
on daily basis. One factor here is that such aspirations are particular to their age 
group. Parents, fathers and mothers alike, have a different life experience and are 
likely to misunderstand and consequently block their daughters' desires. Most 
young women understand this gap between themselves and their parents and rarely 
attempt to challenge it. In addition, they are usually left with no social confidence 
to challenge their parents. However, they are well aware of their predicament and 
when they do get a chance for free expression they are fully capable of articulating 
themselves 26
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Finally, it is in this way that work for many young women becomes a way of 
expressing themselves and breaking the monotony of their restricted lives and 
perhaps boredom. Therefore, despite the fact that young women can sometimes be 
exploited labour (see Chapter Four) or the fact their wages are too little to assert 
themselves within their households, employment opportunities remain of 
paramount importance at this stage in their life courses. For many, it represents a 
symbol of their desires to become independent adults, as well as a means for 
filling their free time.
6.6 Attitudes Towards Work, Marriage and Future Gender Roles
Having positioned the experiences of young women as a new life course trajectory 
within a framework of changing gender and generational relations we now explore 
dominant attitudes towards future gender roles. What are women’s attitudes 
regarding choice on marriage partners and how do these contrast with their parents' 
expectations? What are young women's views on marriage and work? And 
finally, how does the employment of young women affect their marriage prospects 
in terms of male views on female employment? Before addressing these 
questions, an important factor needs to be reiterated; namely the universality of 
marriage in Jordanian society and its inevitability for the young single women in 
the current sample survey.
6.6.1 Parents and Daughters Attitudes Towards Marriage
Traditionally, parents prefer to arrange their children's marriages whether for sons 
or daughters. Most parents prefer to marry their daughters to relatives or at least 
someone from the same community (see earlier). In fact, a large majority of 
parents in the sample survey were themselves cousins. This however, is no longer 
desirable for young women. Young women want to marry non-relatives so that 
they will have new lives outside of their communities which they often perceive as 
less constraining.27
In addition, a substantial number of young women want to marry men they have 
met independently, usually at work or at university (see also Shaefer Davies, 1993 
on Morocco). Such situations raise the suspicions of family members and are 
usually met with rejection. This is because young men and women are not 
supposed to get to know each other outside of the family domain.28 Besides, the 
fact that a young man is willing to act independently of his parents tends to reflect 
negatively on his disposition. Finally, an independent suitor could be seen as an 
insult to male family members. As one father who will only consider suitors who 
are relatives explained:
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My daughter is not cheap! I will not just give her away to 
anyone.
However, this is causing increasing conflict in households, as the following 
exemplifies:
My colleague at work wants to marry me. His father is dead 
and he does not have many male relatives. He came and 
visited my father and brothers four times. On two occasions 
his mother came and brought us gifts. Until now my father 
has rejected his demand. Lately, even my uncles interfered 
and confirmed to my father that in our family, no girl is given 
away to strangers. Meanwhile, I have been refusing the 
suitors from my family. As a result I have embarrassed my 
father with the rest of die family as he has to give reasons for 
my refusal. Young people today should know each other.
Unlike our parents who had no choice and had their 
marriages arranged at a young age, we get married to be 
happy.
The real problem here is that this young man came from a small family that is 
unknown to the young woman's family. Although the latter's family is by no 
means wealthy or powerful they have a large network of relatives and it is 
expected that she should many from within the larger kin group. Her obstinacy is 
problematic for her father as it endangers his relations with his kin group. It is 
also a source of public embarrassment for him because it reflects his lack of 
authority over his daughter.
Generational differences mean that parents' and daughters' attitudes towards 
marriage have developed in divergent ways. Generally, daughters want to be able 
to choose their partners and they idealise the notion of love within marriage (see 
also Shaefer Davies ,1993:211 on Morocco; Manasra, 1993:14 on Palestine; 
Zuhur, 1992:93 on Egypt). This contrasts with parents' attitudes where marriages 
are arranged and security and reputation rather than love is important.
For parents, the universality of marriage, makes any dependence on daughters' 
wages from work dispensable among low income families. Daughters' income, 
although in many cases important to household economy, is rarely fully depended 
on for survival (see Chapter Five). The households where parents objected to 
daughters marriage in order to retain their income were minimal in number.29 
These included two destitute families. One of those was a family where both
202
parents were deceased and the five siblings lived with an ailing grandmother. At 
the time of the interview, the eldest daughter was the only one gainfully employed. 
This woman claimed that her brothers and uncles refused the marriage proposals 
of one of her colleagues at work. The young woman quoted her grandmother as 
saying:
You’d better stay home and take care of us.
The other case was of a family where the father has taken a second wife and 
abandoned them. The family consisted of two sisters in their twenties and four 
other younger siblings. Family survival was dependent on the limited income of 
both the young women. The mother confessed that one of her daughters was 
previously engaged and that she encouraged her to leave her fiance since she was 
in desperate need of her income. The rationale that the mother gave was that since 
their family circumstances are shameful (i.e. poverty and husband's desertion) any, 
future husband of her daughters is likely to mistreat them since they have 'no one 
to protect them.' She, therefore, wants them to retain their dignity by not getting 
married.
6.6.2 Young Women’s Views on Work and Marriage
The restructuring of gender relations in Amman today have resulted in ill-defined 
attitudes to work after marriage among the young women interviewed. At one 
level, workforce participation appears to positively affect young women's attitudes 
towards work after marriage. More employed and unemployed women agree with 
the concept of work after marriage than women who are inactive (see Figure 6.1). 
At another level, however, when attitudes of work after having children is 
approached, the differences between economically active and inactive women 
substantially narrows (see Figure 6.2). In other words, when the issue is pressed 
further and the presence of children is posed, women's perceived 'natural' roles as 
mothers takes precedence.
So, in assessing young women's attitudes towards work and marriage the 
distinction that must be made is between a working wife and a working mother. A 
number of working women stated that ideally they would like to continue with 
their work until their first child. Even those who thought that women should not 
withdraw from the workforce as a result of motherhood would qualify themselves:
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As long as a woman fulfills her duties as mother and wife she 
should be able to continue with work.
It is apparent, therefore, that the redistribution of gender divisions of labour within 
households, as a result of female employment, is not in question for the young 
women. What is in question is women's ensuing dual roles. In addition, behind all 
this is the persistence of the male breadwinner ideology. According to most 
women respondents employment after marriage is largely dependent on their 
husband's consent. There is a general belief that if a husband provides his wife 
with her needs then it is his right to keep her at home (see also Hoodfar, 1988 on 
Egypt).
Figure 6.1 Do You Agree With Work After Marriage?
Depends on 
circumstances
Disagree
Agree
■  Inactive
D  Unemployed
■  Employed
0 20 40 60 80
Source: Household Survey
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Figure 6.2 Do You Agree With Work After Marriage for Women With Children?
Depends on 
circumstances
Disagree
Agree
B Inactive 
□  Unemployed 
I  Employed
0 20 40 60 80
Source: Household Survey
The women who claim that marriage and work 'depends on circumstances' (see 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2) feel that it is family financial needs that should determine 
married women's work (see also Nawar et al. 1995:157-8 on Egypt). For 
example, young women thought that a mothers' employment is legitimate when it 
is 'for her family' or 'to help her husband.' Moreover, actually needing to work was 
not the ideal situation for many women. As one working woman stated:
I work hard now and I am usually tired. May God send me a
husband that is able to support a family.
This leads to a the related issue of attitudes towards women's incomes. The 
general attitude from above is that work does not involve a redistribution of gender 
roles and/or relations within households and married women's employment is only 
legitimate within the context of family need. However, when women were asked 
whether women with an independent income have more status and personal power 
within their households, a majority answered in the affirmative (see Figure 6.3). 
Working and unemployed women again were more sure about this positive 
relationship than the inactive women. Many young women had ready examples 
from their lives' experiences to substantiate this positive relation. One young 
woman recounted her neighbours' example:
It is obvious that a married woman with their own income 
will have a more equal relation with her husband. Our
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neighbour had an abusive husband. We all knew how badly 
he treated her. Then she started her own little sewing 
business at home and became successful. Now he is a 
different man. He respects her and consults with her on 
everything.
Perhaps most women thought that women's income is imperative for more equal 
relations between spouses and empowerment. Most of them however, still regard their 
interests to be bound by male protection which is necessary for future security and this 
includes continuous deference to male authority. One of the consequences of the 
importance of male protection, however, is that the women themselves are likely to 
undermine the significance of their income earning or drop employment altogether in 
order to maintain practical as well as emotional security derived from male consent. 
Therefore, a distinction should be made between young women's independent thinking 
and actual behaviour vis-a-vis marriage and income. To capture this difference the 
young women were asked the hypothetical question of if they had an ideal job with a 
good income would they agree to marry someone who would not allow them to 
work.30
Figure 6.3 Do you believe that married women with their own income have more 
status and power in their households?
Inactive
Unemployed
□  No (%)
■  Yes (%)
Employed
0 20 40 60 80
Source: Household Survey
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Figure 6.4 Would you agree to marry someone who's pre-condition is that you stop
working?
Inactive
Depends on 
Cirumstances (%)
Unemployed
Employed
Source: Household Survey
Surprisingly, the majority of young women would agree to such conditions (see 
Figure 6.4). Young women generally consider it as part of a husband's role to be 
able to provide for their families. Therefore, as outlined above, the work of 
married women is primarily to help the family and their earnings can thus only be 
supplementary to family survival. Of course more inactive women would agree to 
such preconditions than active women. After all the inactive women are not 
working and are unlikely to ever work. However, the active women who by and 
large perceive the need for an independent income would assent to a situation 
where they will be denied the access to this income. What is involved here is a 
difference between what young women believe and what they will do given the 
limited life options available. This study has thus far portrayed what it means to 
be a young unmarried woman in Amman today. So it is not too illogical for young 
women to forsake their income earning capacity for the socially acceptable role of 
economically dependent wife and full-time mother. Young women's life 
experiences that have exposed them to different ideas, and perhaps empowered 
them in some respects, have also resulted in new and problematic dilemmas, 
mainly their existence as single adults in an overwhelmingly married society. 
Therefore, young women may realise the importance of female economic 
autonomy but at the same time they feel a need to ascribe to 'traditional' gender 
roles.
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6.6.3 Young Men's Views on Women's Work and Marriage 
In addition to the above, it is also important to explore young men's views on 
working women. How does employment affect young women's chances of 
marriage? Do young men prefer to marry a working or a non-working women? 
The investigation of male attitudes was not one of the objectives of this study 
especially as the presence of young males during the household interviews was 
limited (see Chapter One). Thus, male views are largely derived here from the 
young women and/or their mothers.31 It has to be borne in mind, therefore, that 
the following discussion is filtered through women's (young and old), perceptions 
of male views.
It has been usually assumed that Arab men prefer to marry younger uneducated 
wives in order to ensure their chastity and obedience. It is also usually assumed 
that Arab mothers-in-law prefer young and 'naive' daughters-in-law for their sons 
who will be in subordinate positions from themselves (see earlier). Both are not 
the case in Amman today. Young men do not prefer young and naive girls and the 
centrality of mother-in-law's domination over young brides is diminishing 
especially with the decline of the extended family household (see Chapter Five).
According to female respondents, both young men and their families are more 
likely to prefer to marry educated girls. In fact, some young men do not seem to 
mind if their future wife is more educated than themselves. As far as employment 
is concerned few young men seem to believe that female employment before 
marriage reduces female virtue. Young men's views on women's work after 
marriage, on the other hand, seem to be influenced by the ideology of the male 
protector and breadwinner both of which harbour women's dependence. However, 
it was particularly hard to decipher what the young men exactly thought or what is 
expected from young women who are about to get married- The fact that young 
men were portrayed as largely unperturbed by young womeni's working experience 
before marriage casts doubt on their actual personal opposition to employment 
after marriage.
Generally, young men's views can be more specifically summed up according to 
the type of employment a young woman holds. If a young woman has a 
prestigious and secure job such as government or banking employment or is a 
skilled professional, it is likely that the young man considers this an asset and 
allow her to continue with her work after marriage. Ini fact, young women 
respondents claim that young men actually want to marry women with such secure
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jobs since these days it is difficult for young families to live on a single wage. So, 
young men with ambitions for upward mobility will seek working women only, 
but since some jobs are socially unacceptable and/or not prestigious for married 
women, it is those with good positions who end up receiving the marriage suitors. 
This is largely resented by the single women. The anxiety of one particular 
woman who is employed in a government ministry illustrates this:
My cousin asked me about my colleague who is also a close 
friend. He first asked about how much she earned, and only 
afterwards asked whether I can introduce him to her. I was 
disgusted that this is his criterion for choosing a wife. Now I 
do not know what is the right thing to do. I do not want to 
stand in my friend's way of marriage prospects, but then 
again, he seems to be only interested in her government 
salary and pension.
As for the young women who do not have prestigious employment, such as factory 
workers, for example, it is taken for granted by everyone around them, including 
themselves, that they will leave their jobs upon marriage. For the young men, 
besides the low prestige, there are low economic returns from such employment 
since wages and benefits are limited. What is interesting is that women in such 
low level employment are themselves willing, if not eager, to leave their jobs. In 
one particular family, for example, a woman respondent humorously recounted 
how her sister who is now married, had hastily left her job in a toy factory as soon 
as she realised that a young man was interested in her and long before she got 
officially engaged. So it is difficult to locate, as far as low level jobs are 
concerned, who decides on the future employment status of women.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has focused on the changes occurring within gender and generation 
hierarchies in Amman as a result of prolonged marriage age and increasing levels 
of education and employment among young women. It illustrated how this can be 
described as a new life course trajectory of single employed adulthood and how 
patriarchal relations, as a result, are being reconstructed.
The reconstruction of patriarchal relations tend to arise from cross-currents 
occurring between patriarchy's intra-household relations and extra-domestic levels. 
At the household level there seems to be increased flexibility in terms of female 
education, employment, and in some cases, an expansion of status and more 
choice in marriage. As for the extra-domestic level, which involves patriarchy's 
public image, young women's potential independence and possible deviance from
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social norms is posing threatening. Therefore, gestures that at least symbolise 
control over female kin have become a main focus. These gestures involve 
notions of appropriate employment for young women and heightened emphasis on 
their behaviour and public image.
Therefore, despite this new life course stage young women are facing limitations 
which in some ways are influencing their access to employment opportunities. 
The impact of this is also visible in the workplace, where some employers, in order 
to appease male family members and gain access to female labour, adjust their 
working conditions in order to dovetail more clearly with familial approval. 
Furthermore, in order to ensure access to young female labour and deflect doubts 
on their own positions, employers usually replicate familial hierarchical relations 
in the workplace.
Further, from the perspectives of the young women, this life course trajectoiy may 
have expanded their aspirational horizons but it has not altered gender divisions in 
the home or in society at large. Low paid women performing gendered jobs do not 
really achieve much job satisfaction or self fulfillment. Professional women, on 
the other hand, find their job satisfaction filtered through gender ideologies where 
ambition itself is a masculinised trait and where abidance by the gender hierarchy 
at the workplace remains necessary to appease male colleagues.
In terms of impact of working women's income earning on their roles within their 
households as well as on their personal autonomy, it can be said that their new life 
course trajectory has resulted in two contrasting situations: one, exposure to new 
ideas and ways of thinking, but to counter this, limited freedom to actualise their 
aspirations. Therefore, the attitudes of the young women towards their future roles 
reveals that although they possess independent views, they continue to define their 
future roles within the context of the ascribed gender roles of marriage and 
motherhood. In other words, changes in gender relations have resulted in stark 
discrepancies between young women's beliefs and behaviour. Finally, the 
reconstruction of patriarchy in Amman has not reorganised gender roles or power 
relations in any significant ways, but simply expanded and restructured young 
women's lives in comparison to their older counterparts.
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Notes to Chapter Six
1 Due to the limited references on the life course stages of Jordanian women, this section draws on 
references from the Middle Eastern region in general.
2 This however, does not mean that families desire sons only. Families are keen to have at least 
one daughter to help them with household chores, child rearing and keep their mothers' company 
(Taminian, 1990:3; see also Hoodfar, 1988).
3 At the time of the interview this particular young women was unemployed and largely confined 
to her home. The leniency provided to her during her college years where she could justify her 
absence from home and therefore practice and perform in a musical band was over. When her 
father eventually found out that she had performed in the college music group, he beat her and her 
mother who tired to protect her.
4 The extent to which women in the sample survey managed to engage in such relationships 
however, was difficult to assess since they were unlikely to report about behaviour that is 
considered deviant to social norms.
3 One important point to be made here is that traditionally, brother-sister relationships has been 
important within Jordanian families. Brothers continue to be women's foremost protectors 
throughout their life courses. After marriage, and in the absence of parents, when a woman has 
problems with a husband or in-laws it is the brothers who will negotiate on her behalf. In addition, 
divorced, abandoned or battered women usually have recourse to their brothers homes. For more 
on brother-sister relationships see Joseph (1994b).
6 Indeed these familial gender relations are even embedded in everyday language. Men always 
refer to women as 'daughters' or 'sisters’ or in the cases of older women 'aunts’. Women likewise 
refer to men as 'brothers' or 'uncles.' This is not confined to the workplace but to society at large 
that translates gender relations into familial relations.
7 In describing the changing attitudes towards female education among a Bedouin community in 
Egypt, Lila Abu Lughod (1993:220) aptly describes the situation which is similar to Amman. One 
of Abu Lughod's informants explains to her: 'for example, my father sees Aisha's father, who has 
educated all his daughters, so my father looks at him and says: why should he educate his daughters 
and not me? I have to educate my daughters.' In other words, what happened in terms of female 
education in both Egypt and Jordan is that people began competing over die education of girls as it 
has evolved to reflect prestige.
^Writing on Taiwan, Greenhalgh (1988) suggests that investment in daughters' education among 
lower income families increases daughters obligations to them and therefore increases family 
resources. Among wealthy families daughters education is a 'status investment' where daughters 
will get better husbands and this reflects on the status of the parents. In the case of Jordan , parents 
rarely expect to be repaid materially from daughters education but the investment of status whether 
among poorer of wealthier families is applicable.
9 One such example is the area of Hai Nazzal which has high rates of female employment in 
clothing and food production enterprises. Most workshops were literally down the hill from this 
area. In the mornings and afternoons it is possible to see groups of young women walking to and 
from work together.
*0 Very few establishments in Jordan have a two-day weekend.
11 Instead young women go to public places on special occasions only, most commonly on pay day 
or on a female colleague's birthday. In other words, public spaces are accessible for women but not 
on the same terms as for men.
12 One incident that demonstrates this is during an interview with an employer who called one of 
his sales women to illustrate how attractive she was and that someone like her should be married 
immediately as she is a temptation to all the male workers and customers. The young woman was, 
of course, uncomfortable, but when later on she was asked whether she was aware of any 'moral 
harassment' in her job, she said no and even described her employer as a 'fair person'.
13 This form of blaming-the-victim has been a prevalent argument in the West surrounding rape 
That is a woman invites the rapist by dressing provocatively or walking alone in deserted places. 
So, likewise, in Amman it is thought that a woman at work can invite sexual harassment by her 
behaviour and dress.
14 Naila Kabeer (1995:176-178) in describing manufacturing industries in Bangladesh describes 
this as the 'desexualisation' of workplace communities. She states that men and women seek to de- 
emphasise the sexual connotations of their proximity and thus defuse the threat to their reputation.
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15 The Jordanian criminal law is based on the French law that included clauses on 'crimes of 
passion.' These are supposed to be based on irrational and temporary insanity and thus treated 
with leniency by the law. Those who commit such crimes get 6 months to 2 year jail terms. The 
French have long since canceled this but it still exists in many Arab countries who adopted the 
French Law.
16 For Jordan which has low crime rates this also amounts to 31% of all reported murders in the 
country in the past decade (see Husseini, 1994).
*7 Indeed, there are different types of veiling as there are different types of Islam. The origins of 
the veil in religious doctrine comes from the Quran that advocates covering the hair and shoulders 
and upper arms. This was in a form of advice given to the wives of the prophet Mohammed who, 
due to their social standing, were permanently in the public eye. The implications for all women 
are unclear, however, and have been interpreted in a variety of ways (Macleod, 1992:538-539).
18 It is important to clarify that this represents a new image of Islamic women which should not be 
confused with traditional forms of dress worn by older women (see also Zuhur, 1992:7 on Egypt).
Adopting the religion of Islam is irreversible. If a Muslim were to change his/her religion he/she 
would be condemned to death.
20 The respondents were asked to list three most suitable professions for women. Non were named 
and they were free to mention any job. See questions 55 and 56 in the household questionnaire 
survey in Appendix Two.
21 This was one of the few questions in the household questionnaire survey with no significant 
variation between the three groups of women interviewed. The frequencies were 42% for 
employed women, 44% for unemployed women, and 46% for inactive women.
22 There is a term in everyday Arabic language that describes such a woman as mistarjileh. This 
has the double meaning of she is like a man or she would rather be a man.
2  ^A study based on Palestinian society, in which the current section draws from, also reveals that 
freedom of movement means different things for different generations. The majority of young 
women in the sample reported that they generally feel socially and physically restrained. The older 
women, on the other hand, perceived activities such as visiting a neighbour as a measure of social 
freedom (see FAFO, 1993:301-5).
^  Studies that address the impact of employment on women's lives have paid limited attention to 
personal aspirations. Writing on Bolivian households Colin Sage (1993:243) states: 'Feminists 
regarded the household as a site of subordination and domination and warned against characterising 
the household with reference to sharing and pooling. More recently other critical approaches have 
recognised the importance of connecting internal structures with social relations and commodity 
relations. Yet despite a greater sensitivity to changing gender and other divisions of labour based 
on age and marital status within the household, attention to individual activities and aspirations 
frequently remain subsumed to a pre-occupation with the characteristics of the collective unit.'
2  ^Two years after this statement, in 1996, this young woman has begun to take driving lessons. 
Being unemployed, however, makes it unlikely that she will be able to buy a car.
2  ^ Within this context, it is relevant to mention here a project that is currently being implemented 
by CARE International in Zarqa, a city that is 30 km from Amman, called Social and Economic 
Self Sufficiency for Disadvantaged Youth. This is a pioneering project that targeted young 
unemployed women and saw it necessary to aim at increasing young women's social confidence 
and expression before focusing on their economic empowerment. One of the activities was 
allowing the participants to write, direct and perform a play. The play which was performed in an 
Islamic centre for an all female audience was based on the women's actual experiences and tackled 
the following issues: brother's dominance, lack of choice in education, forced marriages, domestic 
violence, loneliness and lack of communication between parents and daughters.
27 This applies to young men as well. It is appropriate to mention here that some parents blame 
their daughters' delayed age at marriage on male cousins who are choosing to marry women outside 
the family. It is considered easier to 'take' a wife who is not a relative for a son, than to 'give' a 
daughter to a non-relative. In fact, a substantial amount of discord between relatives can be based 
on decreasing alliance that was previously achieved through children's marriages.
28 Despite the strict social rules that limit male-female contact, therefore, young people do manage 
to meet and develop relationships that might, in some cases, lead to marriage. These meetings 
however, are usually clandestine, especially on part of the young women. For more on male- 
female relations prior to marriage see Shaefer Davies (1993) who writes on the rural Moroccan 
context.
2^ Diane Wolf (1990a) writing on working daughters in Java and Taiwan found that in Java, 
similar to the situation in Jordan, daughters' input to family economy does not affect their marriage
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prospects (see also Scott and Tilly, 1980 on 19th century Europe). In Taiwan, on the other hand, 
daughters later age at marriage is encouraged in order to prolong the economic benefits from their 
wages.
30 Of course, a hypothetical question is likely to yield a hypothetical answer. However, the above 
is not in any way supposed to provide statistical relevance, merely an illustration of the differences 
between young women’s views and actual behaviour.
^  A number of young women got engaged between the two month period that separated the 
quantitative household questionnaire survey and the in-depth interviews. It was in such 
circumstances, that male views on marriage and work were extensively discussed (i.e. fiance's 
views).
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSION
The present and final chapter focuses on the broad findings of the study and 
evaluates them in light of the original research questions and existing theoretical 
perspectives. Given the limited amount of current research that frames women's 
employment within life course changes in developing countries, the chapter goes 
on to outline suggestions for future research and other areas of inquiry. Finally, it 
assesses the implications of the study for policy formulation.
7.1 Cross-Currents Between Employment, Gender and Generation: Critical 
Findings of the Research
One of the main objectives of this research was to identify changing patterns of 
female employment in Jordan through focusing on young, single, urban women. 
The study attempted to show that unlike previous generations, young women today 
marry at a later age, have relatively high education levels and have access to 
expanding employment opportunities. Given that Jordanian society has 
traditionally been based on rigid gender and generation hierarchies with women’s 
roles and identities restricted to being children, adolescents and then dependent 
wives and mothers, rising labour force participation has brought with it a new life 
course stage in Jordanian women's lives: single employed adulthood. With this in 
mind, the study proceeded to explore whether this is leading to changes in 
normative gender and generation hierarchies in the workplace and at household 
levels.
At the workplace level, analysis revealed an increased demand for female labour, 
most of which is a result of changing occupational structures and technological 
shifts, especially in the manufacturing industry. Employers' stereotypes and 
perceptions regarding women means that they are viewed as temporary workers 
and are thus placed in jobs with limited scope for upward mobility. In this 
context, employers have clear preferences for young unmarried females who are 
perceived to have fewer household and child care responsibilities than older 
women. At the same time, assumptions about women's possession of domestic 
skills and associated attributes (patience, dexterity, nurturing qualities etc.), mean 
that most young women remain within the bounds of occupations that are labeled 
as 'female' occupations (i.e. teachers, secretaries, seamstresses and assembly line 
workers). However, gender desegregation appears to be evident in a minority of
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firms. This includes modem and technical occupations (i.e. medical and computer 
related fields). Employers concerns in such firms are skill and proficiency and 
some young women's high education levels make them appropriate candidates. 
Labour market segregation in Amman is therefore developing into two divergent 
paths. One that is becoming less segregated and which employs a minority of 
technically skilled female workers, and, a second, which remains highly 
segregated and includes the majority of women workers.
Within these two emerging paths, the analysis attempted to assess how the wider 
societal custom of sexual segregation intersects with the increasing demand for 
female labour, bearing in mind that women's participation in some occupations is a 
relatively recent phenomenon. This reveals that there is a split in the ideological 
construction of Jordanian employers, although this is rarely in contradiction with 
their interests. Manufacturing employers, for example, tend to promote sex 
segregated workspaces for two main reasons: first because of the assumption that 
this increases work efficiency, and second, because female workers are expected to 
come from home environments which advocate sex segregation, and therefore, it is 
a means of attracting female labour. In terms of commercial enterprises, spatial 
segregation is limited, first because it is inefficient and second because some 
employers want to promote a modernised image of their firms with male-female 
interaction being part of this. Part of this image-building also includes promoting 
women to managerial positions in some cases. Third, female employees in such 
firms tend to be professional or administrative workers and are unlikely to face 
family restriction in interacting with men. In conclusion, spatial and occupational 
segregation, in the Jordanian context, are closely intertwined.
At the household level, the analysis found that compared with other family 
members, young single women have higher education levels. Indeed, some may 
be becoming more qualified than their brothers with a substantial number in 
professional and technical occupations. However, compared with male family 
members, their earnings tend to be less, regardless of occupation type. In addition, 
household factors often cited as significant in influencing female labour supply in 
other cultural contexts, such as extended household forms (see Chant, 1991a; Safa, 
1995) and lower household income (see Bruce and Dwyer, 1988; Stichter, 1990) 
are not as significant in the present context. The reasons for this may well owe in 
part to the fact that the study concentrated on a younger group of women 
compared to other studies.
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In searching for the reasons behind young women's increasing work force 
participation it is necessary to consider both young women's personal 
rationalisations and household level influences. While it is useful to look at these 
separately, the analysis has shown clearly that personal and household needs 
and/or interests often overlap. In terms of personal rationalisations, however, 
some young women who are educated feel the need to utilise their skills, some are 
adamant on some form of economic independence and/or future savings, although 
this is not always possible, and finally, some feel the need to break the monotony 
of their daily lives and establish wider social networks through work. In terms of 
household level influences, it appears that older male family members encourage 
female education, as it is evolving to represent prestige and better marriage options 
for daughters. One of the inadvertent results of this, however, has been 
concessions in allowing daughters to seek employment after obtaining education. 
This increased flexibility appears to be linked to the fact that working daughters 
are perceived as unlikely to challenge existing hierarchical relations, but instead to 
abide by existing power relations and continue to defer to their male elders. In 
other words, work is not expected to empower them. Finally, in some families, 
young women's wages are regarded as an opportunity to expand family income.
Moving on to the consequences of young women's work, in respect to young 
women's personal gains and the impacts on their households, again there are a 
multiplicity of interactions which can often result in contradictions. In terms of 
the impacts on young women, for example, in a number of cases, there is 
expansion of daughters' status and household roles plus more choice in marriage. 
It is also evident that some young women have developed, as a result of work and 
changing interactional patterns, new self images which might lead in some cases to 
a form of 'self differentiation.'1 The contradiction here lies in the fact that these 
young women feel the strong pull of family loyalties. As such, gender role 
conditioning, family expectations, the various forms of limitations they experience 
as a result of power relations, makes their predicament, in terms of self 
actualisation, a difficult one.
In terms of the impacts on the household, there is little doubt that daughters wages 
are valuable given the much greater likelihood that their wages will be 
appropriated for household use than those of their brothers. Although many sons 
do contribute to family maintenance, they are given much greater leeway both to 
choose their employment (and thereby maximising earnings), and to retain their 
income. The reasons behind this gender differential are firstly, that sons' are
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parent's future security, so a favour in youth is likely to be reciprocated in later 
life. A second reason is that men's primaiy role in households mean that they need 
to save for their future marriages. A third factor is that sons have greater social 
freedom and need money for expenditure on recreational activities, whereas 
daughters, with their limited social lives, do not.
In terms of ideological impacts, at the household level, one might expect some 
diminution of patriarchal relations as a result of women's employment. Women's 
waged work, however, is perceived by some males, who no longer can sufficiently 
provide for their families, as a loss of their position and power as family heads. In 
turn this poses a threat to both their identities and their self esteem (see also 
Safilios-Rothchild, 1990). In addition, the social standing of male kin, which 
revolves around the preservation of family reputation/honour, is clearly challenged 
by women's potential independence and possible deviance from social norms. 
Therefore, gestures that at least symbolise control over female kin have become a 
major pre-occupation among fathers and brothers. These gestures mainly involve 
a devaluation of the female wage as well as heightened emphasis on young 
women's appropriate social behaviour. Therefore, young women in some ways 
face increased social pressure, and are rarely allowed to enter into what may be 
deemed 'inappropriate' employment.
However, between the cross-currents of young women's personal aspirations and 
attempts at the household level to re-assert social control, are some measures, not 
only of conflict but also, re-negotiation of patriarchal relations. These often reveal 
that there are considerably different social arrangements that can emerge from 
household level tensions. Indeed, young women's work has placed some of them 
in a position where they can participate and negotiate the circumstances that makes 
their new realities acceptable with the context of normative gendered behaviour 
and expectations. Examples of this are veiling or finding employment close to 
home and/or with colleagues/employers from the same community. Although the 
re-negotiation of power is problematic, one can claim, however, that the seeds for 
'self differentiation' were present among some of the women interviewed in this 
study.
In some ways these re-negotiations of gender and generation hierarchies in 
Amman are themselves signals that at a personal, relational and societal levels 
change is obvious enough to cause concern, not to mention havoc, in relations 
within some families. This also indicates that this new generation of working 
women will face more pressures with each step that they take forward in the
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future. In the long-term, however, once these hierarchical boundaries have been 
re-negotiated at the parental level, they may facilitate a re-negotiation at the 
spousal level, once these young women are married.
Finally, perhaps one of the more important conclusions is the extent to which the 
relationship between women's employment and the increased social and economic 
autonomy of women is a complex one and how the greatest changes for women 
workers are more likely to occur within the home, rather than at the workplace or 
through political change (Chant and Mcllwaine, 1995:301; Moore, 1988:111). 
The centrality of the family in the elaboration and enforcement of male and female 
behaviour here cannot be overestimated (Tucker, 1993: xv) (see below).
7.2 Intersecting Gender, Employment and the Life Course: Theoretical 
Implications
As pointed out in Chapter Two, most existing labour market theories have limited 
utility in that they do not sufficiently explain gender inequality in the workplace, 
let alone the impact of the life course. Having said this, however, some notions in 
particular theories were helpful. For example, although labour market 
segmentation theories largely ignore the gender and age dimensions that affect 
labour recruitment, placement and promotions, yet, it is possible to integrate 
gender and age in certain offshoots of the segmentation theories. The dual labour 
market theories identify the primary, male dominated, sectors and the secondary, 
female concentrated and less advantageous, sectors (Scott, 1991; Walby, 1988). 
Even though these do not fully account for the reasons why women and young 
people are relegated to the secondary sectors, it nevertheless, provides a broad 
framework for analysing gender and age segmentation in Amman. In addition, 
radical labour market segmentation theories explain how the co-existence of 
privileged and disadvantaged sectors serve to reduce worker solidarity and class 
consciousness which in turn keeps wages low are also relevant (see Amsden, 
1980). However, although this approach can be helpful in revealing how privilege 
develops and how barriers are constructed between the different hierarchical 
sectors of the labour market, its neglect of gender and age are less illuminating. 
Finally, one of the most obvious drawbacks of most conventional labour market 
theories, is their views of the role of the household in influencing labour supply. 
They mostly assume, for example, rather than explain gender differentiated roles 
within households which in turn give rise to different degrees of participation and 
different rewards from work in the labour market.
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Feminist approaches to female employment have taken on board these crucial 
household-labour market interconnections (see Beechey, 1987; Moore, 1988). In 
addition, empirical research illustrating the embeddedness of gender in all social 
relations at both the labour market and the family have been recently emerging 
(see Chant, 1991a, Chant and Mcllwaine, 1995; Mcllwaine, 1993; Hanson and 
Pratt, 1994). These studies reveal that gender not only affects employment 
patterns but that it is part and parcel of productive and reproductive relations in 
much wider ways (Stichter, 1990, Scott, 1994). However, despite increasing 
acknowledgment of the linkages between female employment and the household, 
these have not adequately addressed the life course. The value of the present 
study therefore lies in demonstrating that life course trajectories are critically 
important for understanding female employment. The present study reveals how 
women in a specific age cohort (20-30 years) have a different relationship to both 
the labour market and the household than women in other age cohorts. As a result 
of historical, economic and social change, age positions these young women in a 
specific context vis-a-vis their households, as unmarried and employed youth. 
Furthermore, this age cohort positions women in a specific relation with the labour 
market in terms of preferential labour demand. Nevertheless, this must not lead to 
the idea of young women as a homogeneous group, as they have different 
circumstances and/or aspirations as well as different household characteristics. 
Moreover, the age cohort of 20-30 years is large, and could be further 
desegregated to reveal difference.
The emphasis in the current study on the multiplicity of women's experiences 
accords closely with recent developments in post-modern debates. Post­
modernists search for ways social meanings are constructed and highlight the 
importance of 'difference.' They reject simplified definitions of social phenomena, 
which essentialise reality and fail to reveal the complexity of life (Parpart and 
Marchand, 1996:4). In addition, post-modern feminists recognise the 
differentiation of the category 'women.' One mode of exploring this differentiation 
has been attention to the life course, and the ways in which gender and age 
ideologies affect individual opportunities and structure collective experience (Katz 
and Monk, 1993:265; Momsen, 1993). One drawback remains that there is a 
danger of emphasising difference and fragmenting the causal factors that are often 
at the core of women's inequality (Walby: 1992:48). Indeed, in the present case 
the idea of causal power factors include employment differentiation as well as 
hierarchical household relations. Because of this, the analysis has tried to heed 
Cindi Katz's and Janice Monk's (1993:277) warning that:
219
It is important not to get lost in the kaleidoscope of diversity, or 
sunk in the mire of homogeneity if we are to understand the 
significant issues at the heart of women's geographies over the 
life course.
7.3 Differences and Similarities Across Time and Space: Suggestions for 
Future Research
In looking at changes in the labour force participation of an age cohort of women 
in a specific historical, geographical and cultural context, the study was able to 
reveal both similarities and differences in the lives of young women in Amman in 
terms of the reasons for, and impacts of, their work (see above). The drawback is 
that it did not reveal how these circumstances shape other women's experiences in 
other age cohorts. Therefore, because the current study cannot establish the 
conditions of all Jordanian women, we need further research on other age groups 
and the relations between them. By focusing upon young single women's 
experiences, we are perhaps missing other important factors influencing female 
employment, for example, the impact of the retrenchment in public sector 
employment which has traditionally been a major employer of older, usually 
married, women.
The second area is longitudinal research of households, women and employment, 
which involves the collection of life history data across an extended period of 
time. This would enable us to detect the impact, and ideally, to compare the life 
course trajectories of other groups of women (e.g. those who are not yet working 
and older women). Integral to this is the need of a follow-up study of the young 
women interviewed in the present research in order to assess their future decisions 
and roles regarding their family lives and employment status.
The third area of relevance is the need for more comparative cross-cultural data on 
young women workers. Employers' preferences for young female labour, as a 
result of globalisation and market demand for cheap labour, is well documented in 
many contexts (see Heyzer, 1986; Salaff, 1981; Standing, 1989; Wolf 1990a, 
1992). However, we know less of the impacts this has on their own and their 
families' lives, one of the main reasons being that these impacts are more difficult 
to detect and requires, the above mentioned, longitudinal research. However, by 
building a more comprehensive picture over time and by considering the 
differences and similarities between young women workers in their cultural and 
historical contexts it may be possible to assess the significance of young women's 
employment. This might enable us to better understand how women themselves
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might influence labour demand, to detect changes in family organisation, and, 
finally, to identify some common elements in the processes and results of change 
cross-culturally.
In addition to the above, we should highlight here directions of future research on 
Middle Eastern women. It is a fact that in no geographical region is the research 
on women, employment and the household as incomplete. Again, despite some 
seminal work (see Hijab, 1988; Memissi, 1975, 1991; Youssef, 1974), there are 
general tendencies to exclude Middle Eastern women from research that outlines 
changing global patterns and processes (see Chapter One). Indeed, new research is 
needed that reveals the greater complexity of the process of women's integration 
into the economy. As Haleh Afshar (1993:14) states:
If research is to be linked to the process and progress of 
development, then it must transcend the barriers. What is 
needed is more work with working women in the Middle East
On a more specific level, although this study looked at young women's 
participation at both the workplace and household levels, it did not by any means 
address every relevant issue. Among the missing, for example, is the role of the 
state which is crucial in the context of Muslim countries. Although this has 
received some attention by researchers (see Afshar, 1987a, 1987b, 1992; 
Kandiyoti, 1991; Moghadam, 1993), more is needed. This is because it is 
necessary to address how the state regards, and could manipulate, change and 
consequently whether young women will be able to sustain their gains.
Another area of research, that is beyond the scope of this study but of relevance to 
the understanding of current socio-economic change in the Middle East, is 
women's roles in history. This newly emerging area of research, historically 
establishes Arab women as economic producers and political actors and also 
questions the normality of the 'traditional Muslim family,' that is usually portrayed 
as a societal ideal and promoted at policy levels (see Keddie, 1991; Memissi, 
1991; Tucker, 1993). The importance of such research lies in the fact that it 
corrects pervasive assumptions about the static nature of gender roles in the 
Middle East, and enables us to better assess the significance of women's roles and 
how they have been able to negotiate and influence the development of family life 
in the past (Tucker, 1993:206). In addition, addressing women's employment from 
a historical perspective, although the validity of data on female workforce
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participation (including home production) is questionable, would be highly 
informative in terms of assessing the relative value accorded to women within the 
economy over time, as well as documenting shifts in what work is acceptable for 
women over time.2
7.4 Towards Equality: Policy Implications
The gap between Jordanian women and men in terms of education and 
employment seems to be in the process of closing, but equality is still a long way 
off. Given this fact, it is important to consider policies that might be adopted to 
enhance women's positions particularly in the spheres that are relevant to the 
present study. These are education policy, employment generation and the 
household arena. First, however, it is imperative to review official Jordanian 
policies towards women and their achievements to date.
Government policy and Achievements in Gender Equality
In recent years, both governmental and non-governmental organisations in Jordan, 
have increasingly addressed the issue of 'women in development.' Back in 1977, 
the first Department of Women was established in the Ministry of Labour. Among 
its duties was the monitoring of the conditions of women workers. Between the 
late seventies and until the early nineties, the Higher Steering Committee for 
Women's Affairs was established. This was supposed to devise an integrated 
approach to women's issues and programmes and to enhance their developmental 
integration. However, it remained ineffectual as it faced several impediments and 
was finally dissolved in 1991. In 1992 the National Committee for Women's 
Affairs was established. This was composed of representatives from both official 
and private organisations concerned with women's issues. One of the tasks of this 
committee was the preparation of the first national strategy for women, which was 
completed in 1993. It was also the coordinating body for Jordan's involvement in 
the United Nations Fourth Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995.3
Apart from the official/governmental level, there are basically two influential non­
governmental organisations (NGOs): the Queen Alia Fund for Social Work, which 
provides credit extension and income generation projects and training for women, 
and the Queen Noor Foundation which operates programmes for health, and social 
development.4 A third, and smaller NGO, is the Society for Professional and 
Business Women which provides legal advice for working women and business 
consultancy for enterprises owned by women.
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In light of the above, it is clear that there are government intentions to integrate 
women within the development process. The drawback, however, is that they 
remain guided by a 'welfarist' approach.5 At the NGO level, it is clear that these 
are not grassroots organisations that represent women's felt needs, but quasi- 
official NGOs which actually represent government policies towards women (with 
the exception of the Society of Professional and Business Women). In other 
words, they do not go beyond stressing the need for literacy, health and sanitary 
awareness and home production of food and handicrafts as a source of income. 
So, the disjuncture between governmental committees and semi-official NGOs and 
the findings of the current study, is that government policies are currently too 
narrow to address the needs of this emerging generation of young working women. 
Therefore, rather than fragmenting women through isolated development projects 
and special governmental committees, a broader framework which integrates the 
needs of these young women into actual government policies is needed.
Education Policies
This study has shown that education is a significant area of policy achievement as 
far as young women are concerned. Yet, impacts will be limited as long as they 
are not really accompanied by other changes at the local level, such as career 
advice for students, job creation policies or job placement centres and so on. In 
other words, higher education have not been maintained or reinforced by changes 
in other relevant arenas. In addition, distinctions should be made between the 
educational levels per se and the subjects in which young women obtain their 
educational qualifications, which tend to be concentrated in teaching, for example. 
This reveals that education itself is not enough to change women's relation to 
employment because educational systems usually reflect cultural biases and values 
of society at large. Therefore, it is unlikely that increasing education levels of 
women will cause radical change in the conservative attitudes towards appropriate 
female employment (Bourque and Warren 1990: 95).
In addition, the government, caught currently in financial strains, is using public 
expenditure on educating a youthful labour force who have a high probability of 
unemployment (of course, this could be a short-term policy measure to reduce 
unemployment rates). Higher education policies need to be redirected to dovetail 
more closely with types of occupations that seem to have higher demand in the 
labour market. This also includes widening the scope of education itself to include 
an increasing amount of vocational and entrepreneurial training, for example.
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Employment Generation
The discussion of education leads to the issue of what should be done to absorb the 
ever increasing size of the labour force many of whom are university educated and 
increasingly female? The obvious suggestion on part of policy is employment 
generation measures. Government policies can shape women's access to wage 
employment and determine to a great extent the conditions under which women 
work. Job creation can be achieved through the government providing incentives 
for private investors and reforming labour legislation so that it responds better to 
women's needs as well as to employers' (Ibrahim, 1989:1101).
In recent years, it seems that most new working opportunities, especially women's, 
has been in the industrial sector (see Chapter Three). There are three major 
problems with this expansion, however. First, this sector is highly segregated with 
the wage gap between men and women workers at its widest (see Chapter Four). 
Second, demand in this sector is for unskilled female labour while the majority of 
young female workers are highly educated. Third, although workers in the formal 
sector typically enter contractual relationships, the line between formal and 
informal employment is becoming blurred as some industrial jobs depend on 
casual labour thus allowing employers to keep wages down and avoid upholding 
legal entitlements for workers (see Chapter Four). So, what is happening is that 
women's access to wage employment may be improving but the conditions of 
women's work in many cases seems to be getting worse (see Moghadam, 1994; 
Standing, 1989).
Therefore, protective labour laws seem highly pertinent in view of the expansion 
of industrialisation. The government recognises the unequal relationship between 
workers and employers which is why there is a range of legal constraints on 
employers treatment of workers by requiring them to provide a certain minimum 
level of services and safety measures. One weakness of labour legislation, 
however, is that there is no minimum wage. The reason behind this is that it might 
reduce Jordan's competitiveness at the world market level.
The government also recognises the circumstances of women and provides further 
legislation such as protection from jobs that are seen as dangerous with regards to 
their presumed physical weakness, or that endanger pregnant women. This also 
includes a maternity leave and a mandatory creche at any workplace that hires 
more than ten mothers. Jordan had also ratified the ILO Equal remuneration 
convention which relates to the promotion of equal pay for equal work for men
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and women (Doctor and Khoury, 1991:36). Despite this, however, there is a need 
for the government to better enforce these existing measures and adopt further 
policies that could improve women's status in the labour market. Such policies 
may include better interaction between private employers and government, an 
improvement of the information available to decision makers about current trends 
and conditions of employees and perhaps a strengthening of labour organisations 
that could address women's needs (Ibrahim, 1989).6
The Family Arena
A final area for policy relates to the family. This study has demonstrated the 
extent to which gender ideologies are deeply rooted within households and how 
this is usually extended into workplace arrangements. In addition to that it has to 
be mentioned how the Jordanian state regards the family as the central form of 
moral guidance which also represents coherence within society. This functions at 
a range of ideological levels. For example, in the speeches of King Hussein of 
Jordan to the nation, he often addresses: 'our Jordanian family' as a symbol of 
national unity. Also, it has been previously stated how familial relations are used 
at the workplace and on the street with people referring to each others as uncles 
and aunts, when there is an age difference, and sisters and brothers, when there is 
age similarity. The use of the family as a social foundation is also used in state 
administration as well, with one example being a use of the 'family card' as an 
identification for citizens which assumes that every Jordanian individual is part of 
a male headed household.7
Indeed, the family is an ideological fixture in most societies, even if the normative 
family has little to do and may be at odds with people's actual situations (Moore, 
1994:3).8 Within this context the Jordanian family, in its idealized form, is facing 
a time of change and tensions because the behaviour of its individuals (primarily 
daughters) no longer corresponds with the acceptable norms of hierarchical 
relations and gender segregation. The reason behind this is not that family 
members are revolting, far from it, it is just that change have occurred in such a 
manner that these ideals are impossible to fulfill. This is mainly because social 
and economic change have created situations where the interests and needs of all 
individuals cannot be easily accommodated within the household/family.
It might be argued therefore, that an important source of change in Jordanian 
society lies in the attitudes of men who have the upper hand at the household level 
(see also Chant and Mcllwaine, 1995a:301-2 for parallel argument on the 
Philippines). In this sense, family and gender policies should not only address
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women but also men, since they need to realise and accept the new positions of 
women as income earners, and not dependent consumers. However, the extent to 
which this is possible to implement, in the case of Jordan, is questionable. This is 
because household level gender and age divisions and power structures are 
actually reinforced by state policy which promotes a male dominant family form, 
especially in the field of social benefits.
In light of the above, one starting point for changing gender ideologies may be a 
re-orientation of state policies towards the rights of individual citizens as opposed 
to whole families. If the state decreases its emphasis on the family unit, perhaps 
with time, and at a micro level, current challenges to the ideal shape of the family, 
will take root and flourish. Therefore, in terms of gender equality and in light of 
the increasing levels of female employment what is currently needed in the 
Jordanian context is a symbolic de-linking of 'family ties' which may well lead to a 
'de-gendering,' albeit gradual, of women's employment.
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Notes to Chapter Seven
1 Self differentiation can be described as taking responsibility of one's life, including making 
decisions about goals, values and life styles amidst pressures to conform to family rules 
(Stansberry etal. 1992:61). It is self differentiation that often leads to personal authority .
2 This kind of approach has been already addressed in the relevant area of education. Khattab and 
El Daeif (1984) document historical change as well as changing attitudes towards female education 
in Egypt over a 100 year span.
3 See Alami (1994) for a fuller discussion on the role of the Jordanian state in integrating gender 
policy.
4 The Queen Alia Fund was established in 1978 by a special law and Queen Noor Foundation was 
established in 1985 by a Royal decree (Alami, 1994:34)
3 The welfare policy approach is linked to the residual model of social welfare (i.e. top-down 
approach) and is non-challenging to gender norms. According to Caroline Moser (1993:61-2) it is 
based on three assumptions: (1) women are passive recipients rather than active participants in the 
development process (2) motherhood is the most important role for women in society and (3) 
childrearing is their most effective role in the different aspects of development.
6 It has to be noted however that labour organisations in Jordan are relatively weak and do not 
constitute a major political force. In addition to that most labour unions have a predominantly male 
membership.
7 This card is essential for varying official procedures such as elections, obtaining passports, 
driving licenses and state benefits (such as food subsidies for the poor) and is discriminatory by 
nature. For example, women abandoned by their husbands cannot obtain food subsidies or money 
stipends as the card holder (head of household) is the only one who can claim such benefits. 
Another example is that women need the approval and often the presence of male heads on their 
family cards in order to obtain a passport.
8 Moore (1994:3) goes on to explain how in the United Kingdom, the ideology if the nuclear family 
is still very powerful, even of the number of individuals resident in such households represents only 
one quarter of the population.
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APPENDIX ONE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
One of the main aims of this dissertation is to explore both the causes and 
consequences of the increasing labour force participation of young women. In 
methodological terms this involves a strategy of multiple research techniques 
including both quantitative and qualitative levels. It also involves different 
domains of research: the workplace and the household. Since Chapters One, Four 
and Five have already elaborated on the field surveys in terms of sample selection, 
size and so on, and since there are other aspects of the field research not mentioned 
previously, the following matrix provides a synthesis of the different levels of field 
research, as well as the relations between them.
Research Methods Matrix
Macro level
Micro level
Other
(1) Analysis of national Survey (1991 Employment, 
Unemployment and Poverty survey) as well as 
surveys/censuses of earlier years.
sub-sample
(2) Quantitative household survey (N = 302)
sub-sample
(3) Qualitative household interviews (N = 40)
(4) Employer Survey of private sector firms (N = 36)
(5) Interviews with staff at Ministry of Planning and 
Labour
(6) Interviews with staff at Amman Chamber of 
Commerce and Chamber of Industry
(7) Interviews with staff in community development 
centres (e.g. Hai Nazzal, Urban Development 
Department's Wihadat Centre)
(8) Visits and observations of NGO projects (e.g. Care 
International youth training project in Zarqa)
The advantages of choosing a mix of research techniques, however, is because 
both levels of research are mutually reinforcing when used in conjunction of one 
another. Quantitative techniques (such as representative sampling and descriptive
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data), provide researchers with significant and important indicators especially with 
trends overtime. This is deemed especially important in the case of young 
Jordanian women who were not the focus of any previous research. Qualitative 
techniques (such as intensive interviewing) are necessary since they document 
non-quantifiable aspects of women's lives especially the power relations that often 
control their lives. This allows more room for women's 'voices' (i.e. their own 
interpretation of gender relations) (Lawson, 1995:450-51; see also Nicholson, 
1990). Yet, there are also problems in both of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques. For example, qualitative techniques run the risk of fragmenting 
women's lives through localised examples that do not necessarily explain 
processes or practices (Meis, 1990). In addition, these techniques do not 
necessarily get us nearer to the 'truth' since this is usually 'constructed' by the 
researcher (Chant, 1997: Chapter One). Quantitative techniques on the other hand, 
remain descriptive and homogenise women's experiences (Lawson 1995; Meis, 
1990). However, despite these shortcomings and polar differences, the current 
research is guided by Victoria Lawson's (1995) statement that the statistical 
measurement of social life in particular case studies that are able to outline the 
multi-faceted cultural webs that control women's lives coupled with qualitative 
material is indeed possible and can be insightful.
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APPENDIX TWO 
HOUSEHOLD SURVEY AND SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
Access to Information and Family Organisation
The household questionnaire survey was conducted by myself and research 
assistants while the in-depth interviews were mostly by myself. These interviews 
took place in the afternoons, early evenings and sometimes during weekends, since 
we wanted to find working women at home. This meant, however, that other adult 
members were home as well. Although gender segregation was a theme 
throughout this thesis, most households we interviewed were not segregated once 
inside. This meant that our access to the young women had to be mediated 
through this. Ideally, I had wanted to interview young women alone during the 
quantitative part of the survey. In the qualitative interviews the presence of other 
family members was important but I also wanted the young women alone in order 
to discuss personal issues that they might not discuss in the presence of other 
family members. The end result was that we never controlled the situation and 
had to be pragmatic. In some households, as soon as we came in and explained the 
research topic the fathers would take their leave from the room. Brothers, 
especially in middle class families, were more curious and would stay in the room. 
They thought that the research which looked at young adults concerned them as 
well. However, as soon as we got to more personal questions some would politely 
leave. Mothers sat in on the interviews most of all. This was not curiosity or 
interference in their daughters' answers as much as a sense of duty to us as guests, 
since some saw it rude to get up and leave the room.
Who eventually sat during the interviews, or whether other household members 
were within listening distance, was largely mediated by existing 
relations/circumstances within each household. Sometimes I felt that as soon as I 
entered a house and made my interest in the daughter clear this gave some young 
women a sense of pride vis-a-vis other household members. Since parents and 
society at large see this life course stage as transitory, and indeed problematic, the 
fact that young women were the focus of the study was an inadvertent tribute to 
them. In this sense I was sometimes whisked away by some young women who 
would use my presence to drive away all other family members who were curious 
to talk to me and have my undivided attention. Such women would take me to the 
rooftop or to the furthermost comer of the courtyard or garden and would 
aggressively shout at any younger sibling who came close. These women thought 
I wanted to solely talk about mujabin (admirers) or marriage suitors. However, it
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has to be noted that this does not mean that they were totally candid, for they were 
not likely to report to me on behviour and/or action that would be considered 
socially/morally unacceptable. However, I sometimes sensed that they were trying 
to safely convey situations that would not incriminate them and, as a result there 
were often contradictory statements and I knew I was receiving one 'half of the 
truth.
At other times however, I felt that my presence could actually reiterate existing 
forms of mistreatment within families. In one household four aggressive looking 
brothers did not take well to the fact that I wanted to talk to their sister and not to 
them. 'You want to talk to her? What for? She's illiterate.' At my insistence, a shy 
young woman was dragged from her room amidst jokes and bickering and literally 
pushed to the floor next to my feet. I had actually become an agent for her abuse 
by her brothers who were adamant on proving that she 'knew nothing.' I did not 
continue with the interview and took my leave but this was not without a sense of 
helplessness and guilt.
Rarely did young women refuse to be interviewed. In the few cases that they did I 
felt it was a form of resistance against their parents, especially fathers. In a couple 
of cases where fathers were very welcoming they kept calling out for their 
daughters to come in but who never did. This was a statement that symbolised a 
challenge to the authority of the father, in order to embarrass him in front of me, a 
subject discussed in Chapter Six.
Analysis of Quantitative Data
The household questionnaires which were mostly coded prior to the survey were 
entered onto a data base designed by myself, with some professional help, after the 
survey was conducted. This is because there were several open-ended questions in 
the questionnaire and we had to finish the survey in order for such questions to be 
grouped according to frequency of answers and thereafter coded. During this 
process it transpired that there were quite a few 'missing values' in the 
questionnaires. For this in some cases I had to revisit households in order to 
complete the missing information, but in others incomplete questionnaires were 
dropped from the sample. Frequencies, cross-tabulations, and means were used on 
the data with the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Further statistical 
tests (e.g. correlation and multiple regression) were also attempted but revealed 
either to be statistically insignificant or not more revealing than basic cross- 
tabulations (see footnotes 21,22, and 28 in Chapter Five).
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Analysis of Qualitative Data
These interviews were conducted after the quantitative survey and the inputing of 
coded responses onto computer forms (approximately two months separated both 
levels of research). These interviews would largely follow topics of discussion 
and could take up to two hours and in some cases more than one visit. However, I 
found early on that taping or taking detailed notes during the interviews made the 
young women and their families uncomfortable and self conscious about their 
responses. Therefore, I used to take the quantitative, previously filled, 
questionnaire to the specific household I was revisiting, where also the young 
woman would have the liberty to look at her previous answers, and only write 
highlights on the margins and sometimes write down a quote (after asking the 
young woman's permission), but generally relying on mental notes and 
observations throughout the interview. This meant that immediately after each 
interview, I transcribed everything in full on paper. Most of the material of the 
semi-structured data was used as illustrative case study material and therefore 
integrated into the analysis more or less as reported from the respondent.
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Household Questionnaire 
(translation from Arabic)
(All questions addressed to women working, seeking employment or inactive 
between the ages of 20- 30 years unmarried and living in Amman)
NEIGHBOURHOOD................................
FAMILY NUMBER..................................
NUMBER OF RESIDENTS IN FAMILY.
DATE OF INTERVIEW...........................
INTERVIEW CONDUCTED BY.............
RESPONDENT’S NAME.........................
ADDRESS.................................................
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Section One: Data on Family
A. General Family Information
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Serial
no.
Name Relation to 
head of 
household
Sex Age Level of 
education
Marital
status
Relation to 
labour force
1. husband/wife
2. son/daughter
3. mother/father
4.grandchildren
5. sister/brother
6. grandparents
7. other
1. male
2. female
1. illiterate
2 .read/ 
write
3. primary
4. preparat.
5. technical
6. second.
7. diploma
8.higher ed.
1. single
2. married
3. divorced
4. widowed
1. work in gov.
2. private sector
3.NGO
4.unemp/seek
5.unemp/not s.
6. retired/seek
7. retired/not s.
8. older/n. work
9. own income
10. housewife
11. do not wish
12. student
13. other
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 
11 
12
13
14
15
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B. Working Members
8 9 10 11
Serial
no.
Main econ. activity Main occupation Employment status Monthly income 
from main occup.
1. agriculture
2. mining
3. elect water
4. construction
5. transport comm.
6.finance, insurance
7. community ser. 
and gov.
1. technical and prof.
2. administration
3. clerical
4. sales
5. agriculture
6. production
1. employee
2. employer
3. self emp.
4.unpaid family worker
5. unpaid/ trainee
6. other
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
J_5
C. Unemployed Members
12
Prev. econ. activity
13
Previous occupation
14
Prev. emp. status
1. agriculture
2. mining
3. elect, water
4. construction
5. transport, com.
6. finance, insurance
7. community ser. and 
gov._______________
1. technical and prof.
2. administration
3. clerical
4. sales
5. agriculture
6. production
1. employee
2. employer
3. self emp.
4.unpaid family worker
5. unpaid/ trainee
6. other
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Section Two: Data on Single Women
A. Single Women Currently Working
15. If previously employed, how many jobs have you had?
16. What was the main reason for leaving previous job?
1. work place was not segregated by sex (prefer single sex environment)
2. objection of family
3. termination of project
4. location of work place too far from residence
5. wages too low
6. long working hours
7. other, specify
8. not applicable
17. Give two reasons for your main desire to work
1. because I am the main income earner in the family
2. head of household is unemployed
3. to increase family income First Reason:
4. to support myself
5. it was my parents decision that I work Second Reason:
6. in order to benefit from my education and put it to use
7. in order to fill free time
8. in order to improve/increase social status
9. for personal fulfillment and building self esteem and confidence
10. in order to be financially independent
11. in order to make friends and have a social life
12. other. Specify
18. Give date of starting current job (in months):
19. Give hours of work (weekly):
20. How did you obtain current job?
1. through family
2. through friends
3. on my own
4. other. Specify
21. Are there any drawbacks/problems in your current work?
1. job below educational qualifications
2. pay not satisfactory
3. work is too boring
4. ill treatment by the superiors and employers
5. sexual harassment
6. job too tough and tiring
7. discrimination in relation to men (go to q.22)
8. no drawbacks or problems
9. other. Specify
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22. (if 21=7) What kind of discrimination do you face?
1. in training opportunities
2. in incentives given to women
3. in promotions
4. in pay
5. other. Specify
23. Are you happy/content in your current job?
1. yes
2. no
24. Are you looking for better work opportunities or different working 
conditions?
1. part time
2. productive work at home
3. single sex work environment
4. within neighbourhood
5. not looking for different conditions
6. other. Specify
25. How do you mainly spend your income?
1. contributing to household income
2. personal expenditure
3. saving
4. saving and personal expenditure
5. other. Specify
26. How much do you contribute to household income?
1. all income
2. half
3. less than half
4. inconsistent (varies from one month to the next)
5. rarely
6. no contribution at all
27. How is this contribution to family income spent?
1. on rent and amenities
2. siblings education
3. food
4. clothes
5. differs according to need
6. other, specify
28. Do you take part in any family decisions especially those affecting you 
most?
1. yes
2. No
29. If yes, what are the personal and family decisions that you make on your 
own?
1. finding work
2. leaving/changing work
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3. accepting/ refusing marriage suitors
4. siblings education
5. siblings marriage
6. Selling and buying of family or personal assets
7. changing place of residence
8. elections
9. most of the above
10. other, specify
30. Can you go to the following places on your own? 
(I cannot =1,1 can with others =2,1 can alone =3)
a. market
b. doctor
c. visit friends
d. relatives in town
e. relatives outside town
f. travel
31. What do you wear in public?
1. head scarf and long dress (jilbab)
2. head scarf and modem clothes
3. modem clothing
32. Do you perform any domestic work?
1. daily
2. sometimes
3. non
B. Unemployed Single Women
33. If previously employed, how many jobs have you had?
34. What are the main reasons preventing you from working?
1. lack of job opportunities
2. wages are too low
3. termination of project (cases of short term employment or bankruptcy)
4. laid- off
5. parents' objection
6. most work places are mixed (prefers to be in a single sex environment)
7. most work places are too far
8. Working hours too long
9. other. Specify
35. How much did you earn in your previous job?
36. How long have you been unemployed (in months)?
37. What were the average weekly hours in your last job?
First:
Second:
Third:
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38. Give two reasons for your main desire to work?
1. because I am the main income earner in the family
2. head of household is unemployed
3. to increase family income First Reason:
4. to support myself
5. it was my parents decision that I work Second Reason:
6. in order to benefit from my education and put it to use
7. in order to fill free time
8. in order to improve social status
9. for personal fulfillment and building self esteem and confidence
10. in order to be independent financially independent
11. in order to make friends and have a social life
12. other. Specify
39. Are there specific jobs that you would refuse to do?
1. yes
2. no (go to 41)
40. If yes, which kind of jobs?
1. clerical jobs
2. factory work
3. sales
4. services
5. other
41. Do you take part in any family decisions especially those affecting you 
most?
1. yes
2. no
42. If yes, what are the personal and family decisions that you make on your 
own?
1. finding work
2. leaving/changing work
3. accepting/ refusing marriage suitors
4. siblings education First:
5. siblings marriage Second:
6. selling and buying of family or personal assets Third:
7. changing place of residence
8. elections
9. most of the above
10. other, specify
4 3 . Can you go to the following places on your own:
(I cannot =1,1 can with others =2,1 can alone =3)
a. market
b. doctor
c. visit friends
d. relatives in town
e. relatives outside town
f. travel
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44. What do you wear in public?
1. head scarf and long dress (jilbab)
2. head scarf and modem clothes
3. modem clothing
45. How often do you do housework?
1. daily
2. sometimes
3. non
C. Economically Inactive Single Women
46. State the reasons for not working
1. no financial need
2. family's objection to work
3. too much household responsibilities
4. employment does not suit women's roles
5. educational qualification too low for satisfactory employment
6. other. Specify
47. How do you spend your time
1. domestic chores and caring for siblings
2. Various courses (sewing, language....)
3. social activities
4. Productive work at home for domestic consumption
5. other, specify
48. Do you take part in any family decisions especially those affecting you 
most?
1. yes
2. no
49. If yes, what are the personal and family decisions that you make on our 
own?
1. finding Work
2. leaving/changing work
3. accepting/ refusing marriage suitors
4. siblings education First:
5. siblings marriage Second:
6. Selling and buying of family or personal assets Third:
7. changing place of residence
8. elections
9. most of the above
10. other, specify
50. Can you go to the following places on your own?
(I cannot =1,1 can with others =2,1 can alone =3)
a. market
b. doctor
c. visit friends
d. relatives in town
e. relatives outside town
f. travel
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51. What do you wear in public?
1. head scarf and long dress (jilbab)
2. head scarf and modem clothes
3. modem clothing
52. How often do you do housework?
1. Daily
2. sometimes
3. non
Sestion Three: Attitudes and Future Directions of Young Women (addresed to
all women regardless of work status)
A. Female Education
53. In your opinion, is higher education for females necessary?
1. yes
2. no
54. If yes, why?
1. it is essential in this day and age
2. it is important for self confidence and personal development
3. in order to find job opportunities
4. in order to be an active member in society
5. in order to be a better mother
6. to achieve higher social status
7. to marry an educated man
8. other. Specify
55. In your opinion, are there specialisations, after basic schooling, that are 
more suitable for women?
1. yes
2. no (go to 57)
56. If yes, what are they?
1. teaching professions
2. crafts and artisan work ( embroidery, weaving etc.)
3. medical professions
4. technical work ( e.g. engineering)
5. clerical and administrative
6. Sales
7. services
57. If a young woman is in the midst of her education and a suitor proposed 
on condition that she leaves her education. In your opinion should she:
1. marry him
2. reject him
3. other. Specify
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B. Female Employment
58. Do you think it appropriate for women to work after marriage?
1. yes
2. no
3. other, specify
59. Do you think it appropriate for women to work after having children?
1. yes
2. no
3. other, specify
60. In your opinion, when a woman works does she have more say in 
household matters and decision making?
1. yes
2. no
3. no difference
C. Marriage. Family and Future Directions
61. In your opinion, what is the appropriate age at marriage for women?
1. 15-19 years
2. 20-24 years 
3.25-29 years
4. 30-34 years
5. 35 or more years
62. In your opinion what is the ideal family size?
1.1-2 children
2. 3-4 children
3. 5-6 children 
4 .7  or more
63. How do you see yourself in the future?
1. mother and housewife
2. working women
3. mother and working women
64. If you have a daughter would you:
1. encourage her to go to university
2. encourage her to work
3. encourage both university and work
4. discourage her from work
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Section Four: Family Income, Household Expenditure and Living Conditions
65. Do you own your residence or is it rented?
1. own
2. rented
3. rented with furniture
4. other
66. If rented, what is the annual value of rent
66. What is the average monthly expenditure in your household?
68. What is the average annual income?
69. Who is in charge of family budget?
1. father
2. mother
3. both parents
4. respondent herself
5. respondent and siblings
6. shared between all household members.
70. Who buys the groceries on daily basis?
1. father
2. mother
3. both parent
4. respondent
5. siblings
6. respondent and siblings
7. shared between all household members
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Semi Structured Interviews Guideline
- Work history personal and for adult family members
- Details on current job
- The formation of current household structure and previous living arrangements
- Family relations. Current conflicts/negotiations etc.
- Detail on family income and expenditure
- Dress and the issue of veiling
- Social life including frequency of social outings independent of family occasions
- Views on marriage, marital relations and other social values
- Housework and other responsibilities (of respondent only)
- Political participation/Voting (These interviews were conducted directly after the 
1992 parliamentary elections and where the first woman parliamentarian was 
elected).
-Future hopes and ambitions
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APPENDIX THREE 
EMPLOYER QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
Access to Information and Private Sector Employees
The employer survey interviews were all conducted by myself through pre­
arranged appointments with either the employers themselves or personnel 
managers. In making the appointment I usually explained the research objectives 
but emphasised my interest in youth employment rather then young women. This 
was a means to avoid employers' preconceived ideas, and therefore, withholding 
information on gender inequality. Nevertheless, obtaining information from 
employers was not always a straight-forward matter.
There were three problematic areas in access to information that somehow 
influenced the data obtained. The first, related to employers withholding 
information on the pretext of confidentiality. This was mainly a problem with 
larger employers and included information on working capital, size of output, 
marketing strategies and so on. I felt that there were fears that I would extract 
information to replicate their operations as a competitor. In order to gain their 
trust I never persisted and therefore have incomplete information on such matters. 
The second problem related to my insistence in obtaining gender desegregated 
data about wages, turnover rates, duration of employment, and so on. Here, I 
sensed that many employers became defensive and proceeded to prove the extent 
to which they operated equal employment strategies. In such cases I felt the 
information I had was not completely sincere. However, other defensive 
employers in explaining why there are gender disparities inadvertently ended up 
revealing a great amount of information on gender stereotyping and the resulting 
segregation. The third main problem was that many employers, although 
voluntarily conceding to the interview, were either too busy, or actually lacked the 
detailed information that I required, especially on employee numbers, wages, 
turnover rates and so on. Larger employers, in particular, would refer me to 
personnel departments for such information but others claimed that instead of 
wasting their and/or their staffs time, can provide me with quick 'estimations.' In 
a few cases, I had to accept this.
Analysis of Data
After completing the survey the questionnaire was mostly coded (except for the 
open ended questions in section 8) and entered into a data base that was designed 
by myself, with some professional help, with the intention of analysing the data on
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SPSS. However, after one run of all frequencies and a few cross-tabulations it 
appeared that the sample was too small for more sophisticated analysis and even 
some data could be extracted manually. Analysing some of the data directly from 
the questionnaires, rather than from a computer statistical package, actually proved 
to be important since during the interviews I wrote a lot of observations and direct 
quotes on the margins. It is these observations that guided the direction of the 
analysis.
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Employer Questionnaire
(translation from Arabic)
Date of Interview.......................................................... .......................
Employer Questionnaire Number.........................................................
Name of Establishment.........................................................................
Name and Position of Respondent........................................................
Section One: General Information
1.1 Year of establishment..........................................................................
1.2 Establishment's main activity..............................................................
1.3 Are the owners nationals or foreign?...................................................
1.4 What is the approximate working capital?...........................................
1.5 Are products exported? (for industrial firms).......................................
1.6 Are materials imported? (for industrial firms).....................................
Section Two: Structure of the Labour Force
2.1 What is the number of employees currently working in the firm?
Total No. of males  Total No. of females...................
2.2 List Departments and Sections within the firm, number of male and female 
employees within each section according to occupational and age groups.
Department Number of employees Occupational group Age group
Male Female
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2.3 How many women are employed in managerial and supervisory positions?
Section Three: Recruitment Policies and Practices
3.1 In general, what entry requirements does the establishment demand of male 
applicants?
a. age........................................
b. marital status........................
c. education..............................
d. work experience...............................................................................
e. references from previous employers.................................................
f. other characteristics...........................................................................
3.2 In general, what entry requirements does the establishment demand of female 
applicants?
a. age.........................................
b. marital status........................
c. education.................. ...........
d. work experience................................................................................
e. references from previous employers................................. .................
f. other characteristics...........................................................................
3.3 If entry requirements differ for male and female applicants explain
reasons.......................................................................................................................
3.4. If females are preferred for certain jobs identify which jobs and 
why?...................................................................................................
Section Four: Labour Conditions and Turnover Rates
4.1 What type of contracts do the majority of employees have? How many are 
permanent and how many are temporary?
for males.................................................................................................
for females..............................................................................................
4.2 Does the establishment operate a trial period system for workers?
Yes No
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4.3 If yes, why, for how long and what conditions must be fulfilled.
Reasons..............................................................................................
Time period........................................................................................
Conditions..........................................................................................
4.4 For the bulk of the labour force, what is the average duration of employment? 
for males............................................
for females.........................................
4.5 How many employees have been recruited during the past 12 months in the 
following occupations?
Occupation group Males Females Age group
Professional and technical
Administrative
Clerical
Sales
Services
Production
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
4.6 How many employees have left in the past 12 months in the following 
occupations and why (e.g. layoffs or voluntary departure)
Occupation group Males Females Age group Reasons
Professional and tech.
Administrative
Clerical
Sales
Services
Production:
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
Section Five: Training and Promotions
5.1 Does the establishment operate on-the-job training for employees? 
Yes No
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5.2 If yes, list type conducted in the past 12 months and for whom (i.e. 
occupation group, sex, age)?
5.3 How many employees have been promoted in the past 12 months and in which 
occupations?
Occupation group No. of Males No. of Females
Professional and technical
Administrative
Clerical
Sales
Services
Production:
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
5.4 Who makes decisions on promotions and on what criteria?
Section Six: Wages and Salaries
6.1 List the average wages of male and female employees in the following 
occupations
Occupation Males Females
Professional and technical
Administrative
Clerical
Sales
Services
production:
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
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6.2 If there are any differences between male and female employees in similar 
positions? Explain reasons.
Section Seven: Employer Attitudes
7.1 How do you evaluate female performance compared to that of males?
Males better Females better No difference
Productivity
Punctuality
duration in employment 
Adherence to rules 
Accuracy
willingness to take orders 
Other. Specify
7.2 In your opinion, are there specific factors related to your establishment that 
restrict you from employing women?
Yes No
7.3 If yes, could you explain why?
1. Lack of appropriate training and education
2. Lack of appropriate experience
3. Location of work too far
4. Hours of work too long
5. Job too strenuous (not suitable for women)
6. Required skills are Culturally inappropriate for women
7. Women do no stay long enough ( because of marriage and children)
8. Other
7.4 In terms of female employees, do you think there are differences between 
young and single women compared with older married women?
Yes No
7.5 If yes, explain why.......................................................................................
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Section 8: General Comments
8.1 Do you currently face any problems regarding the employees in your firm? 
(e.g. high turn-over rates, lack of qualified labour) ?
8.2 Do you foresee an increase in youth employment in your 
establishment...........................................................................
8.3 Do you foresee an increase in female employment in your establishment in 
future?
8.4 What is your general impression of young working women in your 
establishment?
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